People vs. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143,August 31, 1988

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event.

The facts are not disputed:

This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:

That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.

Contrary to law.

For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;

MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon —

In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes and the catching of fish.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I worked with the accused up to March 1964.

NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon —

I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.

On re-direct examination, this witness declared:

I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.

On re-cross examination, this witness declared:

I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.

RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married —

As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.

On question of the court, this witness declared:

What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.

The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial.

For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows:

I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.

The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court.

From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.

On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected.

Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.

There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.

There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. ¹

The trial Court ² returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.

SO ORDERED. ³

In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. ⁴

The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. ⁵

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. ⁶

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964. ⁷

The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." ⁸ The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." ⁹ Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964." ¹⁰

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." ¹¹ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, ¹² the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." ¹³ Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " ¹⁴

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" ¹⁵ act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.

It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, ¹⁶ a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.

It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, ¹⁷ a divided Court sustained an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" ¹⁸ limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity" ¹⁹ that would supply the standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest." ²⁰ In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." ²¹ "As worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political parties." ²² He was unimpressed with the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." ²³

The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, ²⁴ insofar as the statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend the Constitution." ²⁵ In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.

In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " ²⁶ doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" ²⁷ open to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, ²⁸ legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. ²⁹ In that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.

It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic rights, ³⁰ or as in the Levy case, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is presumed.

In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. ³¹ While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, ³² the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.

We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue measures ³³ designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.

Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." ³⁴ Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," ³⁵ is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," ³⁶ does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.

As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.

To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.

The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." ³⁷

The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. ³⁸ Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. ³⁹ Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." ⁴⁰ In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan ⁴¹ we held that local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" ⁴²). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. ⁴³ By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large wood." ⁴⁴ (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, ⁴⁵ but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. ⁴⁶ They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 7-13.

2 Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 11, Hon. Manolo Madella, Presiding Judge.

3 Rollo, Id., 14.

4 Brief of Appellant, 1-2.

5 Mun. Ord. No. 4 (1955), Id., 3.

6 Mun. Ord. No. 15 (1965), Id., 4.

7 Mun. Ord. No. 12 (1966), Id.

8 Id., 6.

9 Id., 4.

10 Id.

11 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978), citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).

12 402 U.S. 611 (1971); see TRIBE, Id., 720-721.

13 See TRIBE, Id.

14 Id., 721.

15 Id., 720.

16 417 U.S. 733 (1974); see TRIBE, Id., 721.

17 No. L-27833, April 8, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, per Fernando, J.

18 Supra, 850.

19 Supra, 867.

20 Supra, 868.

21 Supra, 884; Sanchez, J., concurring and dissenting.

22 Supra.

23 Supra, 885.

24 Supra; see Castro, J., Separate Opinion, 888-913.

25 Supra, 902.

26 TRIBE, Id., 722.

27 Id.; see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

28 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

29 See TRIBE, Id., 723.

30 Id., 721.

31 Brief for the Appellee, 5.

32 It was the then Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who signed the lease contract.

33 Rollo, Id., 13.

34 Brief of Appellant, Id., 8.

35 Id., 4.

36 Id.

37 Id., 10.

38 Brief for the Appellee, Id., 8.

39 MARTIN, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 31-32 (1984).

40 Brief of Appellant, Id., 11 -12.

41 No. L-18535, December 24, 1964,12 SCRA 611.

42 Brief of Appellant, Id., 3.

43 Santiago v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 593 (1909).

44 Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).

45 Supra.

46 See Northern Philippines Tobacco Corporation v. Municipality of Agoo, La Union, No. L-26447, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 304.

People vs. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-30307, August 15, 1974

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30307 August 15, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JORGE FELICIANO Y GARCIA AND ABRAHAM GARCIA Y PURIFICACION, defendants and appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose S. Sarte for defendants-appellants. .

ESGUERRA, J.:p

This case is before this Court for automatic review of the death sentence for Robbery with Homicide imposed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, in its Criminal Case No. 85500, on accused Abraham Purificacion Garcia and Jorge Garcia Feliciano, who were found guilty upon an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1967, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with three others whose true names and whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of violence, take, steal and carry away the following motor vehicle, to wit:

One (1) passenger jeepney, Ford with plate No. PUJ-1398 '66 Manila, Motor No. GPW 144741, Steel top, painted maroon (body) with lining colored white, and with nickel plated words "Jerry" on the lower center of the windshield frame, valued .... P8,000.00

belonging to one Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat, against the latter's consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat, in the said amount of P8,000.00, Philippine currency; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said motor vehicle, said accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon said Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat, by then and there shooting him and hitting him with an iron pipe and wooden clubs on the head and other parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

All contrary to law, and with the generic aggravating circumstances of having been committed in the nighttime, in an uninhabited place and by a band which facilitated the commission of said offense.

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Thereupon trial ensued and upon its termination, judgment was rendered finding the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged with the attendant aggravating circumstances of craft, nighttime, abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle and without any mitigating circumstance to offset any of them. The extreme penalty of death was imposed on the accused and they were likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 plus P7,000.00 representing the value of the jeepney of the deceased which was never recovered.

It is not disputed that the late Alberto Ila Y Liongson alias Alberto Salamat, alias Vicente Ila was, married to Virginia Ila with whom he had two children; that they had acquired a jeep which he used for transporting passengers for fare; that he took out this vehicle to the streets on February 8, 1967, to solicit passengers along the Divisoria-Quiapo route and earn for the day, but he never returned; that Virginia grew apprehensive and she tried to locate him but failed; that she reported the matter to the police in the morning of February 10, 1967; that thereupon a search was conducted and the next day, Fidel Santos, a taxi-driver and neighbor of the victim, informed Virginia that he saw her husband driving his jeep northbound on the national highway near the San Miguel Brewery plant at Valenzuela, Bulacan, with 3 or 4 passengers aboard. (t.s.n. pp. 3-6, July 24, 1967; pp. 6-13 November 20, 1967)

On February 11, 1967, an unidentified body of a dead man was discovered in Barrio Salangan, Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, by one Quintin Bautista who reported his discovery to the parochial priest. The latter together with the Barrio Captain reported the matter to the municipal authorities. Thereafter, Pat. Rodriguez along with Patrolmen Sanguyo and Salazar and four detainees of the San Miguel municipal jail repaired to the scene where the cadaver was and found the body inside a burlap sack concealed among the tall grasses (talahib). They waited for the arrival of Dr. Verde, the medico-legal officer, and in his presence slashed the sack open. They saw the victim naked with hands bound and face covered with cloth. The knees were bent close to the body and the arms bound to the knees with abaca twine and tie wire in a squatting position. (t.s.n. pp. 3-7 September 12, 1967) During the trial, Pat. Rodriguez declared that he made a sketch of the place where the body was found and the position of the body. After an examination was conducted by the medico-legal officer, he (Pat. Rodriguez) noted the identifying marks of the victim and lifted his fingerprints. impressions of which he indorsed to Det. Manuel Javier of the Manila Police Department (Exh. "E", "E-1",, "F",, "J-1", "J-2" and "J-3" pp. 49, 50, 250-253 Record).

Mrs. Virginia Ila widow of Alberto, upon learning that a dead man was found in San Miguel, Bulacan, went to the Municipal Building of San Miguel, Bulacan, and inquired about the discovered body. She was informed that subject had been buried but she was asked if her husband had identifying marks and she answered that her missing husband had four false teeth with gold crown and a tattoo on his left leg with the name, "Virgie", and with the drawing of a woman. The authorities who earlier noted the dead man's identifying marks informed Mrs. Ila that they noted a tattoo mark on the dead man's left leg. Mrs. Ila then requested that the body be taken to Manila. An exhumation followed and a necropsy thereof was made (t.s.n. November 20, 1967 pp. 13-20).

Dr. Cesar Verde, medico-legal officer of Bulacan, who conducted the autopsy of the deceased, testified that he found the marks around the right and left wrists and right and left ankles measuring 0.5 cm. which he said could have been caused by a rope tied around those parts of the body. He also found lacerated wound on the right occipital side measuring 2 x 1 cm. which could have been caused by a blunt instrument and a gunshot wound on the right chest (Exh. "Q" p. 130 Criminal Case Record Wrapper) He attributed the cause of death to hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound. The retrieved slug was sent to the NBI for ballistic examination. .

Roberto Garcia, Chief. of the fingerprint section, Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Manila Police Department, declared that on February 15, 1967, he received from Det. Javier a set of post mortem fingerprints with a request that a study and comparison be made of said fingerprints lifted from the discovered cadaver with the standard fingerprints of one Alberto Salamat which were on file with Central Records and Identification Division of the MPD. Garcia caused enlarged reproductions of both fingerprints to be made, and after a study arrived at the conclusion that the fingerprint impressions from the dead body were the same as those of Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat on file. In his study, he noted 13 identical characteristics obtaining in the middle right finger of both specimen and according to him (Roberto Garcia) "modern authorities sustain the opinion that 6 to 8 characteristics are sufficient to warrant positive identification." (t.s.n. p. 17 December 27, 1967)

The evidence also shows that when Mrs. Virginia Ila reported the disappearance of her husband to the authorities, an investigation was initiated. Detective Cano interviewed Jose Liongson alias Tisoy and Danilo Esteban who told him that they heard the accused herein say that if it could be confirmed that it was Alberto Ila who was responsible for his (Feliciano) dismissal by Rene Payumo, operator of the jeep he was driving, something would befall him (Alberto) (t.s.n. pp. 33, 34, July 24, 1967; pp. 70-72 t.s.n. September 11, 1967). Feliciano was found to have been dismissed in January 1967 (pp. 72, 73 t.s.n. September 11, 1967). These inquiries led to the apprehension of Abraham Garcia and Jorge Feliciano, herein accused who, when brought to the headquarters of the Manila Police Department (MPD), signed statements. (Exh. "A" and "B" pp. 35, 38, Record Wrapper). They likewise executed a waiver of their rights against detention beyond the period provided for in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, while under investigation. (Exh. "I" p. 135 Record Wrapper). Based on their signed statements which were taken by Detectives Buenaventura, Erfe and Javier, Det. Cano who was given charge of the case proceeded to Valenzuela, Bulacan to check on the statements of defendants, particularly their claim that they brought Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat to a house in said municipality and left the vehicle used in bringing him to the place to somebody also in that municipality (t.s.n. p. 13 July 24, 1967). Unfortunately, he failed to find the person and the vehicle he was looking for. Hence he conjectured that the two were not telling the whole truth. With the discovery of a dead man in Bulacan, accused Feliciano and Garcia readily admitted that their previous statements were not true and in subsequent separate statements given before Det. Cano, in the presence of Pat. San Miguel and Jaranilla (t.s.n. p. 15 July 24, 1967) they narrated in detail how they lured the victim to go to Marilao, Bulacan, on the pretext of fetching a woman (Exh. "C" and "I" pp. 39-48, Record, Wrapper), In his subsequent statement, accused Feliciano related that he had an axe to grind against Alberto whom he suspected as having triggered his, dismissal from his job. He also implication the names "Rene and Ding" as their confederates in the plot of revenge. He mentioned that they brought the victim and his jeepney somewhere on the national highway in San Miguel where he was divested of his jeep and where he (Feliciano) struck the victim with an iron pipe, with Garcia and Ding using pieces of wood also to strike Alberto. They pointed to Rene however as the gun-wielder, with all of them helping in, tying Alberto with abaca twine and tie wire and later slipping him into a burlap sock, tying the ends of the sack and leaving the victim in that pitiable state. They then fled back to Manila on a car painted white which was traced back to an auto repair shop owned by Rafael Bondoc at Lakas ng Mahirap, Caloocan (t.s.n. pp. 17, 18 July 24, 1967; Exh. "C", "D" pp. 39-48 Record Wrapper). The jeep of Alberto was allegedly sold by Rene to someone not personally known to them and they (Garcia and Feliciano) were given their share of the loot.

When the body was taken to Manila, the accused herein identified the deceased (Exh. "H" and "I"). A few days thereafter, a re-enactment of the commission of the crime was made in the presence of Lt. Jesus Buenaventura, Assistant Chief of the Detective and Robbery Division, Sgts. Manguyo and Villanueva and Pat. Dacanay, and the body was photographed. (Exh. "M-O-1")

Accused Jorge Feliciano and Abraham Garcia during the trial repudiated the extra-judicial confessions they made and signed. They now disown the documents purporting to be their confession. (Exh. "A, B, C, D, H and I" pp. 35,36, 37, 38, 53, 54 record; pp. 5, 6, t.s.n. October 17, 1968; pp. 4, 5 t.s.n. September 24, 1968) and claim that the statements were extracted from them by force or through "third degree" methods.

Jorge Feliciano declared that all he remembers was that he was forcibly made to sign many papers by the police officers who arrested him but "did not know exactly" what they were all about (pp. 6, 13, 14, 18 t.s.n. October 17, 1968); and that he was brought to a hotel and to the Detective Bureau where he was "3rd degreed". (pp. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 t.s.n. October 17, 1968). On the other hand, Abraham Garcia claimed that after he was arrested, he was brought to the Manila Police Headquarters at Isaac Peral (now United Nations Street) was maltreated and, at the point of a gun, was made to sign statements (pp. 1-15 t.s.n. September 24, 1968). They however admitted the genuineness of their signatures and that the signatures on the different statements are their normal signatures, a fact aptly noted by the trial judge, viz:

Against their repeated admissions, the defendants entered a defense of complete denial. Defendant Garcia alleged further by way of defense that has become a standard defense that he was maltreated. The claim of maltreatment, however, deserves no credence. Thus the defendant claims with respect to his statement Exh. B that he does not know anything about its contents. Yet, he admitted on cross examination that many of the questions in the statement were asked of him. Again the defendant admitted that the signatures in the statements are his. If it were true as he said that he was maltreated every day for two weeks, his physical condition must have been such that his signatures in the said statements would surely show a marked difference from each other because of the tension and the pain he must have suffered. An examination of the signatures in his different statements taken after days of interval clearly show that they were written with the same sure and firm hand. The defendant claims that the re-enactment was not voluntary on their part. Yet, the defendant admitted that they were told to pose as they pleased. In fact the defendant admitted that he was not actually forced.

The defense in its ably-written brief exerted mighty efforts to discredit the confessions by attempting to prove that they were extorted by torture and maltreatment of the accused. The trial judge, however, after a careful deliberation did not view their contention of a forced confession with sympathy and rejected their claim. Our own study of the record reveals that no error was committed by the court a quo in admitting the confessions of the accused. Their assertions of maltreatment are belied by their own testimonies. The facts contained in the written statements could not have been given by any one else who did not perform the acts narrated therein. They are so replete with details which the police officers could not have known if they merely concocted the confessions. Information such as that Jorge Feliciano was without a drivers license a week before he was arrested or the fact that he had a quarrel with one "Tisoy", an uncle of the deceased, and during which fight Abraham Garcia, the other defendant, was also with him; or that he reached the 7th grade at Tayuman Elementary School or the names of their teachers and other personal circumstances could not have been supplied by the police officers. Likewise their sworn statements contained a narrative detail of how they went about the plot to avenge their grudges against Alberto; their use of the wires and abaca twine to tie the victim's wrists and knees; their use of a burlap sack which contained the deceased and the gunning of the victim, these details dovetailed with the findings of the medico-legal officer.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial judge are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked or which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. (People vs. Pareja
L-21937, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA, 693, 703; People vs. Bautista L-23303-04, May 20, 1969, p. 185, 190). We hold that the trial court did not err when it did not give credence to the accused's claim of involuntary confession.

One additional factor that militates against appellants' claim of maltreatment is that it appears that accused Garcia and Feliciano were transferred to the custody of the NBI in 1968 on motion of the late Delegate Enrique Voltaire Garcia in connection with the hearings of the Senate Committee on Justice on Senate Bills Nos. 801 and 802 which were intended as a remedial legislation on the use of extra-judicial confession in cases. However counsel for appellants never bothered to secure and present in evidence a copy of the result of the Committee Investigation to lend support to their claim of maltreatment. Neither did counsel for appellants file a complaint or charge against the "erring" policemen inspite of alleged prior requests of accused. (t.s.n. pp. 11, 12 September 24, 1968; pp. 18, 19 October 17, 1968).

We have observed too that during the trial defendants alleged that they knew the police officers who maltreated them and in fact they were so positive about their identity. On cross examination, however, the prosecuting officer tried to let the accused identify a police officer through exhibits 0-28 (photographs taken during the re-enactment which accused previously identified as having been taken on said occasion). Accused Garcia identified the man with a hat on as Pat. San Miguel. The prosecuting officer noted that it was not San Miguel but Pat. Jaranilia on the picture whom he identified (t.s.n. p. 11, September 24, 1968; p. 3 October 17, 1968).

Similarly, defendants' claim that they had been forced into signing their respective confessions loses weight in the face of the fact that they had re-enacted the crime before many spectators and before the camera. The trial judge, We have noted in the record, elicited during the hearing an admission from the accused that they were not really pressured into posing before the camera in the re-enactment of the crime. (t.s.n. p. 5 October 17, 1968)

Appellants also question the validity of the signed confessions by mentioning the fact that they were subscribed and sworn to before Col. Morales, Chief of the Detective Bureau of the MPD, and not before a Fiscal or Judge. However, as held in several cases (U.S. versus Corrales L-9230 November 10, 1914, 28 Phil. 362, 366; People vs. Jose Pardo L-562), "there is no provision of law which prescribes that either confessions or admissions are not competent evidence unless made under oath. It is the fact that they are voluntarily made by the accused and against his own interest which gives to them their evidentiary value. Provided that fact is established, it does not matter whether or not they are made under oath." Moreover, confessions are not even required to be in writing as can be gleaned from our ruling in People vs. Bantagan L-33045, August 15, 1930,54 Phil. 834, 839, where it said:

... no explanation is given of the failure of Luis Bantagan to sign the statement, but the fact that he did not accredit the statement with his signature does not render inadmissible the oral testimony of Crisologo and Alvarez as to the substance of his previous admission.

Also the fact that the confessions were made while the accused were under arrest does not render the same inadmissible (People vs. Marimpong L- 43514, 62 Phil. 70) since the confessions were made and admitted prior to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution. Of significance too is the fact that the confessions were made in Tagalog, a dialect fully within the comprehension of, and well-spoken by, the accused, they being residents of Tondo, Manila.

Appellants likewise contend that prosecution has failed to present any eye- witness to the perpetration of the crime, or to adduce any concrete evidence showing the motive of the accused in committing such a heinous crime as robbery with homicide. While the question of motive is important to the person who committed the criminal act, yet when there is no longer any doubt that the defendant was the culprit, it becomes unimportant to know the exact reason or purpose for the commission of the crime. The failure to establish motive in that case becomes inconsequential (People vs. Diva L-22946, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 332, 346). Here We entertain no doubt that the defendants committed the crime.

Accused also raised the issue of jurisdiction, contending that since the cadaver of the deceased was found in a barrio in San Miguel, Bulacan, and there is no evidence as to where the victim was killed, it is doubtful whether the Court of First Instance of Manila can take cognizance of the same. Section 14 (a) Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 14 (a) — In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

Since the commission of the crime was started in Manila, in front of the Vista Theater along Claro M. Recto Avenue, where the victim was lured into going with defendants to Marilao, Bulacan, on the pretext of fetching a woman, then to San Miguel where he was liquidated, the Court of First Instance of Manila unquestionably has jurisdiction of the case.

WHEREFORE, judgment of conviction against the accused, with the civil indemnities therein provided, is hereby affirmed. However, for lack of the required votes to impose the extreme penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment), with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law, shall be suffered by both accused.

Costs against the accused.

Makalintal, C.J, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ. concur.

Barredo, J., cannot conceive of any legal reason why the penalty of death imposed by the lower court should be reduced to life. He voted to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Makasiar, J, took no part.

People vs. Oquiño, G.R. No. L-37483, June 24, 1983

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-37483 June 24, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO OQUIÑO, ROMULO LAGARIO alias "Rogelio Lagario", and ARNIDO CALOSOR, accused, ROMULO LAGARIO alias "Rogelio Lagario", appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose T. Nery for appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Criminal Case No. 580 finding the accused, Romulo Lagario alias "Rogelio Lagario," guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in spite of a personal wish of the undersigned trial Judge, that he be not constrained so to do, but finding herein accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and considering the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, recidivism and habitual delinquency, not having been offset by any mitigating circumstance, accused Romulo Lagario is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. The Court further orders the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Done this 10th day of July 1973, in the City of Tacloban, Phils.

(Sgd.) Godolfredo P. Quisumbing
District Judge

The information for robbery with homicide in the instant case was originally filed on November 11, 1971 charging three accused, namely: Antonio Oquiño Romulo Lagario alias "Rogelio Lagario" and Arnido Calosor. An amended information was later filed on October 23, 1972 likewise charging the said three accused but adding four (4) aggravating circumstances which reads as follows:

That on or about the 10th of October, 1971, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bolos (pisao) with deliberate intent and with intent to kill and with the use of violence and with intent to gain did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away a wrist watch marked "RADO" with serial No. 11658 valued in the amount of P650.00 and by reason thereof and or on occasion thereof, attack, assault and stab one Anecito Parades with a bolo (pisao) which accused have provided for the purposes causing his instantaneous death.

Contrary to Art. 294, par. I of the Revised Penal Code, with the following aggravating circumstances:

(1) That the crime was committed in the nighttime thereby facilitating its commission and enabling the accused to commit the crime with impunity.

(2) That the accused all of whom were armed, took advantage of their superior strength;

(3) That the accused is a recidivist, having been convicted by final judgment of three (3) counts of Theft which, together with the present charge, are embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code;

(4) That the accused, Romulo Lagario is a habitual delinquent, having been previously found guilty by final judgment in the City Court of Tacloban, in the following cases, to wit:

Crime	Date Committed	Convicted	Date Released
Theft (R-12,997)	4-15-68	5-28-68	March 28, 1969
Theft (R-13,689)	4-19-69	7-2-69	February 2, 1971
Theft (R-13,691)	3-29-69	10-28-69	February 2, 1971

Tacloban City, October 23, 1972. ¹

Accused Antonio Oquiño died on February 5, 1972 ² while accused Arnido Calosor was never apprehended and remained at large. ³ Hence, only accused Romulo Lagario was arraigned on October 26, 1972. He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and trial on the merits followed.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as follows:

At about 7:25 o'clock in the evening of October 10, 1971, Marina Uy and her deceased sweetheart, Aniceto Parades, were strolling and conversing at the Children's Park in Tacloban City. It rained. They took shelter in one of the miniature houses and sat on one of the protruding beams of the balcony facing the door. Suddenly accused Calosor opened the door together with his co-accused, Lagario (sic) and Oquiño (pp. 2-4, tsn, Bugho, March 8, 1973). They went inside, brandished their boloes (pisaoan eight-inch knife) and threatened them. Surprised, the duo fell backward. Oquiño held Marina's right hand and dragged her away. Lagario and Calosor took Aniceto to the side of the small house and wanted to take his wrist watch (pp. 5-9, tsn, Id.). Marina was able to free herself from Oquiños hold, for her hand was wet and slippery. Oquiño joined Lagario and Calosor. He took hold of Aniceto's front T-shirt. Then, Lagario stabbed Aniceto at the solar plexus (chest) and Calosor at the back.

The stab wound inflicted by Lagario perforated the heart through and through and Calosor's perforated the right lung (Exhibit "A", p. 100 Folder of Exhibits). Marina saw the stabbing as the place was lighted with a Mercury lamp. After Lagario and Calosor stabbed Aniceto, Marina ran away to ask for help. She went to the Leyte Provincial Jail accompanied by a man. Somebody at the jail tdalked to the telephone. After about twenty (20) minutes, she returned and found Aniceto wounded. His wrist watch was no longer with him (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.)

She saw again Oquiño and Lagario in jail. Pat, de la Peña showed to her the wrist watch taken which was recovered from a whom Lagario had asked to sell the watch (pp. 14-16, tsn., Id.). They took the bleeding Aniceto to the City Hospital where he died (p. 18, tsn, Id.). Accused Lagario had three convictions for theft in Criminal Case Nos. R-13691 dated October 20, 1969 (Exhibit "D", p. 102, Folder of Exhibits R-12997 dated May 28, 1968 (Exhibit "E", P. 103, Id.) and R-13689 dated July 2, 1969 (Exhibit "F" p. 104, Id.). Marina was emphatic in saying that she actually saw Oquiño help Lagario and Calosor in subduing Aniceto and in attempting to take the latter's wrist watch (pp. 40- 41, tsn, Id.).

Patrolman Wilfredo de la Peña of the Tacloban City Police Force investigated the stabbing incident in which the victim was Aniceto Parades. Among the three suspects, he apprehended only Lagario and Oquiño the latter, however, died before the case was terminated. The investigation was done in the presence of other police investigators and Lagario's relatives. At the instance of the two accused, Pat. de la Peña recovered the wrist watch of the deceased from one Agripino Aguilos, alias "Agri", a bus driver (p. 6, tsn, Santos, April 25, 1973). They admitted that they took the wrist watch from the victim (pp. 42-45, tsn, Bugho March 8, 1972).

The cadaver of Aniceto R. Parades was autopsied by Dr. Juanito C. de la Cruz, the assistant city fiscal health officer and medico-legal officer of Tacloban City (Exhibit "A", p. 100, Folder of Exhibits). The deceased received two (2) stab wounds: One (1) at the middle of the chest perforating the heart through and through and the other at the back perforating the right lung (Exhibit "B", "B-1", and "B-2", p. 101, Folder of Exhibits). Two (2) different sharp-pointed double-edged instruments were used in inflicting the two (2) fatal wounds (pp. 2-7, tsn, Santos, February 19, 1973). And, considering the location of the wounds, the assailant's were directly in front and directly at the back of the victim (p. 9, tsn, Id.).

The accused presented the following version of the inccident as submitted in his brief:

At the hearing of April 25, 1973, the accused Romulo Lagario, 20 years old, single, laborer and a resident of Tacloban City, testified that on October 10, 1971 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening he was strolling with Tony Oquiño at the children's park at Tacloban City, when somebody was killed; that while they were strolling, it rained and they took shelter in a small hut at the children's park (tsn, 2-3); that there he saw a man and a woman whose names he did not know; that Oquiño talked to the man and thereafter he saw Oquiño boxed the man and stabbed him in the middle part of the abdomen (tsn, 4); that the man slumped forward and he saw Oquiño again stabbed the man on the back, that he then ran away leaving Oquiño and the man there.

He also testified that he met Oquiño at the pier of Tacloban in the morning of the next day aboard the motorboat Samareno, who requested him to sell a watch (tsn 5); that he told Oquiño he could not sell the watch himself but would look for someone to sell the watch for Oquiño that he requested Agripino Aguilos to sell the watch; that Agripino was unable to sell the watch retaining possession of it (tsn, 6); that the watch came into the custody of the Secret Service Division because when he was apprehended he told the police where the watch was and they took possession of it (tsn, 7).

He also testified that he did not know a woman named Marina Uy who testified against him although he had occasion to see the woman he mentioned in that incident of Oct. 10, 1971 in the courtroom.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he was present when Oquiño stabbed the man he referred to in his direct examination (tsn, 8), that after the stabbing he left Oquiño at the place; that he executed an affidavit in connection with the case but he is not sure if Exh. " G " is the same affidavit he executed; that he did not subscribe and swear to the affidavit Exh. "G", before Fiscal Sano (tsn, 9-10); that Antonio Oquiño gave him the wrist watch; that he did not know a person by the name of Arnido Calosor (tsn, 11-12). "The accused was the only witness who testified in his behalf in view of the fact that at the time of the trial he was an inmate in the City Jail and, therefore, unable to sure a witness or at least contact them.

The trial court as aforesaid, refused to give credence to the evidence of the defendant and convicted him of the crime of robbery with homicide. In the instant review, defendant's counsel de oficio contends that trial court committed the following errors:

I

The lower court erred in giving fun faith and credence to the biased, unnatural, improbable and conflicting testimony of Marina Uy.

II

The lower court erred in finding that the accused is guilty of robbery.

III

The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit "G" an alleged sworn statement by the accused before Fiscal Sano over the objection of the accused.

IV

The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of Lagario and in not acquitting him of the offenses charged.

Under the first assignment of error, accused-appellant seeks to discredit the testimony of Marina Uy, first, because she is the girl friend of the deceased victim, Anecito Parades, second, because her testimony is uncorroborated, and third, because of the alleged inconsistencies that were attendant in her direct examination.

The rule is well-established that a witness' relationship to the victim does not, by itself, impair his credibility. ⁴ On the contrary, it would be unnatural for such persons interested in seeing retribution exacted for the crime to impute the same to any person other than those responsible for the crime. ⁵

While it may be true that Marina Uy is embittered by the irreparable loss of a loved one, her declaration is firm, cogent, credible and straightforward. It is far from being tainted and prejudiced.

It has also been held that even assuming that the testimony of the principal eyewitness was not properly corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses, it is still sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused, since it is also well-settled that "the testimony of a single witness which satisfies the court in a given case, is sufficient to convict. ⁶

The accused-appellant points to the flaws or inconsistencies in Marina Uy's testimony which refer to "the weapon or criminal agency that caused Parades' death, her distance from the alleged protagonists after the lapse of 3 minutes that she ran away to call for assistance, and her exaggerated and contradictory assertion that she saw the knife penetrate the body of the deceased." ⁷

Appellant claims that it is doubtful whether the weapon used to lull Parades was a pisao or a bolo or a knife because the principal eyewitness vacillated when she testified in court. At one time, she testified that the three accused threatened her and her deceased boyfriend with their pisao ⁸ only to admit later that she did not see the bolos brandished at the time. At another time, she claimed that the weapon was "a pisao, about eight (8) inches long" ⁹ only to claim later that she did not know what kind of weapon it was. ¹⁰ Then at another time, she testified that she actually saw the knife of Calosor enter the body of Parades ¹¹ only to contradict herself again by testifying that she did not actually the knife penetrate the body. ¹²

Appellant next casts doubt on the claim of Marina Uy that she saw how Parades was stabbed because she also claimed that she ran away after she was able to free herself from the hold of Oquiño.

The above inconsistencies are too trivial and unsubstantial to merit a reversal of the decision. Owing to the fast succession of the events in addition to the fear engendered by the same an eyewitness' inability to see the minute details of every sequence, to measure by metes and bounds the distances between one point to another as well as tell the exact minutes that have elapsed, is not unusual. Besides, the seeming contradictions are explainable.

In general, the testimony of Marina Uy presents a credible set of facts. She testified that she and her boyfriend, while seated on one of the protruding beams of the balcony of a miniature house at the Children's Park, were threatened by appellant together with two other companions. She may not have seen clearly the weapons when the three opened the door as she was taken aback as in fact she fell with her boyfriend to the ground but eventually saw the weapons. ¹³ As to the kind of weapons, it should be noted that she did not make a categorical answer that "it was a pisao, about eight inches long." She preceded her statement with the "I did not actually see it at that time." ¹⁴ Then on cross-examination, she explicitly declared that she did not actually know the kind of the weapons they had. ¹⁵ Hence, there is no basis for the alleged contradictions.

With respect to the alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Marina Uy as to whether or not she saw the weapon actually penetrate the body of the victim, We find that her testimony in cross-examination is clear that she actually saw it. Whatever she may have said that she "saw it because of the action of the forward thrust" have been clarified in her later statements. Besides, whether she saw the actual penetration or the action of the forward thrust do not really matter as the latter does not mean any other thing. The stubborn fact remains that the defenseless victim was stabbed by a sharp-pointed instrument. ¹⁶

On the contention of the accused that Marina Uy could not have seen the stabbing as she also claimed that she ran away after she freed herself from the clutch of Oquiño suffice it to state that said argument departs from human nature. The knowledge that one is no longer pursued would naturally make him or her stop and look back especially when a loved one is left behind. This was what Marina did as clearly indicated in her testimony. Hence, she saw the actual assailants.

We disagree with appellant's contention that there was no unlawful taking of the wrist watch and that the prosecution failed to prove the element of intent of gain.

Proof as to motive for the crime, that is, the accused intended to rob or only to kill the victim, is important or essential when the evidence on the commission of the robbery is purely circumstantial or inclusive, ¹⁷ as in this case.

Motive may be inferred from the following circumstances: (1) that certain jewelry and money found to be missing from the house of the deceased a short time after the homicide was subsequently found at a place indicated by the accused; ¹⁸ and (2) that the money which the deceased had at the beginning of the assault had disappeared when the body was being removed, although strewn above were a handkerchief, buttons torn from his shirt, and other articles. ¹⁹

Similarly, the motive to rob was duly proven in this case by the categorical statement of Marina Uy that while appellant and Calosor were dragging Aniceto to the side of the hut, they "wanted to take his watch" ²⁰ coupled with the disappearance of the wrist watch when she returned to the wounded Aniceto after seeking help and its subsequent recovery from a certain Agripino Aguilos whose name was supplied to the police by the appellant and his co-accused, Antonio Oquiño after their arrest.

The intent to gain from the taking of the watch is clearly indicated in appellant's testimony that he was asked by Oquiño to sell the watch. ²¹

We likewise do not find merit in the contention of appellant that his sworn statement (Exhibit "G") is inadmissible for the reason that he is illiterate and there is no evidence presented that he understood the same which was in the English language. Said sworn statement was admitted because Jose Sano, the Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban before whom the same was subscribed and sworn to, Identified in court appellant's right-hand thumbmark and declared that said thumbmark was affixed in the presence of a witness who also signed said statement. He also testified that prior to the g of the thumbmark, he explained to appellant the contents of the statement in a dialect he knew and understood.

Moreover, in his testimony, appellant admitted having executed an affidavit in connection with this case. ²² He merely denied having sworn to the truth of the statement. But never did he impugn the same from the time he executed it on October 14, 1971 up to the date he testified on April 25, 1973.

We quote hereunder pertinent portions of the sworn statement of the accused bearing on his participation in the crime charged:

Question and Answer No. 4:

Question — Why were you picked up by the police?

Answer — Because I had a participation in a robbing and stabbing incident.

Question and Answer No. 5:

Q — Who were your companions in this incident when happened?

A — My companions were Antonio Oquiño and Arnido Calosor, alias Arnel and Arnul.

Question and Answer No. 6:

Q — Where did this incident occur?

A — On or about 7:25 p.m. October 10, 1971 at Plaza Libertad, this City, inside the Children's Park. (pp. 25-26, Records)

The trial court in its decision made use of the said sworn statement to impeach the credibility of the accused in view of its inconsistency with his testimony in court on the time of the incident, the number of his companions, the person who gave him the watch as wen as on whether or not he witnessed the incident. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the principle that "the testimony of an accused does not merit credit or inspire confidence when it is inconsistent and incompatible with his statement on other occasions." ²³

Nevertheless, even without the sworn statement, it is clear in the testimony of the accused that he was at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed, that he was in the company of Oquiño one of the perpetrators of the crime; and that the watch was recovered from the person indicated by him and Oquiño All these show his complicity in the crime. His sheer defense that he had nothing to do with it cannot be believed as against the positive and interlocking testimony of Marina Uy who identified him and Calosor as the one who stabbed her boyfriend at the solar plexus and the back, respectively, as corroborated by the testimony of the doctor who confirmed the possibility of the use of two different weapons and inevitably of two assailants, as well as by the testimony of Detective Wilfredo de la Peña who successfully retrieved the watch exactly from the person pointed to by the accused. The lower court correctly found the different testimonies of the prosecution witnesses far more credible than the sole and negative testimony of the accused. Besides, where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are given great weight, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial.

That the crime of robbery with homicide was committed by the accused has, thus, been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court properly took judicial notice of the documents marked as Exhibit "E", Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "D", proving the aggravating circumstance of recidivism against the herein accused. By reason of his previous three convictions by final judgment for the crime of theft, the lower court also rightly considered him as a habitual delinquent. The assault against the unarmed victim having been perpetrated by three armed men, there is no doubt that abuse of superior strength characterized the crime. We agree with the trial court that there was no evidence to show that nighttime was sought purposely or taken advantage of to facilitate the perpetration of the offense.

Finding no error in the decision of the trial court, We hereby AFFIRM the death sentence and the civil liability of P12,000.00 due to the heirs of the victim, imposed on accused Romulo Lagario owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of recidivism, habitual delinquency and abuse of superior strength with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernando, CJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

CONCEPCION, Jr. J., concurring:

RELOVA, J., concurring:

The penalty should be reclution perpetua.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

CONCEPCION, Jr. J., concurring:

RELOVA, J., concurring:

The penalty should be reclution perpetua.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 13-14.

2 Record, p. 27.

3 Record, p. 94.

4 People vs. Villalba, 17 SCRA 948; People vs. Bautista, 6 SCRA 522, People va. Valera. 5 SCRA 910.

5 People vs. Bagsican, 6 SCRA 400; People va. Reyes, 17 SCRA 309; People vs. Tagaro, 7 SCRA 187.

6 People va. Sope, et al., 75 Phil. 810.

7 Appellant's Brief, p. 14.

8 TSN, p. 5.

9 TSN, p. 6, March 8, 1973.

10 TSN, p. 23.

11 TSN, p. 35.

12 TSN, p. 36.

13 TSN, p. 23.

14 TSN, p. 6.

15 TSN, p. 23.

16 TSN, p, 5.

17 People vs, Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364.

18 U.S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil. 88.

19 People vs. Dumduma & Caindoy 55 Phil. 953. ,

20 pp. 8-9, tsn, Bugho, March 8,1973.

21 pp. 5-6, tsn, April 25, 1973.

22 p. 19, tsn, April. 25, 1973.

23 People vs. Ramos, 77 Phil. 4; People vs. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; and People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 391.