Engle vs. Doe, G.R. No. L-23317,August 7, 1925

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23317 August 7, 1925

FLOYD ENGLE, by his next friend E. Womack, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIA DOE (alias SILVESTRA PULGA), defendant-appellant.

Feria and La O for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

STATEMENT

By E. Womack, his next friend, it is alleged that Floyd Engle for about two months has been an inmate of the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila, where he was being treated for serious physical and mental disorders by Doctor N.M. Saleeby, the Director of the Hospital. That the defendant is a resident of the town of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, but at present is somewhere in the City of Manila. That on or about December 9, 1922, and in the hospital in the City of Manila, the defendant, through the aid of her friends and agents, induced and coerced Floyd Engle to go through some sort of a marriage ceremony with her, knowing at the time that he, Floyd Engle, was out of his mind and mentally deranged. That after the procuring of the certificate of the so-called marriage, the defendant forthwith returned to Tacloban, and endeavored to take possession of all of Engle's property who was worth at least P50,000. That the conspiracy of the defendant to marry him was for the sole purpose of obtaining his property, and to default Engle and his legitimate heirs of their property. That it is proper that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem under the provisions of sections 116 and 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Wherefore, plaintiff prays that a special provisional guardian be appointed for Engle and that a preliminary injunction issue against the defendant, restraining her from interfering with his property, and that the alleged marriage be declared void ab initio, and for costs, and such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable.

For answer, the defendant made a general and specific denial of all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense, alleges that for the last fourteen years she has been living maritally under the same roof with the plaintiff by whom she has had six children, the oldest of whom is twelve years of age. That on December 7th of last year, they were legally married. That in contracting the marriage, plaintiff was in the full enjoyment of all of his mental faculties, and that he entered into the contract freely, not only for the purpose of making his status and that of the defendant and her children legal, but to provide for her future in case of his death. That induced by his alleged friends, the plaintiff has caused and consented to the filing of the complaint, together with the application for the appointment of a guardian of his person and property, to make it appear that he is not of sound mind, when in truth and in fact he was then and is now in the full enjoyment of all of his mental faculties, and as a counterclaim, defendant alleges that when they began living together, plaintiff did not have any property, and that through her aid and assistance, he has amassed a considerable fortune, which at present is not less than P200,000. That the defendant has nothing with which to support herself and her children, and that P80 which at present the plaintiff is giving the defendant is not sufficient for that purpose. That to properly support herself and the children and to employ an attorney to defend the suit, she requires a pension of P500 per month and the sum of P800 to be paid in advance on account of attorney's fees, and the defendant prays that she be absolved from the complaint, and that the court make an order requiring the plaintiff to make such allowances for her pension and attorney's fees.

Upon such issues, testimony was taken, and in a well written opinion the lower court found:

That plaintiff at the time of said marriage ceremony in St. Luke's Hospital was mentally deranged to such an extent that he was incapable of entering into the marriage contract or any other contract, and that for this reason the marriage ceremony was null and void.

The court also finds that the defendant is not entitled to anything under her so-called counterclaim, and said counterclaim is hereby dismissed, and rendered a decree to the effect that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was "illegal, null, and void ab initio, and without any legal effect as to plaintiff's and defendant's property rights, without costs to either party.

The defendant appeals, contending:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was mentally deranged to such an extent that he was incapable of entering into the marriage contract, and therefore

II. The lower court erred in declaring the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant to be illegal, null, and void ab initio.

JOHNS, J.:

Opposing counsel have submitted able and exhaustive briefs. The question submitted is largely one of fact.

October 18, 1922. Floyd Engle became an inmate of St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila with Dr. N.M. Saleeby as his physician. It appears from the hospital records that at the time of his admission his disease was defined as:

Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis.

He remained in the hospital under the care of Doctor Saleeby until some time in March, 1923, when he was taken to Baguio, and upon his return to Manila in June, he left for the United States. The marriage ceremony between Engle and the defendant was performed in the hospital on December 7, 1922. December 20, 1922, a petition for the appointment of a guardian for him, alleging insanity, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on December 29, 1922. H.C. Powers was appointed guardian of his person and J.V. House guardian of his property. After the marriage Engle and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and on the following day the defendant left Manila and went back to Tacloban, Leyte, which was Engle's former residence, and made an effort to obtain possession of all his business and property.

The question presented is whether or not at the time of the marriage Engle was of sound mind and mentally capable of entering into a marriage contract. It will be noted that he was admitted to the hospital October 18, 1922, and the nature of his disease at the time of his admission was described in the hospital records as: "Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis," and that his alleged marriage to the defendant took place on December 7, 1922, fifty days after that time.

It appears from his testimony that Doctor Saleeby is 54 years old, and that he graduated from the University of New York Medical College in 1897, and, with the exception of four years, he has engaged in the active practice of his profession ever since and that he was in charge of St. Luke's Hospital from March, 1907, to September, 1912, and from March 1, 1921, to the present time. That during all of the time that Engle was in the hospital, he was under the personal charge of Doctor Saleeby, who was his only physician, and who testifies:

Q. Will you state to the court what was his mental condition during all the time that he was there; that is, from the time he entered the hospital in October, 1922, up to the time he left in March, 1923? — A. All the time he was under my care he was unable to exercise judgment or express his will or decision definitely on any question of any significance.

Q. Will you state to the court whether or not during all that time he had sufficient mentality to knowingly enter into a contract of any kind? — A. He was absolutely unable to make any decision of any kind, and was not fit to make a contract with any one in any business transaction of any significance.

Q. Was the mental condition of Mr. Engle the same from the time he entered the hospital up to the time he left, or did it suffer any change? — A. He was at his worst at the time the priest visited him, and he kept in that same condition until about a month prior to his discharge from the hospital. At the time of his discharge he was in better condition than when the priest visited him, but he was by no means in a fit mental condition.

Q. Will you state to the court whether or not during the time that Mr. Engle was in the hospital he was sane or insane? — A. Mr. Engle was insane from the date he entered the hospital until he was discharged.

The record is conclusive that Doctor Saleeby was a fair and impartial witness, and that he had no interest whatever in the result of this suit, and that he was in daily attendance upon Engle from the time that he entered until he left the hospital, covering a period of about five months. His testimony is materially strengthened and corroborated by the evidence of J.V. House, H.C. Powers, and E. Womack, who were lifelong personal and intimate friends of Engle.

Opposed to this is the evidence of the defendant and the Reverend H.J. Parker, who performed the marriage ceremony.

It must be conceded that the defendant is a party in interest, and the evidence of the Reverend Parker does not carry conviction. It is true that he gave it as his opinion that Engle was mentally sound, but he did not testify as to any fact or circumstance upon which he based his opinion. All of his answers to the questions propounded were more or less categorical, and it appears that any knowledge which he had as to the mental condition of Engle was confined and limited to the two conversations which he had with him in the hospital and which were about and concerning his marriage to the defendant. Much is also said about the evidence of Miguel Romualdez, the present Mayor of the City of Manila. But giving to it full force and credit, he did not see Engle after the 5th of December, 1922, and the marriage was on December 7th, and in answer to the question: "Did you notice any change or difference, in the manner of his conversation and behavior on December 5, 1922, as compared to previous conversation with Engle?" he said, "I have not noticed any change." That may all be true, and yet Engle would be of unsound mind. Be that as it may, the evidence for the defense is not sufficient to overcome that of the plaintiff.

The records of the admission of Engle to the hospital are authentic, and were made when there was no thought of any litigation.

Section 10 of General Orders No. 68 provides, among other things, that a marriage may be annulled for any of the following cases, existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x x x x x x

3. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

x x x x x x x x x

6. That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the marriage state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.

Section 9 of Act No. 2122 provides:

Within the meaning of this Act, insanity is a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.

The evidence is conclusive that at the time he was admitted to the hospital Engle was of unsound mind, and it tends to show that his disease was incurable. The fact that Engle was received and treated as an insane patient on October 18, 1922, and that he was not discharged from the hospital until March, 1923, throws the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish the fact that he was of sound mind at the time of the alleged marriage.

In Corpus Juris, volume 32, pages 757 and 758, it is said:

(SEC. 561) 2. Continuance of Insanity — (a) In General. — General insanity admitted, or once proved to exist, is presumed to continue; and, if a recovery or a lucid interval is alleged to have occurred, the burden to prove such allegation is on the person making it. . . .

(SEC. 562) (b) Rebuttal of Presumption. — The presumption that a person shown to be insane continued so is rebuttable. In order to rebut the presumption of continuance of insanity it is not necessary to show that the person has been restored to the full possession of his mental vigor. However, when insanity has once existed and it is sought to be proved that a subsequent act of its subject was done in a lucid interval, sanity must be shown as of the very time of the act in question; it is not sufficient to show a lucid interval before and after the day of the act.

Ruling Case Law, vol. 14, page 622, says:

74. Burden of Proof in Civil Cases Generally. — In all civil actions it is generally held that the burden of proof of insanity rests upon him who alleges insanity, or seeks to avoid an act on account of it, and it devolves upon him to establish the fact of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. If, however, a previous state of insanity as proved, the burden of proof is then usually considered to shift to him who asserts that the act was done while the person was sane, though it has frequently been held that insanity which is not shown to be settled or general as contradistinguished from a mere temporary aberration or hallucination will not be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. A lucid interval is in its nature temporary and uncertain in its duration, and there is no legal presumption of its continuance.

Applying this rule, there is a failure of proof on the part of the defendant. It is not sufficient to overcome the clear, positive and convincing testimony for the plaintiff, that Engle was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage. Again, on all questions of fact the lower court found for the plaintiff, and its findings are entitled to some weight.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs to either party. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-7071, April 29, 1954

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7071 April 29, 1954

PEDRO CRISOLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HIGINO B. MACADAEG, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Ramon J. Liceralde and Felicisimo U. Tiña for the respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order of the respondent judge requiring Pedro Crisolo to pay a monthly pension pendente lite to a minor allegedly his daughter.

Petitioner asserts that, summoned to answer Marieta Villa' s complaint for support of Maria Erlinda Crisolo as his and her natural daughter, he denied such paternity in an answer properly filed; that upon request of complainant the respondent judge, acting in excess of jurisdiction, before the hearing of the case, and without affording petitioner a chance to object, issued an order directing him to pay Marieta Villa P50 monthly for support pendente lite and for medical expenses of said minor Maria Erlinda; and that his motion for reconsideration was denied.

Respondents reply that support pendente lite was ordered in the interest of justice, after the judge had been shown the birth certificate of the child and a medical certificate showing she had been suffering from Little's Disease and had been confined at the Children's Hospital (National Indigent) for about three years.

The petitioners invokes Francisco vs. Zandueta's holding¹ that were a minor through a guardian ad litem, brings an action for support on the ground that he is a son of the defendant, and the defendant denies his paternity, the court has no jurisdiction to award support pendente lite, because paternity having been denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being an issue, there is no authority to grant support pendente lite until a positive declaration has been made as to the existence of the relationship.

Without going into question whether the documents exhibited to the respondent judge established prima facie the disputed relationship in this case, and whether upon such proofs provisional maintenance could be decreed,² we deem it sufficient to observe that the complaint merely averred that Maria Erlinda Crisolo was the natural daughter of Pedro Crisolo. It did not aver that she was his recognized natural daughter. And yet under the Civil Code and the new Civil Code a natural daughter, as such, has no right to maintenance, unless she has been recognized.³

It is earnestly urged that un unrecognized natural child would thus be in worse condition than other illegitimate children, who are admittedly entitled to support. But such was the juridical situation under the Civil Code for sixty years. It was criticized on that score — it was defended too. The Congress in the new Civil Code (Art. 291) elected not to alter the situation. Ours is not the duty nor the power to amend the statute, which by the way, presents no interstitial space wherein to insert, in the words of Cardozo, "judge-made innovations."

It is alleged however that: (a) the complaint for support was precisely a petition to compel recognition of a natural child; (b) recognition was in order, the certificate of birth being prima facie evidence of paternity and (c) consequently support pendente lite was justified. These three propositions will separately be discussed and rebutted.

A. The complaint did not expressly ask for recognition. Neither did it impliedly ask for the recognition, because it related no facts either voluntary recognition by defendant under article 278, or of compulsory recognition under article 283 of the new Civil Code. It merely proceeded on the theory — erroneous indeed — that as Erlinda was defendant's natural daughter support should be furnished by him. Furthermore, acknowledgment could not have been properly asked, because the action had been initiated by Marietta Villa, the mother and not by the daughter⁴. Litigations for recognition are between parent and child (Arts. 283, 284, 285 new Civil Code) — not between one parent and the other, unless one litigates as guardian of the child.

And the circumstance that at the ex-parte hearing of the petition for support pendente lite some paper was exhibited — supposedly competent evidence of fatherhood — did not have the effect of altering the issues or competing theories as previously outlined by the respective pleadings. To hold the contrary view would sanction the employment of surreptitious maneuvers definitely out of place in judicial proceedings.

B. The certificate of birth, it is argued, which was exhibited to the judge, constituted prima facie evidence of filiation. We disagree.

It is a document, filed with the Local Civil Register of Iloilo, and signed by "Clarita Gustillo, informant" on March 4, 1948, stating that Maria Erlinda Crisolo had been born in Iloilo on February 5, 1945, the legitimate daughter of Marieta Villa and Pedro Crisolo. Under article 410 of the new Civil Code this would be prima facie proof that Erlinda was the legitimate daughter of the persons mentioned. But having alleged and admitted that Maria Erlinda was not a legitimate daughter, plaintiff completely destroyed the certificate's worth as evidence.

If it be contended that such certificate could, at least be proof that Maria Erlinda was the daughter of Pedro Crisolo, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus would at once come to mind poisoning the question whether it applies to documents as well as witnesses. At any rate there is another line of thought compelling outright rejection of such certificate as proof of bastard father-and-child relationship: Had it expressly so state — that. Maria Erlinda was the illegitimate daughter of the persons mentioned — the certificate would not have been recorded (and would not be prima facie evidence) because it was signed only by Clarita Gustillo, and not by the parents of the infant.

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of birth. — The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. . . . In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein, any information by which such father could be identified. (Act No. 3753) (Emphasis ours.)

However, because the certificate described the child as legitimate it was accepted for registration upon the information of a third person, Clarita Gustillo. It is plain to see that to give the document probative value in court would be to approve evasion or circumvention of the above-indicated requirement, not to mention the violation of the specific prohibition against the revelation in the certificate of the name of the father without his consent.

Again pursuant to section 5, of the article 3753, the local civil register had no authority to make of record the paternity (illegitimate) of Pedro Crisolo upon the information of a third party. Wherefore his record could not be competent evidence of such paternity. Records of public officers which are admissible "are limited to those matters which the public officer has authority to record."⁵ And it is essential, to authorize admission of copy of the record of a private instrument "be made in accordance with the statutory requirements."⁶

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and for herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration, and it will be evidence for support pendente lite. And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities for mischief of such prima facie evidence — when and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design. The spirit of liberality towards illegitimate children need not be carried to that extent.

Divested of its official character, the document signed by Clarita Gustillo, the "certificate of birth", is undoubtedly incompetent evidence of fathership against Pedro Crisolo. As to him it is hearsay, it is res inter alios acta.

C. Supposing that the complaint amounted to a petition for recognition as natural child, and that the certificate of birth was prima facie evidence, the question remains whether support pendente lite may decreed. The argument might be advanced that as defendant is obliged to support only an acknowledged natural child, his obligation to support begins only from the moment he acknowledged i.e., only after he is compelled to acknowledge by decree of court at the petition of plaintiff. Nevertheless the angle need not be explored, because the two major premises on which it is constructed happen to be without foundation as above demonstrated.

Wherefore, in the absence of legal basis for Maria Erlinda's support, this petition will be granted,⁷ and the questioned order is hereby declared null and void. No costs.

Pablo, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur in the result.

Footnotes

¹ 61 Phil., 752.

² cf Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 112; Mangoma vs. Macadaeg, 90 Phil., 508; Moran, Rules of Court (1952) Vol. II p. 118.

³ Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 736; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil., 1 Potot vs. Ycong, 40 Off. Gaz., July 26, 1941; Art. 291 (3) new Civil Code.

⁴ The complaint is entitled "Marieta Villa as the natural mother of Maria Erlinda Crisolo," plaintiff vs. Pedro Crisolo, defendant. And the prayer asks that defendant be ordered to give plaintiff support for Maria Erlinda.

⁵ See 20 Am. Jur., Sec. 1024.

⁶ See 20 Am. Jur., p. 880.

⁷ cf. Saavedra vs. Ibañez, 56 Phil., 33.

Dealco Farms vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 153192, January 30, 2009

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009

DEALCO FARMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), CHIQUITO BASTIDA, and ALBERT CABAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Under review are Resolutions¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68972 denying due course to and dismissing petitioner Dealco Farms, Inc.’s petition for certiorari.

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and housed in, petitioner’s farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.

Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents’ work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently showering the cattle to prevent dehydration and to develop heat resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar incident.

Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents’ work ceases. For every round trip travel which lasted an average of 12 days, respondents were each paid P1,500.00. The 12-day period is occasionally extended when petitioner’s customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month, respondents usually made two trips.

On October 15, 1999, respondents Bastida and Caban, together with Ramon Maquinsay and Roland Parrocha, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for separation pay with full backwages, salary differentials, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioner, Delfin Alcoriza² and Paciano Danilo Ramis³ before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, General Santos City. Although the four complainants collectively filed a case against petitioner, Maquinsay and Parrocha never appeared in any of the conferences and/or hearings before the Labor Arbiter. Neither did they sign the verification page of complainants’ position paper. Most importantly, Maquinsay and Parrocha executed affidavits in favor of petitioner praying for the dismissal of the complaint insofar as they were concerned.

It appears that, on August 19, 1999, respondents were told by a Jimmy Valenzuela, a hepe de viaje, that he had been instructed by Ramis to immediately effect their replacement. Valenzuela proffered no reason for respondents’ replacement. Respondents’ repeated attempts to see and meet with Ramis, as well as to write Alcoriza, proved futile, compelling them to file an illegal dismissal case against petitioner and its officers.

In all, respondents alleged in their position paper that: (1) they were illegally dismissed, as they never violated any of petitioner’s company rules and policies; (2) their dismissal was not due to any just or authorized cause; and (3) petitioner did not observe due process in effecting their dismissal, failing to give them written notice thereof. Thus, respondents prayed for money claims, i.e., salary differentials, service incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance (COLA) and 13th month pay.lavvphi1.ne+

Petitioner, however, paints a different picture. Petitioner asserts that the finished cattle are sold to traders and middlemen who undertake transportation thereof to Manila for distribution to the wet markets. In fact, according to petitioner, the buyers and end-users of their finished cattle actually purchase the cattle as soon as they are considered ready for the market. Petitioner claims that once the finished cattle are bought by the buyers, these buyers act separately from, and independently of, petitioner’s business. In this regard, the buyers themselves arrange, through local representatives, for the (a) hauling from petitioner’s farm to the port area; (b) shipment of the finished cattle to Manila; and (c) escort or "comboy" services to feed and water the cattle during transit.

In its position paper, petitioner relates only one instance when it engaged the services of respondents as "comboys." Petitioner maintains that their arrangement with respondents was only on a "per-trip" or "per-contract" basis to escort cattle to Manila which contemplated the cessation of the engagement upon return of the ship to the port of origin – the General Santos City port.

Petitioner further narrates that sometime in 1998, and well into 1999, its import of cattle from Australia substantially decreased due to the devalued dollar. Consequently, petitioner was forced to downsize, and the sale and shipments to Manila were drastically reduced. Thus, petitioner and/or its buyers no longer retained escort or "comboy" services.

Ultimately, petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents. Petitioner posits that: (a) respondents are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested only in the result thereof; (c) in the alternative, respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production; and (d) respondents likewise failed to complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set forth in Article 280⁴ of the Labor Code, as petitioner’s shipments were substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or "comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.

On June 30, 2000, the Labor Arbiter found that respondents were employees of petitioner, thus:

[Petitioner] admits having engaged the services of [respondents] as caretakers or "comboys" (convoys) though it qualifies that it was on a "per trip" or "per contract" basis. It also admits paying their remuneration of P1,500.00 per trip. It tacitly admits having terminated [respondents’] services when it said that [respondents] were among the group of escorts who were no longer accommodated due to the decrease in volume of imports and shipments. [Petitioner] also undoubtedly exercised control and supervision over [respondents’] work as caretakers considering that the value of the cattle shipped runs into hundreds of thousands of pesos. The preparation of the cattle for shipment, manning and feeding them prior to and during transit, and making a report upon return to General Santos City to tally the records of the cattle shipped out versus cattle that actually reached Manila are certainly all in accordance with [petitioner’s] instructions.

Thus, all the four elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship being present, [x x x] [respondents] were, therefore, employees of [petitioner].

x x x [Respondents] also performed activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of [petitioner] (Art. 280, Labor Code). [Petitioner’s] contention, to the contrary, is erroneous. Transporting the cattle to its main market in Manila is an essential and component aspect of [petitioner’s] operation. As held by [the NLRC’s] Fifth Division in one case:

Complainant’s task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent. It is of judicial notice that the bulk of the market for livestock of big livestock raisers such as respondent is in Manila. Hogs do not swim, they are shipped. When in transit (usually two-and-one-half days) they do not queue to the mess hall, they are fed. x x x The caretaker is a component of the business, a part of the scheme of the operation. (NFL and Ricardo Garcia v. Bibiana Farms, Inc., NLRC CA No. XI-065089-99 (rab-xi-01-50026-98); prom. April 28, 2000).

More, it also appears that [respondents] had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of Art. 280). [Respondents], in fact, were hired on October 29, 1994 (Bastida) and June 25, 1993 (Caban), a fact which [petitioner] dismally failed to refute.

Given the foregoing, [petitioner’s] contention that [respondents] were independent contractors and free lancers deserves little consideration. Its argument that its usual trade or business (importation/production and fattening) ends in General Santos City, and does not include transporting the cattle, does not persuade us.

[Petitioner’s] witnesses tried to corroborate [its] contention that [respondents] also offered their services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to [petitioner]. Former complainants Maquinsay and Parrocha mentioned the names of these traders/buyers or shippers as Lozano Farms, Bibiana Farms and other big cattle feedlot farms in SOCSARGEN (Annexes "A" and "E," [petitioner’s] position paper.) But not a modicum of evidence was adduced to prove payment of [respondent’s] services by any of these supposed traders or that [respondents] received instructions from them. There is also no record that shows that the trader/s actually shipped livestock and engaged the services of caretakers.⁵

Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter granted respondents’ claim for separation pay, COLA and union service fees. The Labor Arbiter awarded respondents: (a) separation pay of one month for every year of service; (b) COLA, as petitioner failed to prove payment thereof or its exemption therefrom; and (c) union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award. The Labor Arbiter computed respondents’ total monetary awards as follows:

NAME	SEPARATION PAY	COLA	SUB-TOTAL
Chiquito Bastida	P15,000.00	P2,400.00	P17,400.00
Albert Caban	18,000.00	2,400.00	20,400.00
			P37,800.00
	Plus 10% Union Service Fees		3,780.00
		TOTAL ------	P41,580.006

However, the Labor Arbiter denied respondents’ claim for backwages, 13th month pay, salary differential, service incentive leave pay and damages, to wit:

But we deny the "claim" for backwages which was merely inserted in the prayer portion of [respondents’] position paper. Reasons are abundant why we decline to grant the same. In their complaint, [respondents] prayed for separation pay (not reinstatement with consequent backwages) thereby indicating right from the start that they do not want to work with [petitioner] again. More importantly[,] during the conference held on January 6, 2000, [petitioner] manifested its willingness to reinstate [respondents] to their former work as [comboys] under the same terms and conditions but [respondents] answered that they do not want to return to work and instead are asking for payment of their separation pay. Finally[,] [respondents] do not dispute that [petitioner’s] downsizing of its escorts in 1999 was due to a legitimate cause, i.e., dollar devaluation.

Also to go are [respondents’] labor standard claims for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as well as the claim for damages. We also deny the "claim" for salary differentials.

[Respondents] are not entitled to their claims for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay because they were paid on task basis. The claim for damages is denied for lack of factual and legal basis as there is no showing that respondent acted in bad faith in downsizing the number of its caretakers. It even appears that the same is due to a legitimate cause. The "claim" for salary differentials is denied on two grounds: (1) [these are] not prayed for in their complaint; and (2) for lack of merit. It takes not more than 3 days for the Gen. Santos-Manila trip. Even if we include counting the return trip that would be total of six (6) days to the maximum. [Respondents] were paid P1,500.00 per trip. Or, since they made an average of 2 trips/month they were paid P3,000.00 for a twelve (12) days’ work (or the equivalent of P250.00/day).⁷

On appeal to the NLRC, the Fifth Division affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and the total monetary award of P41,580.00 representing respondents’ separation pay, COLA and union service fees. The NLRC declared:

After a judicious review of the records of this case, we found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the branch.

The presence of the four (4) elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship has been clearly established by the facts and evidence on record, starting with the admissions of [petitioner] who acknowledged the engagement of [respondents] as escorts of their cattles shipped from General Santos to Manila, and the compensation of the latter at a fee of P1,500.00 per trip. The dates claimed by [respondents] that they were engaged remain not disputed by [petitioner] as observed by the branch.

The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions, supervision and control by [petitioner] on [respondents’] performance of work as escorts for which they were hired. This we agree on all four[s]. The livestock shipment would cost thousands of pesos and the certainty of it reaching its destination would be the only thing any operator would consider at all [time] and under all circumstances. Nothing more, nothing less. It is illogical for [petitioner] to argue that the shipment was not necessary [or] desirable to their business, as their business was mainly livestock production, because they were undeniably the owners of the cattle escorted by [respondents]. Should losses of a shipment occur due to [respondents’] neglect these would still be [petitioners’] loss, and nobody else’s.

At this point, we emphasize the fact that even on appeal [petitioner] declines to refute, by way of evidence, the finding of the branch that they failed to prove the payment of [respondents’] services by any of the supposed traders, or that said traders actually shipped livestock. This is the point where the case of NFL v. Bibiana Farms cited by [petitioner] differs from the instant case in that bills of lading issued to, thus, in the name of the hog shippers were submitted as proof that said shippers engaged, compensated and supervised the escorts or convoys in their work, and not the hog raisers.⁸

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. As previously adverted to, the CA denied due course and dismissed the petition for the following procedural flaws:

1) other material portions of the record referred to in the petition are not attached thereto such as the Complaint for illegal dismissal and position papers of the parties, in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and

2) there is no written explanation why personal service was not resorted to, as required under Sec. 11, Rule 13, Ibid.⁹

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied by the appellate court.

Hence, this appeal positing the following issues:

1. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition for certiorari based on technical rules of procedure.

2. Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

3. Corollary thereto, whether the NLRC gravely erred when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner and the consequent award of money claims to respondents.

At the outset, we observe that petitioner raises extraneous issues which were obviously not passed upon by appellate court when the latter denied due course and dismissed outright the petition for certiorari. As such, the instant petition for review on certiorari directly assails the NLRC’s decision which mainly involves factual issues, such as whether respondents were employees of petitioner and if they are entitled to their money claims.

Petitioner is unconcerned with the CA’s reasons for dismissing the petition and, in fact, declares that the dismissal was done with grave abuse of discretion for sticking to the provisions of the Rules of Court – a "mere technicality" as petitioner cavalierly puts it. Petitioner asseverates that the CA dismissal "defeat[s] substantial justice considering that [it] has a strong cause of action against [respondents]." In all, petitioner submits that it had faithfully complied with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court by submitting an explanation and a duly notarized affidavit of service of Maria Fe Sobrevega. Petitioner likewise points out that the Explanation for the resort to service of the petition for certiorari via registered mail is found on page 30 thereof. Curiously, however, only the copy of the same document submitted to the CA lacked an Explanation.

We completely agree with the appellate court’s forthright dismissal of the petition for certiorari.

Even if we are to overlook petitioner’s account on the curious case of the missing Explanation only in the CA’s copy of the petition, petitioner’s non-compliance with the requisites for the filing a petition for certiorari remains. We detect petitioner’s ploy to sidestep a more fatal procedural error, i.e., the failure to attach copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari set forth in paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which reads:

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.¹⁰

Corollary thereto, the second paragraph of Section 6, Rule 65, the first paragraph of Section 2, Rule 56, and the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 respectively read:

SEC. 6. Order to comment. — x x x

In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. x x x

SEC. 2. Rules applicable. — The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rules[.] x x x

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. — x x x

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Quite apparent from the foregoing is that the CA did not err, much less commit grave abuse of discretion, in denying due course to and dismissing the petition for certiorari for its procedural defects. Petitioner’s failure to attach copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to its petition for certiorari warranted the outright dismissal thereof.

Petitioner, however, invokes the righteous ends of substantial justice as would exempt it from adherence to procedural rules. Petitioner claims that the merits of its case necessitate a liberal interpretation of the Rules of Court leading to a reversal of the appellate court’s outright dismissal of its petition.

Regrettably, upon an evaluation of the merits of the petition, we do not find cause to disturb the findings of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC, which are supported by substantial evidence.

The well-entrenched rule is that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.¹¹ Section 5, Rule 133 defines substantial evidence as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."1avvphi1.ne+

Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly adhered to in labor cases.¹² We may take cognizance of and resolve factual issues only when the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the CA.¹³

In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct, or the so-called "control test."¹⁴ Of the four, the power of control is the most important element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof.¹⁵

Naturally, both petitioner’s and respondents’ claims are on opposite poles. Respondents aver that they were regular employees of petitioner, designated as escorts or "comboys" for the latter’s cattle. Petitioner, on the other hand, denies that claim, and simultaneously asserts that respondents are free lance escorts who offer their services to the buyers, middlemen and traders of petitioner. Petitioner further asserts that its business is only confined to the fattening of cattle and their sale once they reach the required market weight. According to petitioner, its business does not include the shipment of cattle, which is undertaken by the middlemen, traders and buyers, who, as owners thereof, engage respondents’ services to care for the cattle while in transit. Thus, petitioner ultimately asserts that respondents, at that juncture, were under the control and supervision of these middlemen, traders and buyers.

To support the foregoing contentions, petitioner simply presents the affidavits of Maquinsay and Parrocha, original complainants before the Labor Arbiter, praying for the withdrawal of the complaint for illegal dismissal insofar as they are concerned. Maquinsay and Parrocha both allege that their engagement with petitioner is on a "per-trip" or "per-contract" basis, and that they and their fellow "comboys" or escorts, herein respondents, did not offer their services to petitioner alone.

Paying no heed to petitioner’s narration of the contemplated arrangement with respondents, the Labor Arbiter pointed out the following:

[Maquinsay and Parrocha, petitioner’s] witnesses, tried to corroborate [petitioner’s] contention that complainants also offered their services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to [petitioner]. Former complainants Maquinsay and Parrocha mentioned the names of these traders/buyers or shippers as Lozano Farms, Bibiana Farms and other big cattle feedlot farms in SOCSARGEN (Annexes "A" and "B", [petitioner’s] position paper). But not a modicum of evidence was adduced to prove payment of [respondents’] services by any of these supposed traders or that [respondents] received instructions from them. There is also no record that the trader/s actually shipped livestock and engaged the services of caretakers.¹⁶

Echoing the same observation, the NLRC declared, thus:

At this point, we emphasize the fact that even on appeal [petitioner] decline to refute, by way of evidence, the finding of the branch that they failed to prove the payment of [respondents’] services by any of the supposed traders, or that said traders actually shipped livestock. This is the point where the case of NFL v. Bibiana Farms cited by [petitioner] differ from the instant case in that bills of lading issued to, thus, in the name of the hog shippers were submitted as proof that said shippers engaged, compensated and supervised the escorts or convoys in their work, and not the hog raisers.¹⁷

Yet, petitioner is adamant that its lack of documentary evidence should not be taken against it since Maquinsay and Parrocha, two of the original complainants, attest to the nature of a "comboy’s" or escort’s work.

Significantly, Maquinsay’s and Parrocha’s affidavits proffer no reason why, in the first place, they filed, along with herein respondents, the complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Maquinsay and Parrocha made an absolute turnaround and retracted their previous claim of regular employee status without proof to support their allegations as against the claim of the remaining complainants, herein respondents.

Conveniently, for its purposes, petitioner claims that Maquinsay’s and Parrocha’s affidavits "substantiate the claim of petitioner that indeed shipping arrangements and accommodation of escorts, which are informal in nature and, thus, unrecorded, are under the responsibility, control and supervision of the buyers and traders." Essentially, petitioner insists that the affidavits of Maquinsay and Parrocha should bear more weight than the claims of respondents in their complaint and position paper.

We reject petitioner’s self-serving contention. Having failed to substantiate its allegation on the relationship between the parties, we stick to the settled rule in controversies between a laborer and his master that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the former’s favor.¹⁸ The policy is reflected in no less than the Constitution,¹⁹ Labor Code²⁰ and Civil Code.²¹

Moreover, petitioner’s other contention that the shipment and the escort of live cattle is not part of its business, thus, at most, respondents may only be considered as casual employees, likewise fails to persuade.

First. Petitioner failed to disprove respondents’ claim that they were hired by petitioner as "comboys" from 1993 and 1994, respectively. In fact, petitioner admits that respondents were engaged, at one point, as "comboys," on a "per trip" or "per contract" basis. This assertion petitioner failed anew to substantiate. Noteworthy is the fact that Maquinsay’s and Parrocha’s affidavit merely contain a statement that the offer of their services as "comboys" or escorts was not limited to petitioner alone. The affidavits simply aver that they, including herein respondents, were engaged by Dealco on a "per trip" basis, which commenced upon embarkation on a ship for Manila and terminated upon their return to the port of origin. Maquinsay and Parrocha did not state that respondents’ engagement by petitioner was on a one-time basis. As a result, petitioner’s claim remains an unsubstantiated and bare-faced allegation.

Second. Even assuming that respondents’ task is not part of petitioner’s regular course of business, this does not preclude their attainment of regular employee status.

Article 280 of the Labor Code explicitly provides:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.²²

Undoubtedly, respondents were regular employees of petitioner with respect to the escort or "comboy" activity for which they had been engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to continuity or brokenness of the service.

Lastly, considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiter’s and the NLRC’s finding of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies’ finding of respondents’ illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to disturb the award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated July 29, 2001 of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. M-005974-2000 (RAB-11-10-50453-99) is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA* Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

^* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 556 dated January 15, 2009.

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now deceased), with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed) and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 202-203, 323.

² President of petitioner Dealco Farms, Inc.

³ South Cotabato manager of petitioner Dealco Farms, Inc.

⁴ Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. – The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

⁵ Rollo, pp. 49-51.

⁶ Id. at 53.

⁷ Id. at 51-52.

⁸ Id. at 60-61.

⁹ Id. at 202.

¹⁰ Emphasis supplied.

¹¹ G & M (Phils.), Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 140495, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 215, 220.

¹² PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 44, 54.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 350 Phil. 35, 58 (1998); Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 164, 171.

¹⁵ Lopez v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 154472, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 428, 446.

¹⁶ Rollo, p. 51. (Emphasis supplied.)

¹⁷ Id. at 60-61.

¹⁸ L.T. Datu & Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 323 Phil. 521, 531 (1996).

¹⁹ Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

²⁰ Art. 4. Construction in favor of Labor. — All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

²¹ Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

²² Emphasis supplied.

White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

Tinga, J.:

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).

I.

The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.

SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.

SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.

SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.

SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.

Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21

Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:

[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22

The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:

"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.

II.

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that:

"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."36

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function."38

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

III.

To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.

The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.41

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

A.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.

B.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.50

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.

C.

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.

Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

D.

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[66]

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

E.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

IV.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well­-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice (On Sick Leave)

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.

2 See rollo, pp. 4-41.

3Id. at 42-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez (later, Solicitor-General) and Antonio P. Solano.

4 Id. at 46.

5 Id. at 62-69.

6 Id. at 45-46.

7 Id. at 70-77.

8 Id. at 47.

9Id.

10Id.

11Id. at 48.

12Id. at 81.

13Id. at 82-83.

14Id. at 84-99.

15 Id. at 104-105.

16 Id. at 49.

17 Id. at 52.

18Id. at 120.

19 No. L-74457, 20 March 1987, 148 SCRA 659.

20 Rollo, pp. 129-145.

21 Id. at 158.

22 Id. at 53.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 43-59.

25 Id. at 4-40.

26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

27 Const., Art. VIII , Sec. 5, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).

28Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979).

29See Domingo v. Carague, G.R. No. 161065, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 450. See also Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236.

30 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

31Supra note 29.

32 499 U.S. 400 (1991).

33 Id. at p 410-411.

34 See Kelsey McCowan Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 237, for a general discussion on advocacy groups.

35 381 U.S. 479(1965).

36 Id. at 481.

37429 U.S. 190 (1976).

38Id. at 194.

39 Chavez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 415; Adiong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 712.

40127 Phil. 306 (1967).

41 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.

42 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306 (1967).

43 JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94 (1996) citing Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).

44 U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759.

45 People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938).

46 Javier v. Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 (1937).

47 Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 (1931).

48 See U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1908); Insular Government v. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil. 58 (1910).

49 Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).

50 See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 330 citing CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).

51 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

52 Id, at 152.

53 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

54 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).

55 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

56 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

57 Central Bank Employee’s Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531 (2004); Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; In Ermita-Malate, supra note 1 at 324, the Court in fact noted: "if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider."

58 Central Bank Employee’s Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 57.

59Id.

60 Mendoza, J., Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.

61Id.

62 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

63 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

64 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the use of the equal protection clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the latter fell into disfavor in the United States. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies (2nd ed. 2002).

65 Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

66Id. at 440.

67 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 336-337.

68 Rollo, p. 258.

69 "Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises — be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. (See Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom — it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. supra note 1 at 337-338.

70 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 338-339.

71 Metro Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., G.R. Nos. 170656 and 170657, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 341.

72 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910).

73 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

74 Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD, G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007, Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 24 Phil. 172 (1968); U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918).

75 Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 314 Phil. 131 (1995).

76 Supra note 1.

77 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; De La Cruz, et al. v. Hon. Paras, et al., 208 Phil. 490 (1983); Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note 42.

78 "The end of the state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of life." Therefore any state "which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance…" The law "should be a rule of life such as will make the members of a [state] good and just." Otherwise it "becomes a mere covenant – or (in the phrase of the Sophist Lycophron) ‘a guarantor of men’s rights against one another.’" Politics II.9.6-8.1280 31-1280bii; cited in Hamburger, M., Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory (1951 ed.), p. 178.

79 Greenwalt, K., Conflicts of Law and Morality (1989 ed.), at 38.

80 Steven G., Render Unto Caesar that which is Caesars, and unto God that which is God’s, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 495. He cites the example of the failed Twentieth (?) Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibited the sale and consumption of liquor, where it was clear that the State cannot justly and successfully regulate consumption of alcohol, when huge portions of the population engage in its consumption.

See also Posner, Richard H., The Problematics of Moral And Legal Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2002). He writes:

. . . Holmes warned long ago of the pitfalls of misunderstanding law by taking its moral vocabulary too seriously. A big part of legal education consists of showing students how to skirt those pitfalls. The law uses moral terms in part because of its origin, in part to be impressive, in part to speak a language that the laity, to whom the commands of the law are addressed, is more likely to understand – and in part, because there is a considerable overlap between law and morality. The overlap, however, is too limited to justify trying to align these two systems of social control (the sort of project that Islamic nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been engaged in of late). It is not a scandal when the law to pronounce it out of phase with current moral feeling. If often is, and for good practical reasons (in particular, the law is a flywheel, limiting the effects of wide swings in public opinion). When people make that criticism—as many do of the laws, still found on the statute books of many states, punishing homosexual relations—what they mean is that the law neither is supported by public opinion nor serves any temporal purpose, even that of stability, that it is merely a vestige, an empty symbol.

81 See Burton, S., Judging in Good Faith, (1992 ed.), at 218.