People vs. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143,August 31, 1988

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event.

The facts are not disputed:

This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:

That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.

Contrary to law.

For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;

MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon —

In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes and the catching of fish.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I worked with the accused up to March 1964.

NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon —

I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.

On re-direct examination, this witness declared:

I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.

On re-cross examination, this witness declared:

I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.

RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married —

As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.

On question of the court, this witness declared:

What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.

The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial.

For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows:

I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.

The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court.

From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.

On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected.

Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.

There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.

There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. ¹

The trial Court ² returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.

SO ORDERED. ³

In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. ⁴

The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. ⁵

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. ⁶

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964. ⁷

The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." ⁸ The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." ⁹ Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964." ¹⁰

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." ¹¹ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, ¹² the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." ¹³ Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " ¹⁴

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" ¹⁵ act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.

It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, ¹⁶ a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.

It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, ¹⁷ a divided Court sustained an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" ¹⁸ limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity" ¹⁹ that would supply the standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest." ²⁰ In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." ²¹ "As worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political parties." ²² He was unimpressed with the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." ²³

The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, ²⁴ insofar as the statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend the Constitution." ²⁵ In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.

In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " ²⁶ doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" ²⁷ open to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, ²⁸ legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. ²⁹ In that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.

It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic rights, ³⁰ or as in the Levy case, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is presumed.

In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. ³¹ While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, ³² the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.

We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue measures ³³ designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.

Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." ³⁴ Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," ³⁵ is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," ³⁶ does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.

As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.

To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.

The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." ³⁷

The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. ³⁸ Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. ³⁹ Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." ⁴⁰ In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan ⁴¹ we held that local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" ⁴²). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. ⁴³ By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large wood." ⁴⁴ (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, ⁴⁵ but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. ⁴⁶ They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 7-13.

2 Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 11, Hon. Manolo Madella, Presiding Judge.

3 Rollo, Id., 14.

4 Brief of Appellant, 1-2.

5 Mun. Ord. No. 4 (1955), Id., 3.

6 Mun. Ord. No. 15 (1965), Id., 4.

7 Mun. Ord. No. 12 (1966), Id.

8 Id., 6.

9 Id., 4.

10 Id.

11 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978), citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).

12 402 U.S. 611 (1971); see TRIBE, Id., 720-721.

13 See TRIBE, Id.

14 Id., 721.

15 Id., 720.

16 417 U.S. 733 (1974); see TRIBE, Id., 721.

17 No. L-27833, April 8, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, per Fernando, J.

18 Supra, 850.

19 Supra, 867.

20 Supra, 868.

21 Supra, 884; Sanchez, J., concurring and dissenting.

22 Supra.

23 Supra, 885.

24 Supra; see Castro, J., Separate Opinion, 888-913.

25 Supra, 902.

26 TRIBE, Id., 722.

27 Id.; see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

28 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

29 See TRIBE, Id., 723.

30 Id., 721.

31 Brief for the Appellee, 5.

32 It was the then Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who signed the lease contract.

33 Rollo, Id., 13.

34 Brief of Appellant, Id., 8.

35 Id., 4.

36 Id.

37 Id., 10.

38 Brief for the Appellee, Id., 8.

39 MARTIN, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 31-32 (1984).

40 Brief of Appellant, Id., 11 -12.

41 No. L-18535, December 24, 1964,12 SCRA 611.

42 Brief of Appellant, Id., 3.

43 Santiago v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 593 (1909).

44 Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).

45 Supra.

46 See Northern Philippines Tobacco Corporation v. Municipality of Agoo, La Union, No. L-26447, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 304.

People vs. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, January 29, 1988

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75268 January 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTEBAN MELGAR Y CORNEL and GERARDO LANGUISAN, accused- appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal brought by the accused Gerardo Languisan who, together with Esteban Melgar y Cornel, was charged before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) Rizal, Quezon City, Branch 31 with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of October, 1976, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery, and with evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab with a bladed instrument one Jaime Duque y Palada, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provision of the Civil Code. (Original Record, p. 1)

On December 20, 1976, Esteban Melgar was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Gerardo Languisan alias "Jerry" remained at large so that trial proceeded against Esteban Melgar only.

On July 9,1979, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting Esteban Melgar for failure on the part of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On September 11, 1980, or four years after the incident, Gerardo Languisan was arrested. Upon arraignment on November 6, 1980, he pleaded not guilty.

The trial court, after evaluating the evidence presented, rendered its decision on December 9, 1981 finding accused Languisan guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused GERARDO LANGUISAN alias "JERRY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder charged in the information and as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in accordance therewith, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the Heirs of Jaime Duque the amounts of P12,000.00, as compensatory damages P15,000.00, in moral damages; and P3,100-00 in medical and funeral expenses, and to pay the costs.

The accused being detained and considering the practice in the Quezon City Jail for all detention prisoners to agree in writing that they be governed by the same rules concerning convicted prisoners, he is hereby credited with the full extent of the period under which he was under detention.

Let a copy of this decision be served to the Heirs of Jaime Duque.

SO ORDERED. (Original Records, p. 279).

The prosecution's evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is summaries as follows:

At about 7:00 P.M. of October 20,1976, Angelito Mata who have (sic) been driving a passenger jeepney with the route Farmers Market Libis and vice-versa, was then at the back of Farmers Market, Cubao, Quezon City, falling in line with other passenger jeepneys for his turn to get passengers for Libis, Murphy, Quezon City. With Angelito Mata at that time in his passenger jeepney were Lorenzo Ramos and the victim, Jaime Duque, who were seated at the front seat, with the victim between Angelito Mata and Lorenzo Ramos. Esteban Melgar and accused Gerardo Languisan were also at the place, serving as starters for the jeepney passengers, seeing to it that the passenger jeepneys fall in line and get their passengers only as their turn comes in the line-up, for which they get a fee of P0.25 per passenger jeepney they served. Since it was already dark, Angelito Mata decided to go home. For this purpose, he maneuvered his passenger jeepney out of the line. But he was blocked by another passenger jeepney. As a result, some passengers took the passenger jeepney of Angelito Mata which angered Esteban Melgar and which resulted into an argument with the victim, Jaime Duque, who was asked by Esteban Melgar why he inserted at (sic) the line-up his passenger jeepney to which the victim retorted that it was none of his business as they were already going home, leading Esteban Melgar to tell the victim: "Baka hindi mo ako kilala dito, kaya kita sabayan." Thereafter, Esteban Melgar approached accused Gerardo Languisan and talked with him. After their talk, accused Gerardo Languisan boarded the passenger jeepney of Angelito Mata and seated himself at the center of the right back seat behind the victim, Jaime Duque, who was seated between Angelito Mata and Lorenzo Ramos at the front seat. At this, the passenger jeepney of Angelito Mata proceeded to Libis, which was the end of its route. At Libis, when Mata's passenger jeepney stopped, accused Languisan was the last to alight. But before he did, Angelito Mata, thru his rear-view mirror saw him stabbed (sic) the victim with a double-bladed knife in his right hand at the back of the victim's neck, left side, and then when Angelito Mata turned his head to look, accused Gerardo Languisan alighted from the passenger jeepney and ran away towards a dark place. The victim attempted to pursue accused Gerardo Languisan by going across the back seat. But there the victim slumped at the right seat as he became weak. Then, the victim was brought to the Quirino Memorial Hospital at Quezon City where he died the next day, October 21,1976, of cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of the stab wound to the nape (Exh. D-3), per his Certificate of Death issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City (Exh- D). The cadaver of the victim was autopsied by Capt. Desiderio A. Moraleda, Chief, Medico-Legal Branch, PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, on October 21, 1976 at the PCCL Morgue, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and he found in his Medico-Legal Necropsy Report dated October 27, 1976, the following Postmortem findings:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae lips and nailbeds are pale. There is a tracheostomy opening at the anterior aspect of the neck, measuring 1.2 cm. long with 2 stitches applied and a surgical incision at the left hypochondriac region, measuring 3 by 1 cm., 12 cm. from the anterior midline.

NAPE:

Stab wound, nape, measuring 4 by 0.5 cm., 5 cm. left of the posterior midline, 7.5 cm. deep, directed anteriorwards, downwards and to the right, cutting the muscles and major blood vessels of the neck.

REMARKS:

Cause of the death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to the shock and hemorrhage as a result of a stab wound of the nape. (Exh. A)

Capt. Moraleda also caused the taking of the picture of the victim (Exh. B), showing the wound at the back of the nape, left side (Exh. B-1), as well as, a sketch of the human body (Exh. C), showing the said wound (Exh. C-1). For the death of his son, Juan Duque spent Pl,000.00 for medicine and P2,100.00 for funeral expenses.

In his defense, accused Gerardo Languisan asserts that he had nothing to do with the killing of the victim, Jaime Duque. For, according to him, at about 7:00 P.M. on October 20, 1976, he was at the Farmers Market, Cubao, Quezon City, at the passenger jeepney's starting point calling for passengers, as a starter of passenger jeepneys, for Libis at Murphy, Quezon City, at which place he had been since 5:00 P.M. until 9:00 P.M. when he left Farmers Market and went home to Libis. (Original Records, pp. 274- 275).

Accused-appellant Languisan now raises the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANT LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF JAIME DUQUE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE IdENTIFYING HIM AS THE ASSAILANT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN POINTING TO THE APPELLANT AS THE ASSAILANT OF THE VICTIM DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF MOTIVE (AND WHICH THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE) ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO KILL THE VICTIM BECAUSE:

A. THE APPELLANT AND THE VICTIM HAVE NEVER KNOWN NOR MET EACH OTHER;

B. THE APPELLANT AND THE VICTIM HAD NO CONFRONTATION, GRUDGE, OR ALTERCATION, EITHER IN THE PAST OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE STABBING INCIDENT,

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE SPECULATIVE AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT

VI

EVEN ON THE GRATUITOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE STABBING TOOK PLACE, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE VICTIM WAS COMPLETELY UNAWARE WHEN ATTACKED (Brief for the Appellant, pp. 7-8, Rollo, p. 55)

The first assignment of error stresses the alleged absence of evidence positively Identifying Languisan as the assailant on the ground that the description by the prosecution witness, Angelito Mata, was erroneous. According to the defense, the person whom the witness Identified was another person, the name of the assailant having been given by the witness as "Willie" and not Gerry. The same was sufficiently explained by the prosecution — that Mata knew Gerry Languisan as Willie and the Willie as mentioned in his statement is the accused Languisan (TSN, pp. 5-6, August 31, 1981). There can be no question about the Identity of Languisan because Mata pointed to him in open court. He was not Identified because of his name but he was pointed to and singled out upon the instructions of the court to finger the accused-appellant if he was in the courtroom.

This Court, in a number of cases, held that minor inconsistencies do not destroy the credibility of the witness. An inconsistency may even prove that the witness is unrehearsed. (People v. Dava, 149 SCRA 582; People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500; People v. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178; People v. De las Piñas 141 SCRA 379).

The Identity of the assailant is further established by the fact that Mata saw the appellant stab the victim (TSN, p. 4, June 4, 1977). There is nothing in the records that would show that Angelito Mata had any bias or prejudice against Languisan. The fact that there were no earlier differences between them was admitted by the accused himself (TSN, pp. 6 and 13, October 20, 1981). There being no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, his testimony should be given full faith and credit. (People v. Alcantara, 126 SCRA 425, 436).

Furthermore, between the positive declaration of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence (ibid., People v. Paseo, Jr., 137 SCRA 137; People v. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702).

As to the second assignment of error regarding the absence of motive to kill, proof of motive is not essential in the face of the positive Identification by the witness (People v. Anquillano, 149 SCRA 442; People v. Ramilo, 147 SCRA 102; People v. Manalo, 135 SCRA 84). Such proof is necessary only when there are no eyewitnesses and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons.

Possible motive, however, is not wanting. Languisan was a barker or starter for jeepneys lining up for passengers behind the Farmers' Market. Starters take charge of seeing to it that jeepneys fag in line according to the arranged schedule. When Mata went ahead of the other drivers patiently waiting for their turn, it became a matter of honor for the appellant because his usefulness or his authority was challenged. There was a threat to harm or kill the victim as shown by the altercation between the co-accused Melgar and Duque. The threat was carried out when Melgar approached Languisan. After the two talked to each other, Languisan boarded the jeepney of Mata and stabbed the victim.

The defense of the appellant that he was not at the scene of the crime when the incident happened but was at the jeepney starting point is without merit. The defense of alibi to be given full credit must be clearly established and not leave room for doubt (People v. Petil, 149 SCRA 92; People v. Ramilo, 147 SCRA 102). Alibi is an inherently weak defense especially because of the proximity of the accused's alleged whereabouts at the time to the scene of the crime (People v. Anquillano, 149 SCRA 442; People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404). The appellant failed to establish that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime inasmuch as the traveling time from said starting point to his residence at Libis, Murphy, Quezon City is only 5 kms. and is only 30 minutes ride (Original Records, pp. 275-276). It was, therefore, not impossible for the accused to be at the passenger jeepney of Mata and be back to Farmers Market immediately thereafter, riding in another jeepney, then staying there to resume his work of starting passenger jeepneys until 9:00 p.m. when he went home to Libis.

The contention of the defense that the accused did not flee from the scene of the crime is untenable. Prosecution witness Mata testified that after stabbing Duque, Languisan ran from the scene of the crime (TSN, p. 4, June 14, 1977).

The claim of the defense that the accused did not attempt to escape does not inspire belief. According to the defense, the accused neither changed his residence nor place of work. This is nothing but a mere pretense. It was precisely because of the difficulty of locating the accused that the court litigation proceeded only against Melgar. Languisan was at large at the time the information was filed against him because he could not be found at his last address. It was only after four (4) years that he was found and arrested. Flight of the accused is indicative of his guilt (People v. Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People v. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 25).

The third assignment of error claiming that the evidence of the prosecution was speculative and doubtful specifically because its witness, Angelito Mata, is wanting of credibility has been discussed earlier. It was established that Mata had no bias against Languisan. There is no doubt from the records that he was an actual eyewitness. There is no improper motive on Mata's part to implicate Languisan of the crime.

Lately, the defense holds that the lower court erred in appreciating the quailing circumstance of treachery because the prosecution was unable to prove that the victim was completely unaware when attacked and that there was no deliberate adoption of means to insure the killing. We agree with the Solicitor General that treachery was duly and sufficiently proven. The Revised Penal Code, specifically Art. 14, Sec 16, states that 'there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or terms in the execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make"(People v. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169). In the case at bar, the victim was suddenly and without warning stabbed at the back of his nape by the appellant from behind with a double-bladed knife (TSN, pp. 6-7, May 14,1981, Medico-Legal Necropsy Report, Exh. A). The appellant, therefore, employed a means of attack without risk to himself which might have arisen from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim (People v. Casalme, 17 SCRA 717).

The unexpected stabbing in the back of the victim by the accused proves the existence of treachery (People v. Crisanto, 135 SCRA 413). In a number of cases, it has been held that there is treachery when the defenseless victim was shot from behind without risk to his assailants (People v. Asil, 141 SCRA 286) or when the victim, while driving his jeepney was strangled from behind (People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 673).

Therefore, the crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery. No other modifying circumstance attended the commission of the offense.

The judgment of conviction imposed by the lower court is affirmed but the penalty will have to be modified. This is in view of the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, "unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it." (Art. III, Sec. 19, [1]).

The penalty for Murder is now reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua (People v. Masangkay, G.R. No. 73461, Jan. 25, 1988; People v. Lopez, G. R. Nos. 71875-76, Jan. 25, 1988; and People v. Gavarra, G.R. No. I,37673, Oct. 30, 1987). In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. For purposes of applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of penalty is prision mayor, in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, from ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. (People v. Masangkay, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED except for a MODIFICATION of the penalty. The accused-appellant Gerardo Languisan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to EIGHTEEN(18)YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay indemnity to the heirs of Jaime Duque in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

The Revised Penal Code (Book 1- Art. 1 to Art. 113)

ACT NO. 3815 AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS (December 8, 1930) Preliminary Article — This law shall be known as "The Revised Penal Code." BOOK ONE GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DATE OF ENFORCEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE, AND REGARDING THE OFFENSES, THE PERSONS LIABLE AND THE PENALTIES Preliminary Title DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE

Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. — This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-two.

Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

Title One FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY Chapter One F E L O N I E S
Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property.

Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons.

Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. — Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of this Code.

Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned Art..

Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided.

Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Chapter Two JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present;


First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

2. A person under nine years of age.

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.

When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.

6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause.

Chapter Three CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances;

1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.

2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.

3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.

5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.

7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;

8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.

9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.

Chapter Four CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH AGGRAVATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:

1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.

2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities.

3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.

4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.

5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.

6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.

Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.

7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

9. That the accused is a recidivist.

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.

10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.

11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.

13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation.

14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.

15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.

18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.

There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.

20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).

21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commissions.

Chapter Five ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.

The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Title Two PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:

1. Principals.

2. Accomplices.

3. Accessories.

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

1. Principals

2. Accomplices.

Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.

Title Three P E N A L T I E S Chapter One PENALTIES IN GENERAL
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.

Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. — The following shall not be considered as penalties:

1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.

2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes specified therein.

3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.

4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.

5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form.

Chapter Two CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the following:

Scale PRINCIPAL PENALTIES


Capital punishment: Death.


Afflictive penalties: Reclusion perpetua,

Reclusion temporal,

Perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,

Prision mayor.


Correctional penalties: Prision correccional,

Arresto mayor,

Suspension,

Destierro.


Light penalties: Arresto menor,

Public censure.


Penalties common
to the three preceding
classes: Fine,

and Bond to keep the peace.

ACCESSORY PENALTIES

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,

Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the

profession or calling.

Civil interdiction,

Indemnification,

Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,

Payment of costs.

Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.

Chapter Three DURATION AND EFFECTS OF PENALTIES Section One. — Duration of Penalties
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.

Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months.

Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine.

Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final.

If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant commences to serve his sentence.

Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970).

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1988).

Section Two. — Effects of the penalties according to their respective nature
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension.

Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking.

The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.

Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

Art. 37. Cost; What are included. — Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to schedule.

Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment. — In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:

1. The reparation of the damage caused.

2. Indemnification of consequential damages.

3. The fine.

4. The cost of the proceedings.

Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969).

Section Three. — Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. — Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

Chapter Four APPLICATION OF PENALTIES Section One. — Rules for the application of penalties to the persons criminally liable and for the graduation of the same.
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.

Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.

Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:

1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.

2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.

Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.

Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.

Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.

Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.

Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.

Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories. — Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.

Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.

Art. 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.

Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:

1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.

2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.

3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.

4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale.

5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.

Section Two. — Rules for the application of penalties with regard to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and habitual delinquency.
Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.

4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.

5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:


(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;

(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and

(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.

3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.

7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.

Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.chan robles virtual law library

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

Art. 70. Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1. Death,

2. Reclusion perpetua,

3. Reclusion temporal,

4. Prision mayor,

5. Prision correccional,

6. Arresto mayor,

7. Arresto menor,

8. Destierro,

9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,

10 Temporal absolute disqualification.

11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling, and

12. Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended).

Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty.

The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,

2. Reclusion perpetua,

3. Reclusion temporal,

4. Prision mayor,

5. Prision correccional,

6. Arresto mayor,

7. Destierro,

8. Arresto menor,

9. Public censure,

10. Fine.


SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification,

2. Temporal absolute disqualification

3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be

voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling,

4. Public censure,

5. Fine.

Art. 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. — The civil liabilities of a person found guilty of two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following the chronological order of the dates of the judgments rendered against him, beginning with the first in order of time.
Section Three. — Provisions common in the last two preceding sections Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalties. — Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.

Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specially designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the next higher penalty.

Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. — Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum.

The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not consist of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.

Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. — The legal period of duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown in the following table:

TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR PERIODS

Penalties Time included Time included Time included Time included
in the penalty in its minimum in its medium in its maximum
in its entirety period period period

Reclusion temporal From 12 years From 12 years and From 14 years, 8 From 17 years, 4
and 1 day to 1 day to 14 years months and 1 months and 1
20 years. and 8 months. day to 17 years day to 20 years.
and 4 months.

Prision mayor, abso- From 6 years From 6 years and 1 From 8 years and 1 From 10 years and
lute disqualification and 1 day to day to 8 years. day to 10 years. 1 day to 12 years.
and special temporary 12 years.
disqualification

Prision correccional From 6 months From 6 months and From 2 years, 4 From 4 years, 2
suspension and and 1 day to 1 day to 2 years months and 1 months and 1
destierro 6 years. and 4 months. day to 4 years day to 6 years.
and 2 months.

Arresto mayor From 1 month From 1 to 2 months. From 2 months From 4 months
and 1 day to 6 and 1 day to 4 and 1 day to 6
months. months. months.

Arresto menor From 1 to 30 From 1 to 10 days. From 11 to 20 From 21 to 30
days. days. days.

Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.

Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.

Chapter Five EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES Section One. — General Provisions
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.

The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.

Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. — When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.

If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his sentence.

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed hereinbelow until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper.

The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong.

The Director of Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him.

The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his authorized representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein.

If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person.

If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release.

In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him.

The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government: Provided, however, That whenever the Secretary of Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses above mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and eighty-eight of the Administrative Code.

Section Two. — Execution of principal penalties.
Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.

If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.

Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.

Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40.

Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. — The execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize.

Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp.

Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.

Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.

Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to it.

Title Four EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY Chapter One TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence;

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

4. By absolute pardon;

5. By prescription of the crime;

6. By prescription of the penalty;

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966).

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;

4. Light penalties, in one year.

Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
Chapter Two PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1. By conditional pardon;

2. By commutation of the sentence; and

3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.

Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. — Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him.

Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. — The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.

Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:

1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.

Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article.

Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.

Title Five CIVIL LIABILITY Chapter One PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Chapter Two WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

Art. 105. Restitution; How made. — The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.

The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to him.

This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.

Art. 106. Reparation; How made. — The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.

Art. 107. Indemnification; What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.

Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential damages and actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves. — The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.

The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured.

Art. 109. Share of each person civilly liable. — If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond.

Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony; Preference in payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.

The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.

Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective shares.

Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. — Any person who has participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation.

Chapter Three EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY
Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability. — Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.

Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.