Ministerio vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971

ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C. BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.

Eriberto Seno for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

What is before this Court for determination in this appeal by certiorari to review a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the question of whether or not plaintiffs, now petitioners, seeking the just compensation to which they are entitled under the Constitution for the expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of a street, no condemnation proceeding having been filed, could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials without thereby violating the principle of government immunity from suit without its consent. The lower court, relying on what it considered to be authoritative precedents, held that they could not and dismissed the suit. The matter was then elevated to us. After a careful consideration and with a view to avoiding the grave inconvenience, not to say possible injustice contrary to the constitutional mandate, that would be the result if no such suit were permitted, this Court arrives at a different conclusion, and sustains the right of the plaintiff to file a suit of this character. Accordingly, we reverse.

Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.

In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." ¹

The lower court decision now under review was promulgated on January 30, 1969. As is evident from the excerpt to be cited, the plea that the suit was against the government without its consent having been manifested met with a favorable response. Thus: "It is uncontroverted that the land in question is used by the National Government for road purposes. No evidence was presented whether or not there was an agreement or contract between the government and the original owner and whether payment was paid or not to the original owner of the land. It may be presumed that when the land was taken by the government the payment of its value was made thereafter and no satisfactory explanation was given why this case was filed only in 1966. But granting that no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in this case. It may be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General and not against the National Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their official capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have been made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent." ²

Then came this petition for certiorari to review the above decision. The principal error assigned would impugn the holding that the case being against the national government which was sued without its consent should be dismissed, as it was in fact dismissed. As was indicated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, this assignment of error is justified. The decision of the lower court cannot stand. We shall proceed to explain why.

1. The government is immune from suit without its consent. ³ Nor is it indispensable that it be the party proceeded against. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. It follows then that even if the defendants named were public officials, such a principle could still be an effective bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial responsibility for the government, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is not personal. The party that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability may be interposed. ⁴

So it has been categorically set forth in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez: ⁵ "However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government." ⁶

2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean: ⁷ "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." ⁸

3. It would follow then that the prayer in the amended complaint of petitioners being in the alternative, the lower court, instead of dismissing the same, could have passed upon the claim of plaintiffs there, now petitioners, for the recovery of the possession of the disputed lot, since no proceeding for eminent domain, as required by the then Code of Civil Procedure, was instituted. ⁹ However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay City, ¹⁰ this Court speaking through Justice Montemayor, restoration would be "neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes." ¹¹ The only relief, in the opinion of this Court, would be for the government "to make due compensation, ..." ¹² It was made clear in such decision that compensation should have been made "as far back as the date of the taking." Does it result, therefore, that petitioners would be absolutely remediless since recovery of possession is in effect barred by the above decision? If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use ¹³ were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." ¹⁴ If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. ¹⁵

Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed with the complaint and determine the compensation to which petitioners are entitled, taking into account the ruling in the above Alfonso case: "As to the value of the property, although the plaintiff claims the present market value thereof, the rule is that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time that it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government." ¹⁶

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of January 30, 1969 dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Petition, Annex H, pp. 1 and 2.

2 Ibid, Annex I, p.4.

3 Cf. Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, L-26386, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 598; Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. United States Lines Co., L-26533, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 309; Switzerland General Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Republic, L-27389, March 30, 1970; 32 SCRA 227.

4 Cf. Begosa v. Chairman Philippine Veterans Administration, L-25916, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 466, citing Ruiz v. Cabahug, 102 Phil. 110 (1957) and Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949).

5 84 Phil. 312 (1949) affirmed in Marvel Building Corp. v. Phil. War Damage Commission, 85 Phil. 27 (1949) and Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807 (1954). Such a doctrine goes back to Tan Te v. Bell, 27 Phil. 354 (1914). Cf. L. S. Moon v. Harrison, 43 Phil 27 (1922).

6 Ibid., p. 319.

7 L-31135, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 368.

8 Ibid., pp. 377-378.

9 Act No. 190 (1901). According to Section 241 of such Code: "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having by law the right to condemn private property for public use shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed." The next section reads: "The complaint in condemnation proceedings shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, and describe the property sought to be condemned, showing the interest of each defendant separately." Sec. 242.

10 106 Phil. 1017 (1960).

11 Ibid., p. 1022.

12 Ibid.

13 "According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

14 Section 247 of Act No. 190 reads in full: "Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of compensation as fixed by the judgment, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. In case the defendant and his attorney absent themselves from the court or decline to receive the same, payment may be made to the clerk of the court for him, and such officer shall be responsible on his bond therefor and shall be compelled to receive it."

15 Cf. Merrit v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311 (1916); Compania General de Tabacos v. Government, 45 Phil. 663 (1924); Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724 (1937); Bull v. Yatco, 67 Phil. 728 (1939); Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281 (1952) ; Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905 (1954); Angat River Irrigation v. Angat River Workers' Union, 102 Phil. 789 (1957); Concepcion, J., diss.; Lyons, Inc. v. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593 (1958); Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120; Hartford Insurance Co. v. P. D. Marchessini & Co., L-24544, November 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 860; Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Maersk Line Far East Service, L-27189, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 519; Insurance Co. of North America v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, L-22784, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 780; Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, L-26386, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 598.

16 Alfonso v. Pasay City, 106 Phil. 1017, 1022-1023 (1960).

People vs. Vera, G.R. No. L-26539 February 28, 1990

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26539 February 28, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIO VERA, ET AL., defendants. TAGUMPAY A. NANADIEGO, defendant-appellee.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal interposed by the People of the Philippines from the Order * of the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch II, in Criminal Case No. 12145 dated January 23, 1965, dismissing the case as against defendant-appellee Tagumpay A. Nanadiego with cost de oficio.

The dispositive portion of the said order reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant case is Ordered dismissed as against this defendant Tagumpay A. Nanadiego, with cost de oficio. The bail bond posted by said defendant for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and declared of no further force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On July 23, 1954, a complaint for kidnapping with murder docketed as Criminal Case No. 2454 was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon by Sgt. Francisco G. de Asis, P.C. of Lucena City against the following: Gaudencio Vera, Restitute Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florida Arcadio Talavera, Sr., Tagumpay Nanadiego, Paulino Bayran, Jaime Garcia and 92 others (Record, Vol. I, p. 1).

On December 20,1954, a manifestation and motion was filed by the accused Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas and Tagumpay Nanadiego through counsel de Mesa and de Mesa where the above-named accused entered a plea of not guilty and further renounced their rights to the second stage of the preliminary investigation by the justice of the peace, and finally prayed that the case be elevated to the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Record, Vol. 1, p. 231) which was granted in an order dated December 22, 1954 by the aforesaid court (Record, Vol. 1, pp. 24-25).

In February 23, 1955, an information (Record, Vol. I, p. 94) was filed by the then Provincial Fiscal Jose O. Lardizabal in the Court of First Instance of Quezon charging the accused (including Tagumpay Nanadiego) with the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder, defined and punished under Articles 48, 267 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of February, 1945, in the Municipality of Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of His Hon. Court, the above-named accused Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Arcadio Talavera, Tagumpay Nanadiego and Paulino Bayran alias Enong, together with Jaime Garcia and 92 other John Does who are still at large armed with high power rifles such as .50 caliber machinegun, .30 caliber machinegun, Browning automatic rifles, carbines, Garrands, Springfield rifles, pistols and Revolver of different calibers, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one Amadeo Lozanes in his residence at said municipality of Unisan, Quezon, with both hands tied together, detain and carry him to Vera's Headquarters located at Lalaguna, Municipality of Lopez, Quezon, and while he (Amadeo Lozanes) was under their custody and control, in pursuance of their conspiracy, taking advantage of their superior strength, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously boxed, kicked, tortured and later on executed on March 14, 1945, in the said barrio of Lalaguna, Lopez, Quezon.

Contrary to law.

On May 11, 1955, an Urgent Petition was filed by Provincial Fiscal Lardizabal praying that the case be referred to the Amnesty Commission (Record, Vol. I, p. 158). On the same date, the AFP Amnesty Commission requested the Provincial Fiscal to furnish said Commission with a true copy of the records of Criminal Case No. 12145. The records requested were forwarded to the Commission on July 15, 1955 (Brief for the Appellant, p. 3, Rollo, p. 27).

On June 22, 1955, the Provincial Fiscal filed an amended information against the same accused (including accused-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego) for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Record, Vol. I, p. 207).

On August 12, 1955, the above case was referred to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission (Record, Vol. I, p. 229). Few days thereafter, Hon. Vicente del Rosario of the Court First Instance of Quezon, acting upon authority from the Department of Justice, convoked the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission composed of different judges of Laguna, Mindoro, Batangas and Quezon (Brief for the Appellant, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27).

On June 12, 1956, after a continuous trial of the case, in which Tagumpay Nanadiego was one of the accused, the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission held that none of the defendants admitted having committed the crime charged. Such being the case, defendants have no use for amnesty as amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime; hence, the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission has no jurisdiction, thereby remanding the case to the court a quo (Record, Vol. II, p. 156).

On July 20, 1956, accused filed a motion for reconsideration (Record, Vol. I, p. 167) which the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission denied in its order dated January 11, 1957, and maintained its order to return the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon for lack of jurisdiction (Record, Vol. II, p. 175).

Thereafter, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision and order of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission under date of June 12,1956 and January 11, 1957, respectively (Record, Vol. II, pp. 185-186) for which reason the entire record was elevated to the Court of Appeals as per order dated February 12, 1957 (Record, Vol. II, p. 187). On appeal, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 2004-R.

On November 16, 1960, the Court of Appeals, in its decision affirmed the decision and order appealed from (Record, Vol. II, p. 191). Later, a petition for review was filed in the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-18184.

In a decision dated January 31, 1963, this Court affirmed the decision and order of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed, and ruled that a previous admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty since the invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation (Record, Vol. II, p. 198). The above decision became final and executory on November 6, 1963 as per Entry of Judgment (Record, Vol. II, p. 204).

On December 21, 1963, Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion filed a petition ex parte in the Court of First Instance of Quezon praying that a trial on the merits of the case be continued for which reason the case was set for arraignment and trial sometime in January, 1964 (Record, Vol. II, p. 205).

On January 11, 1965, defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Information" (Record, Vol. II, p. 357) in the above entitled case on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by virtue of the amnesty extended him by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines in Resolution No. 1-F 859 (Record, Vol. II, p. 360) dated July 7, 1959 in accordance with Proclamation No. 8, series of 1946 of the President of the Philippines, and that the defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego, claimed that he applied before the Amnesty Commission; Armed Forces of the Philippines on July 26, 1954 for amnesty under Proclamation No. 8, s. 46 of the President of the Philippines in connection with the charge filed against him on July 23, 1954 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon. However, on January 22, 1965, an opposition to the urgent motion to quash was filed by special prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion although the latter in his opposition admits that "on July 7, 1959, the AFP Amnesty Commission cleared the petitioner Tagumpay Nanadiego in its decision" (Record, Vol. II, p. 371).

Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, in an order dated January 23, 1965 ordered that the aforesaid case against Tagumpay Nanadiego be dismissed (Record, Vol. II, p. 375) on the ground that "the crime for which the accused was charged in the Armed Forces Amnesty Commission is the same charge in the criminal case No. 12145" which was "admitted by the Special Prosecutor of the Department of Justice in open court" manifesting that the accused was granted amnesty on July 7, 1959. Further, the lower court ruled that "to try the accused under the information in criminal case No. 12145 would be tantamount to trying him for an offense where he has been granted amnesty long time ago, and to try him again would constitute double jeopardy." However, a motion for reconsideration dated January 31, 1965 was filed by special prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion (Record, Vol. II, p. 377) which was denied by the trial court in its order dated February 6, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 401).

Hence, this appeal.

On February 11, 1965, the special prosecutor filed a notice of appeal from the order dated January 23, 1965 dismissing the case against Tagumpay Nanadiego (Record, Vol. II, p. 400). Meanwhile, on May 24,1965, a Motion to Set Arraignment and Trial and Manifestation was filed by the special prosecutor in the trial court (Record, Vol. II, pp. 402-403) which was granted in an order dated August 28, 1965 and the arraignment and trial was set on September 4,1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 411).

On the other hand, defendants filed through their counsel a Petition and Counter Petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon dated August 27, 1965 followed by their Motion for Reconsideration dated September 3, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 412) which seeks to set aside the order dated August 28, 1965 and approval of the Petition and Counter Petition dated August 27, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 410). Accordingly, on September 10, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Quezon issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit (Record, Vol. II, p. 414).

A petition to elevate the case was filed by Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion on November 5, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 429) in connection with the appealed case against defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. Likewise, said Special Prosecutor filed a 4th Motion to set arraignment and trial in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the other defendants on January 24, 1966 (Record, Vol. II, p. 432) which was granted in an order of the Court a quo dated February 26, 1966 and the arraignment and trial was set on June 21, 1966 (Record, Vol. II, p. 436).

The lower court not having elevated the case to this Court, Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion filed on February 28, 1966 another Petition to elevate the case to the Supreme Court (Record, Vol. II, p. 456) which was granted by the a quo in its order dated March 5, 1966 (Rollo, p. 6).

On July 11, 1966, the Court a quo acting on the Manifestation of the Special Prosecutor, ordered the cancellation and postponement of the arraignment and trial scheduled on that day until the special prosecutor shall have terminated the reinvestigation of the case with respect to some of the defendants or until such time that he (the Special Prosecutor) has filed an amended information. In the same order, the court a quo reiterating its order dated March 5, 1966, ordered the elevation of the record of the case to the Supreme Court (Rollo, p. 7). Thus, on August 15, 1966 (Rollo, p. 1; p. 40), the records of the case was elevated to this Court. Said records, however, show that the trial has not been finished as regards the other accused (Rollo, p. 82).

On March 13, 1967, the Solicitor General, representating the People of the Philippines, appellant, filed its Brief (Rollo, p. 27). Meanwhile, in the Court a quo, the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss dated October 18, 1967 against the defendants for lack of sufficient evidence and loss of interest of the prosecution witnesses, whose testimony is indispensable without which the prosecution cannot prosecute the same (Rollo, p. 41). On November 20, 1967, the court a quo acting on the Motion to Dismiss, ruled that it can act on said motion, when the special prosecutor has withdrawn his appeal in order that the record of the case be returned to the court a quo (Rollo, p. 48).

On the other hand, this Court, in its resolution dated February 19, 1980 (Rollo, p. 37) considered this case submitted for decision without Appellee's Brief, while defendants filed in this Court on February 20, 1980 a Motion for Remand of Record to the Court of First Instance of Quezon in order that the pending motion to dismiss before the Court a quo may be acted upon (Rollo, p. 38).

In its resolution dated March 4, 1980, this Court required the Solicitor General to comment on the motion filed by the counsel for accused-appellee dated February 9,1980 (Rollo, p. 50,) which was complied with by the Solicitor General in a comment filed on June 5, 1980 (Rollo, p. 81).

In the resolution of June 17, 1980, this Court granted the motion to remand the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Rollo, p. 86).

On August 25, 1980, the court a quo, in resolving the Motion to Dismiss dated October 18, 1967 filed by Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion, ordered the dismissal of the case against all the accused, with the exception of accused Tagumpay Nanadiego and further ordered the return of the record of this case to this Court where the appeal of the State Prosecutor in connection with the case as against the accused-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego is still pending (Record, Vol. IV, p. 189).

On April 11, 1988, this Court in its Resolution required the parties to manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or if supervening events have transpired which render the case moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same (Rollo, p. 102).

On July 11, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that he is still interested in prosecuting the case (Rollo, 111).

In its brief, appellant assigned the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WAS VALIDLY GRANTED AMNESTY ON JULY 7, 1959 BY THE ARMED FORCES COMMISSION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE 8TH GUERILLA AMNESTY COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION DATED JUNE 12, 1956 HAS ALREADY DENIED AMNESTY TO DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12145 AND SUSTAINED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS DECISIONS DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1960 AND JANUARY 21, 1963.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TO TRY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE UNDER THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE 12145 WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TAGUMPAY NANADIEGO.

The pivotal issue of the case is whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case against Tagumpay Nanadiego.

In Its Brief, appellant People of the Philippines contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the case against herein appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. Appellant averred that the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission and the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission both derived authorities from Proclamation Not 8, series of 1946 by the President of the Philippines. In this connection, as creations of the said proclamation, both commissions have concurrent jurisdiction over the case at bar and the first body that acquires jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of the other. Appellant further claimed that the decision of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission dated June 12, 1956 was issued or rendered earlier than that of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission dated July 7, 1959. Hence, the decision of the former is the controlling decision in the case at bar.

The records, however, show that the appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego applied for Amnesty before the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission on July 26, 1954 right after the case was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon. On the other hand, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, referred the case (Criminal Case No. 12145) to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission, on August 12, 1955. Therefore, insofar as appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego is concerned, jurisdiction was properly acquired by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission earlier than that of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Furthermore, it appears that appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego did not participate in the proceedings before the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Be that as it may, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts (Lee v. Presiding Judge, G.R. No. 68789, November 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 408). Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated (Abadilla v. Ramos, G.R. No. 71973, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 92; Lat v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 69 SCRA 425 [1975]; Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641 [1968]; Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Company, 16 SCRA 908 [1966]; Tuvera v. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 [1965]).

On July 7, 1959, the criminal liability of the appellee had been completely extinguished by virtue of the amnesty extended him by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines in Resolution No. 1-F 859. It has been consistently ruled by this Court that amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged; that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense (Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez, et al., 82 Phil. 642 [1949]). Amnesty is a public act of which the court should take judicial notice. Thus, the light to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the complainant or prosecution or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent, for he stands ill the eyes of the law as of the had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, and not be punished as criminal (Barrioquinto et al. v. Fernandez, et al., supra). Moreover when the Court a quo dismissed the case upon motion of defendant-appellee based on the resolution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission granting him amnesty, said court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

One of the grounds for a motion to quash a criminal case is when the criminal action or liability has been extinguished (Sec. 2[f], Rule 117). Criminal action or liability is totally extinguished by, among others, amnesty. Thus, Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Court a quo, acting on the motion to dismiss dated October 18, 1967 filed by Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion in Criminal Case No. 12145 alleging as grounds therefor, among others, insufficiency of evidence to warrant the prosecution of the case, issued an order dated August 20, 1980 dismissing the case against all the accused except appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. The latter was excluded from the order of dismissal because of the pendency of this appeal. To remand the case for further proceedings before the trial court at this late hour when as early as October 18, 1967, the prosecution has admittedly no evidence sufficient to warrant its prosecution, is a useless ritual which would not serve the ends of justice. At the ask of being repetitious, nothing would be gained by remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings since there is no offense to prosecute.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the trial court dated January 23, 1965 dismissing Criminal Case No. 12145 as against appellee Tagumpay A. Nanadiego with cost de oficio is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.