Engle vs. Doe, G.R. No. L-23317,August 7, 1925

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23317 August 7, 1925

FLOYD ENGLE, by his next friend E. Womack, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIA DOE (alias SILVESTRA PULGA), defendant-appellant.

Feria and La O for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

STATEMENT

By E. Womack, his next friend, it is alleged that Floyd Engle for about two months has been an inmate of the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila, where he was being treated for serious physical and mental disorders by Doctor N.M. Saleeby, the Director of the Hospital. That the defendant is a resident of the town of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, but at present is somewhere in the City of Manila. That on or about December 9, 1922, and in the hospital in the City of Manila, the defendant, through the aid of her friends and agents, induced and coerced Floyd Engle to go through some sort of a marriage ceremony with her, knowing at the time that he, Floyd Engle, was out of his mind and mentally deranged. That after the procuring of the certificate of the so-called marriage, the defendant forthwith returned to Tacloban, and endeavored to take possession of all of Engle's property who was worth at least P50,000. That the conspiracy of the defendant to marry him was for the sole purpose of obtaining his property, and to default Engle and his legitimate heirs of their property. That it is proper that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem under the provisions of sections 116 and 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Wherefore, plaintiff prays that a special provisional guardian be appointed for Engle and that a preliminary injunction issue against the defendant, restraining her from interfering with his property, and that the alleged marriage be declared void ab initio, and for costs, and such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable.

For answer, the defendant made a general and specific denial of all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense, alleges that for the last fourteen years she has been living maritally under the same roof with the plaintiff by whom she has had six children, the oldest of whom is twelve years of age. That on December 7th of last year, they were legally married. That in contracting the marriage, plaintiff was in the full enjoyment of all of his mental faculties, and that he entered into the contract freely, not only for the purpose of making his status and that of the defendant and her children legal, but to provide for her future in case of his death. That induced by his alleged friends, the plaintiff has caused and consented to the filing of the complaint, together with the application for the appointment of a guardian of his person and property, to make it appear that he is not of sound mind, when in truth and in fact he was then and is now in the full enjoyment of all of his mental faculties, and as a counterclaim, defendant alleges that when they began living together, plaintiff did not have any property, and that through her aid and assistance, he has amassed a considerable fortune, which at present is not less than P200,000. That the defendant has nothing with which to support herself and her children, and that P80 which at present the plaintiff is giving the defendant is not sufficient for that purpose. That to properly support herself and the children and to employ an attorney to defend the suit, she requires a pension of P500 per month and the sum of P800 to be paid in advance on account of attorney's fees, and the defendant prays that she be absolved from the complaint, and that the court make an order requiring the plaintiff to make such allowances for her pension and attorney's fees.

Upon such issues, testimony was taken, and in a well written opinion the lower court found:

That plaintiff at the time of said marriage ceremony in St. Luke's Hospital was mentally deranged to such an extent that he was incapable of entering into the marriage contract or any other contract, and that for this reason the marriage ceremony was null and void.

The court also finds that the defendant is not entitled to anything under her so-called counterclaim, and said counterclaim is hereby dismissed, and rendered a decree to the effect that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was "illegal, null, and void ab initio, and without any legal effect as to plaintiff's and defendant's property rights, without costs to either party.

The defendant appeals, contending:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was mentally deranged to such an extent that he was incapable of entering into the marriage contract, and therefore

II. The lower court erred in declaring the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant to be illegal, null, and void ab initio.

JOHNS, J.:

Opposing counsel have submitted able and exhaustive briefs. The question submitted is largely one of fact.

October 18, 1922. Floyd Engle became an inmate of St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila with Dr. N.M. Saleeby as his physician. It appears from the hospital records that at the time of his admission his disease was defined as:

Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis.

He remained in the hospital under the care of Doctor Saleeby until some time in March, 1923, when he was taken to Baguio, and upon his return to Manila in June, he left for the United States. The marriage ceremony between Engle and the defendant was performed in the hospital on December 7, 1922. December 20, 1922, a petition for the appointment of a guardian for him, alleging insanity, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on December 29, 1922. H.C. Powers was appointed guardian of his person and J.V. House guardian of his property. After the marriage Engle and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and on the following day the defendant left Manila and went back to Tacloban, Leyte, which was Engle's former residence, and made an effort to obtain possession of all his business and property.

The question presented is whether or not at the time of the marriage Engle was of sound mind and mentally capable of entering into a marriage contract. It will be noted that he was admitted to the hospital October 18, 1922, and the nature of his disease at the time of his admission was described in the hospital records as: "Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis," and that his alleged marriage to the defendant took place on December 7, 1922, fifty days after that time.

It appears from his testimony that Doctor Saleeby is 54 years old, and that he graduated from the University of New York Medical College in 1897, and, with the exception of four years, he has engaged in the active practice of his profession ever since and that he was in charge of St. Luke's Hospital from March, 1907, to September, 1912, and from March 1, 1921, to the present time. That during all of the time that Engle was in the hospital, he was under the personal charge of Doctor Saleeby, who was his only physician, and who testifies:

Q. Will you state to the court what was his mental condition during all the time that he was there; that is, from the time he entered the hospital in October, 1922, up to the time he left in March, 1923? — A. All the time he was under my care he was unable to exercise judgment or express his will or decision definitely on any question of any significance.

Q. Will you state to the court whether or not during all that time he had sufficient mentality to knowingly enter into a contract of any kind? — A. He was absolutely unable to make any decision of any kind, and was not fit to make a contract with any one in any business transaction of any significance.

Q. Was the mental condition of Mr. Engle the same from the time he entered the hospital up to the time he left, or did it suffer any change? — A. He was at his worst at the time the priest visited him, and he kept in that same condition until about a month prior to his discharge from the hospital. At the time of his discharge he was in better condition than when the priest visited him, but he was by no means in a fit mental condition.

Q. Will you state to the court whether or not during the time that Mr. Engle was in the hospital he was sane or insane? — A. Mr. Engle was insane from the date he entered the hospital until he was discharged.

The record is conclusive that Doctor Saleeby was a fair and impartial witness, and that he had no interest whatever in the result of this suit, and that he was in daily attendance upon Engle from the time that he entered until he left the hospital, covering a period of about five months. His testimony is materially strengthened and corroborated by the evidence of J.V. House, H.C. Powers, and E. Womack, who were lifelong personal and intimate friends of Engle.

Opposed to this is the evidence of the defendant and the Reverend H.J. Parker, who performed the marriage ceremony.

It must be conceded that the defendant is a party in interest, and the evidence of the Reverend Parker does not carry conviction. It is true that he gave it as his opinion that Engle was mentally sound, but he did not testify as to any fact or circumstance upon which he based his opinion. All of his answers to the questions propounded were more or less categorical, and it appears that any knowledge which he had as to the mental condition of Engle was confined and limited to the two conversations which he had with him in the hospital and which were about and concerning his marriage to the defendant. Much is also said about the evidence of Miguel Romualdez, the present Mayor of the City of Manila. But giving to it full force and credit, he did not see Engle after the 5th of December, 1922, and the marriage was on December 7th, and in answer to the question: "Did you notice any change or difference, in the manner of his conversation and behavior on December 5, 1922, as compared to previous conversation with Engle?" he said, "I have not noticed any change." That may all be true, and yet Engle would be of unsound mind. Be that as it may, the evidence for the defense is not sufficient to overcome that of the plaintiff.

The records of the admission of Engle to the hospital are authentic, and were made when there was no thought of any litigation.

Section 10 of General Orders No. 68 provides, among other things, that a marriage may be annulled for any of the following cases, existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x x x x x x

3. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

x x x x x x x x x

6. That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the marriage state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.

Section 9 of Act No. 2122 provides:

Within the meaning of this Act, insanity is a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.

The evidence is conclusive that at the time he was admitted to the hospital Engle was of unsound mind, and it tends to show that his disease was incurable. The fact that Engle was received and treated as an insane patient on October 18, 1922, and that he was not discharged from the hospital until March, 1923, throws the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish the fact that he was of sound mind at the time of the alleged marriage.

In Corpus Juris, volume 32, pages 757 and 758, it is said:

(SEC. 561) 2. Continuance of Insanity — (a) In General. — General insanity admitted, or once proved to exist, is presumed to continue; and, if a recovery or a lucid interval is alleged to have occurred, the burden to prove such allegation is on the person making it. . . .

(SEC. 562) (b) Rebuttal of Presumption. — The presumption that a person shown to be insane continued so is rebuttable. In order to rebut the presumption of continuance of insanity it is not necessary to show that the person has been restored to the full possession of his mental vigor. However, when insanity has once existed and it is sought to be proved that a subsequent act of its subject was done in a lucid interval, sanity must be shown as of the very time of the act in question; it is not sufficient to show a lucid interval before and after the day of the act.

Ruling Case Law, vol. 14, page 622, says:

74. Burden of Proof in Civil Cases Generally. — In all civil actions it is generally held that the burden of proof of insanity rests upon him who alleges insanity, or seeks to avoid an act on account of it, and it devolves upon him to establish the fact of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. If, however, a previous state of insanity as proved, the burden of proof is then usually considered to shift to him who asserts that the act was done while the person was sane, though it has frequently been held that insanity which is not shown to be settled or general as contradistinguished from a mere temporary aberration or hallucination will not be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. A lucid interval is in its nature temporary and uncertain in its duration, and there is no legal presumption of its continuance.

Applying this rule, there is a failure of proof on the part of the defendant. It is not sufficient to overcome the clear, positive and convincing testimony for the plaintiff, that Engle was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage. Again, on all questions of fact the lower court found for the plaintiff, and its findings are entitled to some weight.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs to either party. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Resins Inc. vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-17888,October 29, 1968

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17888 October 29, 1968

RESINS, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Lichauco Picazo & Agcaoili for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Central Bank Legal Counsel for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner here, as did petitioner in Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez,¹ would seek a refund² from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under Republic Act No. 2609 for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, used for the production of synthetic glue of which it was a manufacturer. Since the specific language of the Act speak of "urea formaldehyde,"³ and petitioner admittedly did import urea and formaldehyde separately, its plea could be granted only if we could construe the above provision of law to read "urea and formaldehyde." In the above Casco decision, we could not see our way clear to doing so. We still cannot see it that way. Hence, this petition must fail.

Our inability to indulge petitioner in the aforecited Casco petition was made clear by the present Chief Justice. Thus: "Hence, 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from 'urea' and 'formaldehyde', as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resins known as 'urea formaldehyde'. Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction 'and' between the terms 'urea' and 'formaldehyde', and that the members of Congress intended to exempt 'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called 'urea. fomaldehyde' not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives ... Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formaldehyde' — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President ... If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree."

To which we can only add that deference to the scope and implication of the function entrusted by the Constitution to the judiciary leaves us no other alternative. For nothing is better settled than that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they find it, not as they would like it to be. Fidelity to such a task precludes construction or interpretation, unless application is impossible or inadequate without it.⁴ Such is not the case in the situation presented here. So we have held in Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez. We do so again.

Then, again, there is merit in the contention of the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondent Central Bank, and the Auditor General, that as a refund undoubtedly partakes of a nature of an exemption, it cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language. As was held by us in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero:⁵ "From 1906, in Catholic Church vs. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris." Certainly, whatever may be said of the statutory language found in Republic Act 2609, it would be going too far to assert that there was such a clear and manifest intention of legislative will as to compel such a refund.

One last matter. Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the respondent Auditor General in an indorsement to the respondent Central Bank⁶ causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such indorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and of formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. It does not admit of doubt that the respondent Auditor General's interpretation amounts to a literal adherence to the statute as enacted. As such, it cannot be said to be contrary to law. As a matter of fact, it is any other view, as is evident from the above, that is susceptible to well-founded criticism, as lacking legal basis. Under the circumstances, the respondent Auditor General was merely complying with his duty in thus calling the attention of respondent Central Bank.

The limit of his constitutional function was clearly set forth in Guevara v. Gimenez,⁷ the opinion being rendered by the present Chief Justice. Thus: "Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the property officer, has been entered into in comformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated therein is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do no more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), 'to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant.' This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary."

In the same way that the Auditor General, by virtue of the above function, which is intended to implement the constitutional mandate that no money can be paid out of the treasury except in the pursuance of appropriation made by law,⁸ must carefully see to it that there is in fact such statutory enactment, no refund, which likewise represents a diminution of public funds in the treasury, should be allowed unless the law clearly so provides. The Auditor General would be sadly remiss in the discharge of his responsibility under the Constitution if, having the statute before him, he allows such a refund when, under the terms thereof, it cannot be done. His actuation here cannot be stigmatized as violative of any legal precept; as a matter of fact, it is precisely in accordance with the constitutional mandate.

WHEREFORE, this petition is denied, with costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

¹ L-17931, February 28, 1963.

² According to the Prayer in the Brief for Petitioner dated March 27, 1961, it had deposited with respondent Central Bank the amount of P52,271.09, exclusive of further sums filed by it since the date of the filing of this petition, representing the margin fee deposited by it on its various importation of urea and formaldehyde as separate articles.

³ Section 2, par. XVIII, Republic Act No. 2609.

⁴ People v. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968; and Padilla v. City of Pasay, L-24039, June 29, 1968.

⁵ L-20942, September 22, 1967.

⁶ 3rd Indorsement dated July 13, 1960.

⁷ L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962. Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Phil. Operations, Inc. v. Auditor General, 94 Phil. 868 (1954); Villegas v. Auditor General, L-21352, Nov. 29, 1966. The rather broad language in Matute v. Hernandez, 66 Phil. 68 (1938) has thus been qualified.

⁸ Par. 2, Section 23, Article VI, Constitution of the Philippines.

Dealco Farms vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 153192, January 30, 2009

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009

DEALCO FARMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), CHIQUITO BASTIDA, and ALBERT CABAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Under review are Resolutions¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68972 denying due course to and dismissing petitioner Dealco Farms, Inc.’s petition for certiorari.

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and housed in, petitioner’s farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.

Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents’ work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently showering the cattle to prevent dehydration and to develop heat resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar incident.

Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents’ work ceases. For every round trip travel which lasted an average of 12 days, respondents were each paid P1,500.00. The 12-day period is occasionally extended when petitioner’s customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month, respondents usually made two trips.

On October 15, 1999, respondents Bastida and Caban, together with Ramon Maquinsay and Roland Parrocha, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for separation pay with full backwages, salary differentials, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioner, Delfin Alcoriza² and Paciano Danilo Ramis³ before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, General Santos City. Although the four complainants collectively filed a case against petitioner, Maquinsay and Parrocha never appeared in any of the conferences and/or hearings before the Labor Arbiter. Neither did they sign the verification page of complainants’ position paper. Most importantly, Maquinsay and Parrocha executed affidavits in favor of petitioner praying for the dismissal of the complaint insofar as they were concerned.

It appears that, on August 19, 1999, respondents were told by a Jimmy Valenzuela, a hepe de viaje, that he had been instructed by Ramis to immediately effect their replacement. Valenzuela proffered no reason for respondents’ replacement. Respondents’ repeated attempts to see and meet with Ramis, as well as to write Alcoriza, proved futile, compelling them to file an illegal dismissal case against petitioner and its officers.

In all, respondents alleged in their position paper that: (1) they were illegally dismissed, as they never violated any of petitioner’s company rules and policies; (2) their dismissal was not due to any just or authorized cause; and (3) petitioner did not observe due process in effecting their dismissal, failing to give them written notice thereof. Thus, respondents prayed for money claims, i.e., salary differentials, service incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance (COLA) and 13th month pay.lavvphi1.ne+

Petitioner, however, paints a different picture. Petitioner asserts that the finished cattle are sold to traders and middlemen who undertake transportation thereof to Manila for distribution to the wet markets. In fact, according to petitioner, the buyers and end-users of their finished cattle actually purchase the cattle as soon as they are considered ready for the market. Petitioner claims that once the finished cattle are bought by the buyers, these buyers act separately from, and independently of, petitioner’s business. In this regard, the buyers themselves arrange, through local representatives, for the (a) hauling from petitioner’s farm to the port area; (b) shipment of the finished cattle to Manila; and (c) escort or "comboy" services to feed and water the cattle during transit.

In its position paper, petitioner relates only one instance when it engaged the services of respondents as "comboys." Petitioner maintains that their arrangement with respondents was only on a "per-trip" or "per-contract" basis to escort cattle to Manila which contemplated the cessation of the engagement upon return of the ship to the port of origin – the General Santos City port.

Petitioner further narrates that sometime in 1998, and well into 1999, its import of cattle from Australia substantially decreased due to the devalued dollar. Consequently, petitioner was forced to downsize, and the sale and shipments to Manila were drastically reduced. Thus, petitioner and/or its buyers no longer retained escort or "comboy" services.

Ultimately, petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents. Petitioner posits that: (a) respondents are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested only in the result thereof; (c) in the alternative, respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production; and (d) respondents likewise failed to complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set forth in Article 280⁴ of the Labor Code, as petitioner’s shipments were substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or "comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.

On June 30, 2000, the Labor Arbiter found that respondents were employees of petitioner, thus:

[Petitioner] admits having engaged the services of [respondents] as caretakers or "comboys" (convoys) though it qualifies that it was on a "per trip" or "per contract" basis. It also admits paying their remuneration of P1,500.00 per trip. It tacitly admits having terminated [respondents’] services when it said that [respondents] were among the group of escorts who were no longer accommodated due to the decrease in volume of imports and shipments. [Petitioner] also undoubtedly exercised control and supervision over [respondents’] work as caretakers considering that the value of the cattle shipped runs into hundreds of thousands of pesos. The preparation of the cattle for shipment, manning and feeding them prior to and during transit, and making a report upon return to General Santos City to tally the records of the cattle shipped out versus cattle that actually reached Manila are certainly all in accordance with [petitioner’s] instructions.

Thus, all the four elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship being present, [x x x] [respondents] were, therefore, employees of [petitioner].

x x x [Respondents] also performed activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of [petitioner] (Art. 280, Labor Code). [Petitioner’s] contention, to the contrary, is erroneous. Transporting the cattle to its main market in Manila is an essential and component aspect of [petitioner’s] operation. As held by [the NLRC’s] Fifth Division in one case:

Complainant’s task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent. It is of judicial notice that the bulk of the market for livestock of big livestock raisers such as respondent is in Manila. Hogs do not swim, they are shipped. When in transit (usually two-and-one-half days) they do not queue to the mess hall, they are fed. x x x The caretaker is a component of the business, a part of the scheme of the operation. (NFL and Ricardo Garcia v. Bibiana Farms, Inc., NLRC CA No. XI-065089-99 (rab-xi-01-50026-98); prom. April 28, 2000).

More, it also appears that [respondents] had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of Art. 280). [Respondents], in fact, were hired on October 29, 1994 (Bastida) and June 25, 1993 (Caban), a fact which [petitioner] dismally failed to refute.

Given the foregoing, [petitioner’s] contention that [respondents] were independent contractors and free lancers deserves little consideration. Its argument that its usual trade or business (importation/production and fattening) ends in General Santos City, and does not include transporting the cattle, does not persuade us.

[Petitioner’s] witnesses tried to corroborate [its] contention that [respondents] also offered their services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to [petitioner]. Former complainants Maquinsay and Parrocha mentioned the names of these traders/buyers or shippers as Lozano Farms, Bibiana Farms and other big cattle feedlot farms in SOCSARGEN (Annexes "A" and "E," [petitioner’s] position paper.) But not a modicum of evidence was adduced to prove payment of [respondent’s] services by any of these supposed traders or that [respondents] received instructions from them. There is also no record that shows that the trader/s actually shipped livestock and engaged the services of caretakers.⁵

Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter granted respondents’ claim for separation pay, COLA and union service fees. The Labor Arbiter awarded respondents: (a) separation pay of one month for every year of service; (b) COLA, as petitioner failed to prove payment thereof or its exemption therefrom; and (c) union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award. The Labor Arbiter computed respondents’ total monetary awards as follows:

NAME	SEPARATION PAY	COLA	SUB-TOTAL
Chiquito Bastida	P15,000.00	P2,400.00	P17,400.00
Albert Caban	18,000.00	2,400.00	20,400.00
			P37,800.00
	Plus 10% Union Service Fees		3,780.00
		TOTAL ------	P41,580.006

However, the Labor Arbiter denied respondents’ claim for backwages, 13th month pay, salary differential, service incentive leave pay and damages, to wit:

But we deny the "claim" for backwages which was merely inserted in the prayer portion of [respondents’] position paper. Reasons are abundant why we decline to grant the same. In their complaint, [respondents] prayed for separation pay (not reinstatement with consequent backwages) thereby indicating right from the start that they do not want to work with [petitioner] again. More importantly[,] during the conference held on January 6, 2000, [petitioner] manifested its willingness to reinstate [respondents] to their former work as [comboys] under the same terms and conditions but [respondents] answered that they do not want to return to work and instead are asking for payment of their separation pay. Finally[,] [respondents] do not dispute that [petitioner’s] downsizing of its escorts in 1999 was due to a legitimate cause, i.e., dollar devaluation.

Also to go are [respondents’] labor standard claims for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as well as the claim for damages. We also deny the "claim" for salary differentials.

[Respondents] are not entitled to their claims for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay because they were paid on task basis. The claim for damages is denied for lack of factual and legal basis as there is no showing that respondent acted in bad faith in downsizing the number of its caretakers. It even appears that the same is due to a legitimate cause. The "claim" for salary differentials is denied on two grounds: (1) [these are] not prayed for in their complaint; and (2) for lack of merit. It takes not more than 3 days for the Gen. Santos-Manila trip. Even if we include counting the return trip that would be total of six (6) days to the maximum. [Respondents] were paid P1,500.00 per trip. Or, since they made an average of 2 trips/month they were paid P3,000.00 for a twelve (12) days’ work (or the equivalent of P250.00/day).⁷

On appeal to the NLRC, the Fifth Division affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and the total monetary award of P41,580.00 representing respondents’ separation pay, COLA and union service fees. The NLRC declared:

After a judicious review of the records of this case, we found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the branch.

The presence of the four (4) elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship has been clearly established by the facts and evidence on record, starting with the admissions of [petitioner] who acknowledged the engagement of [respondents] as escorts of their cattles shipped from General Santos to Manila, and the compensation of the latter at a fee of P1,500.00 per trip. The dates claimed by [respondents] that they were engaged remain not disputed by [petitioner] as observed by the branch.

The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions, supervision and control by [petitioner] on [respondents’] performance of work as escorts for which they were hired. This we agree on all four[s]. The livestock shipment would cost thousands of pesos and the certainty of it reaching its destination would be the only thing any operator would consider at all [time] and under all circumstances. Nothing more, nothing less. It is illogical for [petitioner] to argue that the shipment was not necessary [or] desirable to their business, as their business was mainly livestock production, because they were undeniably the owners of the cattle escorted by [respondents]. Should losses of a shipment occur due to [respondents’] neglect these would still be [petitioners’] loss, and nobody else’s.

At this point, we emphasize the fact that even on appeal [petitioner] declines to refute, by way of evidence, the finding of the branch that they failed to prove the payment of [respondents’] services by any of the supposed traders, or that said traders actually shipped livestock. This is the point where the case of NFL v. Bibiana Farms cited by [petitioner] differs from the instant case in that bills of lading issued to, thus, in the name of the hog shippers were submitted as proof that said shippers engaged, compensated and supervised the escorts or convoys in their work, and not the hog raisers.⁸

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. As previously adverted to, the CA denied due course and dismissed the petition for the following procedural flaws:

1) other material portions of the record referred to in the petition are not attached thereto such as the Complaint for illegal dismissal and position papers of the parties, in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and

2) there is no written explanation why personal service was not resorted to, as required under Sec. 11, Rule 13, Ibid.⁹

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied by the appellate court.

Hence, this appeal positing the following issues:

1. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition for certiorari based on technical rules of procedure.

2. Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

3. Corollary thereto, whether the NLRC gravely erred when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner and the consequent award of money claims to respondents.

At the outset, we observe that petitioner raises extraneous issues which were obviously not passed upon by appellate court when the latter denied due course and dismissed outright the petition for certiorari. As such, the instant petition for review on certiorari directly assails the NLRC’s decision which mainly involves factual issues, such as whether respondents were employees of petitioner and if they are entitled to their money claims.

Petitioner is unconcerned with the CA’s reasons for dismissing the petition and, in fact, declares that the dismissal was done with grave abuse of discretion for sticking to the provisions of the Rules of Court – a "mere technicality" as petitioner cavalierly puts it. Petitioner asseverates that the CA dismissal "defeat[s] substantial justice considering that [it] has a strong cause of action against [respondents]." In all, petitioner submits that it had faithfully complied with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court by submitting an explanation and a duly notarized affidavit of service of Maria Fe Sobrevega. Petitioner likewise points out that the Explanation for the resort to service of the petition for certiorari via registered mail is found on page 30 thereof. Curiously, however, only the copy of the same document submitted to the CA lacked an Explanation.

We completely agree with the appellate court’s forthright dismissal of the petition for certiorari.

Even if we are to overlook petitioner’s account on the curious case of the missing Explanation only in the CA’s copy of the petition, petitioner’s non-compliance with the requisites for the filing a petition for certiorari remains. We detect petitioner’s ploy to sidestep a more fatal procedural error, i.e., the failure to attach copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari set forth in paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which reads:

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.¹⁰

Corollary thereto, the second paragraph of Section 6, Rule 65, the first paragraph of Section 2, Rule 56, and the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 respectively read:

SEC. 6. Order to comment. — x x x

In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. x x x

SEC. 2. Rules applicable. — The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rules[.] x x x

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. — x x x

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Quite apparent from the foregoing is that the CA did not err, much less commit grave abuse of discretion, in denying due course to and dismissing the petition for certiorari for its procedural defects. Petitioner’s failure to attach copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to its petition for certiorari warranted the outright dismissal thereof.

Petitioner, however, invokes the righteous ends of substantial justice as would exempt it from adherence to procedural rules. Petitioner claims that the merits of its case necessitate a liberal interpretation of the Rules of Court leading to a reversal of the appellate court’s outright dismissal of its petition.

Regrettably, upon an evaluation of the merits of the petition, we do not find cause to disturb the findings of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC, which are supported by substantial evidence.

The well-entrenched rule is that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.¹¹ Section 5, Rule 133 defines substantial evidence as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."1avvphi1.ne+

Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly adhered to in labor cases.¹² We may take cognizance of and resolve factual issues only when the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the CA.¹³

In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct, or the so-called "control test."¹⁴ Of the four, the power of control is the most important element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof.¹⁵

Naturally, both petitioner’s and respondents’ claims are on opposite poles. Respondents aver that they were regular employees of petitioner, designated as escorts or "comboys" for the latter’s cattle. Petitioner, on the other hand, denies that claim, and simultaneously asserts that respondents are free lance escorts who offer their services to the buyers, middlemen and traders of petitioner. Petitioner further asserts that its business is only confined to the fattening of cattle and their sale once they reach the required market weight. According to petitioner, its business does not include the shipment of cattle, which is undertaken by the middlemen, traders and buyers, who, as owners thereof, engage respondents’ services to care for the cattle while in transit. Thus, petitioner ultimately asserts that respondents, at that juncture, were under the control and supervision of these middlemen, traders and buyers.

To support the foregoing contentions, petitioner simply presents the affidavits of Maquinsay and Parrocha, original complainants before the Labor Arbiter, praying for the withdrawal of the complaint for illegal dismissal insofar as they are concerned. Maquinsay and Parrocha both allege that their engagement with petitioner is on a "per-trip" or "per-contract" basis, and that they and their fellow "comboys" or escorts, herein respondents, did not offer their services to petitioner alone.

Paying no heed to petitioner’s narration of the contemplated arrangement with respondents, the Labor Arbiter pointed out the following:

[Maquinsay and Parrocha, petitioner’s] witnesses, tried to corroborate [petitioner’s] contention that complainants also offered their services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to [petitioner]. Former complainants Maquinsay and Parrocha mentioned the names of these traders/buyers or shippers as Lozano Farms, Bibiana Farms and other big cattle feedlot farms in SOCSARGEN (Annexes "A" and "B", [petitioner’s] position paper). But not a modicum of evidence was adduced to prove payment of [respondents’] services by any of these supposed traders or that [respondents] received instructions from them. There is also no record that the trader/s actually shipped livestock and engaged the services of caretakers.¹⁶

Echoing the same observation, the NLRC declared, thus:

At this point, we emphasize the fact that even on appeal [petitioner] decline to refute, by way of evidence, the finding of the branch that they failed to prove the payment of [respondents’] services by any of the supposed traders, or that said traders actually shipped livestock. This is the point where the case of NFL v. Bibiana Farms cited by [petitioner] differ from the instant case in that bills of lading issued to, thus, in the name of the hog shippers were submitted as proof that said shippers engaged, compensated and supervised the escorts or convoys in their work, and not the hog raisers.¹⁷

Yet, petitioner is adamant that its lack of documentary evidence should not be taken against it since Maquinsay and Parrocha, two of the original complainants, attest to the nature of a "comboy’s" or escort’s work.

Significantly, Maquinsay’s and Parrocha’s affidavits proffer no reason why, in the first place, they filed, along with herein respondents, the complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Maquinsay and Parrocha made an absolute turnaround and retracted their previous claim of regular employee status without proof to support their allegations as against the claim of the remaining complainants, herein respondents.

Conveniently, for its purposes, petitioner claims that Maquinsay’s and Parrocha’s affidavits "substantiate the claim of petitioner that indeed shipping arrangements and accommodation of escorts, which are informal in nature and, thus, unrecorded, are under the responsibility, control and supervision of the buyers and traders." Essentially, petitioner insists that the affidavits of Maquinsay and Parrocha should bear more weight than the claims of respondents in their complaint and position paper.

We reject petitioner’s self-serving contention. Having failed to substantiate its allegation on the relationship between the parties, we stick to the settled rule in controversies between a laborer and his master that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the former’s favor.¹⁸ The policy is reflected in no less than the Constitution,¹⁹ Labor Code²⁰ and Civil Code.²¹

Moreover, petitioner’s other contention that the shipment and the escort of live cattle is not part of its business, thus, at most, respondents may only be considered as casual employees, likewise fails to persuade.

First. Petitioner failed to disprove respondents’ claim that they were hired by petitioner as "comboys" from 1993 and 1994, respectively. In fact, petitioner admits that respondents were engaged, at one point, as "comboys," on a "per trip" or "per contract" basis. This assertion petitioner failed anew to substantiate. Noteworthy is the fact that Maquinsay’s and Parrocha’s affidavit merely contain a statement that the offer of their services as "comboys" or escorts was not limited to petitioner alone. The affidavits simply aver that they, including herein respondents, were engaged by Dealco on a "per trip" basis, which commenced upon embarkation on a ship for Manila and terminated upon their return to the port of origin. Maquinsay and Parrocha did not state that respondents’ engagement by petitioner was on a one-time basis. As a result, petitioner’s claim remains an unsubstantiated and bare-faced allegation.

Second. Even assuming that respondents’ task is not part of petitioner’s regular course of business, this does not preclude their attainment of regular employee status.

Article 280 of the Labor Code explicitly provides:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.²²

Undoubtedly, respondents were regular employees of petitioner with respect to the escort or "comboy" activity for which they had been engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to continuity or brokenness of the service.

Lastly, considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiter’s and the NLRC’s finding of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies’ finding of respondents’ illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to disturb the award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated July 29, 2001 of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. M-005974-2000 (RAB-11-10-50453-99) is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA* Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

^* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 556 dated January 15, 2009.

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now deceased), with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed) and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 202-203, 323.

² President of petitioner Dealco Farms, Inc.

³ South Cotabato manager of petitioner Dealco Farms, Inc.

⁴ Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. – The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

⁵ Rollo, pp. 49-51.

⁶ Id. at 53.

⁷ Id. at 51-52.

⁸ Id. at 60-61.

⁹ Id. at 202.

¹⁰ Emphasis supplied.

¹¹ G & M (Phils.), Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 140495, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 215, 220.

¹² PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 44, 54.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 350 Phil. 35, 58 (1998); Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 164, 171.

¹⁵ Lopez v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 154472, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 428, 446.

¹⁶ Rollo, p. 51. (Emphasis supplied.)

¹⁷ Id. at 60-61.

¹⁸ L.T. Datu & Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 323 Phil. 521, 531 (1996).

¹⁹ Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

²⁰ Art. 4. Construction in favor of Labor. — All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

²¹ Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

²² Emphasis supplied.

People vs. Vera, G.R. No. L-26539 February 28, 1990

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26539 February 28, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIO VERA, ET AL., defendants. TAGUMPAY A. NANADIEGO, defendant-appellee.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal interposed by the People of the Philippines from the Order * of the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch II, in Criminal Case No. 12145 dated January 23, 1965, dismissing the case as against defendant-appellee Tagumpay A. Nanadiego with cost de oficio.

The dispositive portion of the said order reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant case is Ordered dismissed as against this defendant Tagumpay A. Nanadiego, with cost de oficio. The bail bond posted by said defendant for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and declared of no further force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On July 23, 1954, a complaint for kidnapping with murder docketed as Criminal Case No. 2454 was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon by Sgt. Francisco G. de Asis, P.C. of Lucena City against the following: Gaudencio Vera, Restitute Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florida Arcadio Talavera, Sr., Tagumpay Nanadiego, Paulino Bayran, Jaime Garcia and 92 others (Record, Vol. I, p. 1).

On December 20,1954, a manifestation and motion was filed by the accused Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas and Tagumpay Nanadiego through counsel de Mesa and de Mesa where the above-named accused entered a plea of not guilty and further renounced their rights to the second stage of the preliminary investigation by the justice of the peace, and finally prayed that the case be elevated to the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Record, Vol. 1, p. 231) which was granted in an order dated December 22, 1954 by the aforesaid court (Record, Vol. 1, pp. 24-25).

In February 23, 1955, an information (Record, Vol. I, p. 94) was filed by the then Provincial Fiscal Jose O. Lardizabal in the Court of First Instance of Quezon charging the accused (including Tagumpay Nanadiego) with the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder, defined and punished under Articles 48, 267 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of February, 1945, in the Municipality of Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of His Hon. Court, the above-named accused Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Arcadio Talavera, Tagumpay Nanadiego and Paulino Bayran alias Enong, together with Jaime Garcia and 92 other John Does who are still at large armed with high power rifles such as .50 caliber machinegun, .30 caliber machinegun, Browning automatic rifles, carbines, Garrands, Springfield rifles, pistols and Revolver of different calibers, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one Amadeo Lozanes in his residence at said municipality of Unisan, Quezon, with both hands tied together, detain and carry him to Vera's Headquarters located at Lalaguna, Municipality of Lopez, Quezon, and while he (Amadeo Lozanes) was under their custody and control, in pursuance of their conspiracy, taking advantage of their superior strength, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously boxed, kicked, tortured and later on executed on March 14, 1945, in the said barrio of Lalaguna, Lopez, Quezon.

Contrary to law.

On May 11, 1955, an Urgent Petition was filed by Provincial Fiscal Lardizabal praying that the case be referred to the Amnesty Commission (Record, Vol. I, p. 158). On the same date, the AFP Amnesty Commission requested the Provincial Fiscal to furnish said Commission with a true copy of the records of Criminal Case No. 12145. The records requested were forwarded to the Commission on July 15, 1955 (Brief for the Appellant, p. 3, Rollo, p. 27).

On June 22, 1955, the Provincial Fiscal filed an amended information against the same accused (including accused-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego) for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Record, Vol. I, p. 207).

On August 12, 1955, the above case was referred to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission (Record, Vol. I, p. 229). Few days thereafter, Hon. Vicente del Rosario of the Court First Instance of Quezon, acting upon authority from the Department of Justice, convoked the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission composed of different judges of Laguna, Mindoro, Batangas and Quezon (Brief for the Appellant, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27).

On June 12, 1956, after a continuous trial of the case, in which Tagumpay Nanadiego was one of the accused, the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission held that none of the defendants admitted having committed the crime charged. Such being the case, defendants have no use for amnesty as amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime; hence, the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission has no jurisdiction, thereby remanding the case to the court a quo (Record, Vol. II, p. 156).

On July 20, 1956, accused filed a motion for reconsideration (Record, Vol. I, p. 167) which the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission denied in its order dated January 11, 1957, and maintained its order to return the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon for lack of jurisdiction (Record, Vol. II, p. 175).

Thereafter, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision and order of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission under date of June 12,1956 and January 11, 1957, respectively (Record, Vol. II, pp. 185-186) for which reason the entire record was elevated to the Court of Appeals as per order dated February 12, 1957 (Record, Vol. II, p. 187). On appeal, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 2004-R.

On November 16, 1960, the Court of Appeals, in its decision affirmed the decision and order appealed from (Record, Vol. II, p. 191). Later, a petition for review was filed in the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-18184.

In a decision dated January 31, 1963, this Court affirmed the decision and order of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed, and ruled that a previous admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty since the invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation (Record, Vol. II, p. 198). The above decision became final and executory on November 6, 1963 as per Entry of Judgment (Record, Vol. II, p. 204).

On December 21, 1963, Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion filed a petition ex parte in the Court of First Instance of Quezon praying that a trial on the merits of the case be continued for which reason the case was set for arraignment and trial sometime in January, 1964 (Record, Vol. II, p. 205).

On January 11, 1965, defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Information" (Record, Vol. II, p. 357) in the above entitled case on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by virtue of the amnesty extended him by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines in Resolution No. 1-F 859 (Record, Vol. II, p. 360) dated July 7, 1959 in accordance with Proclamation No. 8, series of 1946 of the President of the Philippines, and that the defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego, claimed that he applied before the Amnesty Commission; Armed Forces of the Philippines on July 26, 1954 for amnesty under Proclamation No. 8, s. 46 of the President of the Philippines in connection with the charge filed against him on July 23, 1954 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon. However, on January 22, 1965, an opposition to the urgent motion to quash was filed by special prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion although the latter in his opposition admits that "on July 7, 1959, the AFP Amnesty Commission cleared the petitioner Tagumpay Nanadiego in its decision" (Record, Vol. II, p. 371).

Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, in an order dated January 23, 1965 ordered that the aforesaid case against Tagumpay Nanadiego be dismissed (Record, Vol. II, p. 375) on the ground that "the crime for which the accused was charged in the Armed Forces Amnesty Commission is the same charge in the criminal case No. 12145" which was "admitted by the Special Prosecutor of the Department of Justice in open court" manifesting that the accused was granted amnesty on July 7, 1959. Further, the lower court ruled that "to try the accused under the information in criminal case No. 12145 would be tantamount to trying him for an offense where he has been granted amnesty long time ago, and to try him again would constitute double jeopardy." However, a motion for reconsideration dated January 31, 1965 was filed by special prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion (Record, Vol. II, p. 377) which was denied by the trial court in its order dated February 6, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 401).

Hence, this appeal.

On February 11, 1965, the special prosecutor filed a notice of appeal from the order dated January 23, 1965 dismissing the case against Tagumpay Nanadiego (Record, Vol. II, p. 400). Meanwhile, on May 24,1965, a Motion to Set Arraignment and Trial and Manifestation was filed by the special prosecutor in the trial court (Record, Vol. II, pp. 402-403) which was granted in an order dated August 28, 1965 and the arraignment and trial was set on September 4,1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 411).

On the other hand, defendants filed through their counsel a Petition and Counter Petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon dated August 27, 1965 followed by their Motion for Reconsideration dated September 3, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 412) which seeks to set aside the order dated August 28, 1965 and approval of the Petition and Counter Petition dated August 27, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 410). Accordingly, on September 10, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Quezon issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit (Record, Vol. II, p. 414).

A petition to elevate the case was filed by Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion on November 5, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 429) in connection with the appealed case against defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. Likewise, said Special Prosecutor filed a 4th Motion to set arraignment and trial in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the other defendants on January 24, 1966 (Record, Vol. II, p. 432) which was granted in an order of the Court a quo dated February 26, 1966 and the arraignment and trial was set on June 21, 1966 (Record, Vol. II, p. 436).

The lower court not having elevated the case to this Court, Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion filed on February 28, 1966 another Petition to elevate the case to the Supreme Court (Record, Vol. II, p. 456) which was granted by the a quo in its order dated March 5, 1966 (Rollo, p. 6).

On July 11, 1966, the Court a quo acting on the Manifestation of the Special Prosecutor, ordered the cancellation and postponement of the arraignment and trial scheduled on that day until the special prosecutor shall have terminated the reinvestigation of the case with respect to some of the defendants or until such time that he (the Special Prosecutor) has filed an amended information. In the same order, the court a quo reiterating its order dated March 5, 1966, ordered the elevation of the record of the case to the Supreme Court (Rollo, p. 7). Thus, on August 15, 1966 (Rollo, p. 1; p. 40), the records of the case was elevated to this Court. Said records, however, show that the trial has not been finished as regards the other accused (Rollo, p. 82).

On March 13, 1967, the Solicitor General, representating the People of the Philippines, appellant, filed its Brief (Rollo, p. 27). Meanwhile, in the Court a quo, the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss dated October 18, 1967 against the defendants for lack of sufficient evidence and loss of interest of the prosecution witnesses, whose testimony is indispensable without which the prosecution cannot prosecute the same (Rollo, p. 41). On November 20, 1967, the court a quo acting on the Motion to Dismiss, ruled that it can act on said motion, when the special prosecutor has withdrawn his appeal in order that the record of the case be returned to the court a quo (Rollo, p. 48).

On the other hand, this Court, in its resolution dated February 19, 1980 (Rollo, p. 37) considered this case submitted for decision without Appellee's Brief, while defendants filed in this Court on February 20, 1980 a Motion for Remand of Record to the Court of First Instance of Quezon in order that the pending motion to dismiss before the Court a quo may be acted upon (Rollo, p. 38).

In its resolution dated March 4, 1980, this Court required the Solicitor General to comment on the motion filed by the counsel for accused-appellee dated February 9,1980 (Rollo, p. 50,) which was complied with by the Solicitor General in a comment filed on June 5, 1980 (Rollo, p. 81).

In the resolution of June 17, 1980, this Court granted the motion to remand the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Rollo, p. 86).

On August 25, 1980, the court a quo, in resolving the Motion to Dismiss dated October 18, 1967 filed by Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion, ordered the dismissal of the case against all the accused, with the exception of accused Tagumpay Nanadiego and further ordered the return of the record of this case to this Court where the appeal of the State Prosecutor in connection with the case as against the accused-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego is still pending (Record, Vol. IV, p. 189).

On April 11, 1988, this Court in its Resolution required the parties to manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or if supervening events have transpired which render the case moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same (Rollo, p. 102).

On July 11, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that he is still interested in prosecuting the case (Rollo, 111).

In its brief, appellant assigned the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WAS VALIDLY GRANTED AMNESTY ON JULY 7, 1959 BY THE ARMED FORCES COMMISSION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE 8TH GUERILLA AMNESTY COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION DATED JUNE 12, 1956 HAS ALREADY DENIED AMNESTY TO DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12145 AND SUSTAINED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS DECISIONS DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1960 AND JANUARY 21, 1963.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TO TRY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE UNDER THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE 12145 WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TAGUMPAY NANADIEGO.

The pivotal issue of the case is whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case against Tagumpay Nanadiego.

In Its Brief, appellant People of the Philippines contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the case against herein appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. Appellant averred that the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission and the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission both derived authorities from Proclamation Not 8, series of 1946 by the President of the Philippines. In this connection, as creations of the said proclamation, both commissions have concurrent jurisdiction over the case at bar and the first body that acquires jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of the other. Appellant further claimed that the decision of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission dated June 12, 1956 was issued or rendered earlier than that of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission dated July 7, 1959. Hence, the decision of the former is the controlling decision in the case at bar.

The records, however, show that the appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego applied for Amnesty before the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission on July 26, 1954 right after the case was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon. On the other hand, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, referred the case (Criminal Case No. 12145) to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission, on August 12, 1955. Therefore, insofar as appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego is concerned, jurisdiction was properly acquired by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission earlier than that of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Furthermore, it appears that appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego did not participate in the proceedings before the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Be that as it may, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts (Lee v. Presiding Judge, G.R. No. 68789, November 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 408). Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated (Abadilla v. Ramos, G.R. No. 71973, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 92; Lat v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 69 SCRA 425 [1975]; Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641 [1968]; Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Company, 16 SCRA 908 [1966]; Tuvera v. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 [1965]).

On July 7, 1959, the criminal liability of the appellee had been completely extinguished by virtue of the amnesty extended him by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines in Resolution No. 1-F 859. It has been consistently ruled by this Court that amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged; that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense (Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez, et al., 82 Phil. 642 [1949]). Amnesty is a public act of which the court should take judicial notice. Thus, the light to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the complainant or prosecution or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent, for he stands ill the eyes of the law as of the had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, and not be punished as criminal (Barrioquinto et al. v. Fernandez, et al., supra). Moreover when the Court a quo dismissed the case upon motion of defendant-appellee based on the resolution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission granting him amnesty, said court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

One of the grounds for a motion to quash a criminal case is when the criminal action or liability has been extinguished (Sec. 2[f], Rule 117). Criminal action or liability is totally extinguished by, among others, amnesty. Thus, Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Court a quo, acting on the motion to dismiss dated October 18, 1967 filed by Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion in Criminal Case No. 12145 alleging as grounds therefor, among others, insufficiency of evidence to warrant the prosecution of the case, issued an order dated August 20, 1980 dismissing the case against all the accused except appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. The latter was excluded from the order of dismissal because of the pendency of this appeal. To remand the case for further proceedings before the trial court at this late hour when as early as October 18, 1967, the prosecution has admittedly no evidence sufficient to warrant its prosecution, is a useless ritual which would not serve the ends of justice. At the ask of being repetitious, nothing would be gained by remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings since there is no offense to prosecute.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the trial court dated January 23, 1965 dismissing Criminal Case No. 12145 as against appellee Tagumpay A. Nanadiego with cost de oficio is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Case Digest - Banawa vs. Mirano, No. L-24750, 97 SCRA 517, May 16, 1980

Case Digest for Statutory Construction

FACTS: Defendants-appellants spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of Maria Mirano, Juliana’s niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido Punzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses wanted something for Maria after their death.

On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death she left only as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are children of the deceased’s brother.

The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba property as legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:

In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and were substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano was not legally adopted.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the instant case?

HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.