Showing posts with label google. Show all posts
Showing posts with label google. Show all posts

Friday, August 21, 2009

Sorry

Sorry to those who are frequent visitors of this blog.

I have not updated its post since August 10, 2009

I was so busy so some personal stuff which I have to settle first.

By Monday, August 24, I will continue the updates here, to include my other blogs..

http://yahookid.blogspot.com

http://dailypoundyen.blogspot.com

http://forexweeklyupdate.blogspot.com

http://superworldrecords.blogspot.com

http://imalawyer2015.blogspot.com

http://relihiyonko.blogspot.com

Thursday, July 23, 2009

De Jesus vs. Syquia, G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.

At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.

When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.

The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.

It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.

What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly, that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.

Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:

Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931

Rev. PADRE:

La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.

(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA

Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:

Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo manches. A cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."

Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."

Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."

Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."

Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.

Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:

Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible admitir por otro medio la prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y la intencion de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.

No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito, en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse otra prueba que la conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.

x x x x x x x x x

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta hacerlo por incidencia; es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo a su numero 2.º

Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity, "When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The writing that is required by said provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each not being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.

By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintiff-appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the defendant- appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and that it was the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of the documents, which is prohibited by law.

Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco," as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

x x x x x x x x x

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.

The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the following facts, as found by the lower court in its decision:

Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de 1931 asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.

Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a dicha demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el contrato para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.

Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child they can not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael when it was baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.

The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the witnesses during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:

In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:

. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find that he visited the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support of the plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a position in a commercial house.

x x x x x x x x x

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously the status of a natural child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but that it is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that recognition must appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that the son has possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which comes short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it was the intention of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the acts performed by him were done with that intention.

Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain says:

En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de hijo natural se requiere que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la paternidad, la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el reconocimiento expreso.lawphil.net

En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el hecho de que dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el padre; y el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.

It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

Avanceña, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.

Dumlao vs. Quality Plastic Products, G.R. No. L-27956 , April 30, 1976

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976

DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Castillo & Castillo for appellants.

Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p

On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).

Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.

The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).

The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.

Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.

After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.

The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was never served with summons.

There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Tuesday, July 21, 2009

People vs. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411-14 October 13, 1999

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 130411-14 October 13, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO BELLO, accused-appellant.

MELO, Acting C.J.:

In a highly conservative and religious society like ours, no crime is perhaps more repulsive and disgusting than incestuous rape, and much more so, rape by fathers of their minor daughters. As such, our Legislature has declared such offense undeserving of society's mercy, compassion, and leniency, providing, that the offense should rightfully carry with it the supreme penalty of death. Regrettably, the imposition of said penalty in the case at bar cannot be properly sustained due to the requirements of substantial justice and procedural rules not having been fully satisfied.1âwphi1.nêt

Accused-appellant was charged with four (4) counts of rape committed against his own legitimate daughter, Jenalyn A. Bello, committed on August 13, 14, 19, and 24, 1995. The first information alleged:

That on or about the 13th day of August, 1995, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of Jenalyn A. Bello, a minor, twelve (12) years of age, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Jenalyn A. Bello against her will, and consent, with the aggravating circumstance of relationship.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(p. 9, Rollo.)

The three other informations were identically worded as the above information, except that they respectively charged that the rape therein committed occurred on August 14, 19, and 24, 1995.

At the arraignment on February 13, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the prosecution presented its side through the lone testimony of the victim which was summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:

THE RAPE OF AUGUST 13, 1995

Around 3 o'clock in the early morning of August 13, 1995, while Jenalyn was soundly sleeping in the bedroom of their house together with her two younger brothers, her drunken father woke her up and ordered her to go to the kitchen. She walked to the kitchen and he followed her. In the kitchen, he angrily ordered her to undress, promising to give her money. Realizing the evil intent of her father, she gently pleaded: "Do not do that". Gripped with fear, however, Jenalyn followed his command. Naked, he made her lie on a bench, laid on top of her and inserted his erect penis into her vagina. Feeling intense pain, she continued her plea: "Do not do that." But he paid no heed. She called for her mother, who was then sleeping at the sala, but to no avail. Jenalyn could not do anything but submit herself to the evil desires of the man whom she feared and from whose hands she suffered several punishments. Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of his own daughter.

(pp. 2-3, Appellee's Brief.)

THE RAPE OF AUGUST 14, 1995

Around 1 o'clock in the early morning of August 14, 1995, appellant woke up Jenalyn and sternly whispered: "Do not say anything. Do not tell your mother. Anyway, you are not a virgin anymore." He, thereafter, ordered her to undress. At that time, Jenalyn's mother was at the public market selling fish to the early fish buyers.

When she was already naked, appellant placed himself on top of her and inserted his private organ into hers. Jenalyn repeatedly pleaded: "Father, do not do that!" He did not mind her. Instead, and in a jeer his father remarked: "Why are you saying that, anyway you are no longer a virgin like your elder sister" (appellant was obviously referring to his daughter Juliet Bello who was also victimized by him, but lucky to escape his clutches). After he was through with his sexual carnage, appellant just left the room.

Jenalyn cried the whole day, but her mother did not even ask what was bothering her. Sensing that her mother knew what was happening, Jenalyn lost the courage to approach and tell her about the matter.

(pp. 3-4, Appellee's Brief.)

THE RAPE OF AUGUST 19, 1995

Around 3 o'clock in the morning of August 19, 1995, appellant replayed the sexual assault upon Jenalyn at the kitchen of their abode while his wife was sleeping at the sala. After threatening her, he compelled her to lie on the floor. Appellant positioned himself and inserted his erect organ into her vagina enjoying his bestial act. Unable to bear the pain, she repeated her plea: "Father, do not do it anymore." Appellant bluntly replied: "Do not say anything." Her mother's lack of concern and her own fear for her father, muted Jenalyn from crying for help.

(p. 4, Appellee's Brief.)

THE RAPE OF AUGUST 24, 1995

Around 9 o'clock in the morning of August 24, 1995, Jenalyn was at Sankalan Elementary school to attend her first periodical examination. Realizing that she did not have enough paper for the examination, she returned home to ask money from her mother to buy paper. When she reached home, she saw her father and brother J.R. She went straight to their comfort room as she had then her menstrual period. From there, she proceeded to their bedroom to get something. Her father followed her and asked if she still had classes. She answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, he ordered her to undress. She refused, saying "Father, don't do that because I have my menstruation, besides, we are having now our periodical tests." Appellant insisted that she undress. Afraid of his usual maltreatment, Jenalyn gave in. After satisfying his lust, appellant just left his devastated daughter.

(p. 5, Appellee's Brief.)

On April 16, 1996, the scheduled date of the cross-examination of the complainant, accused-appellant, through his counsel de oficio, manifested that he wished to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and to substitute the same with one of guilty. Convinced that accused-appellant understood the consequences of his change of plea, the Honorable Mateo M. Leanda, presiding judge of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban City, allowed the same to be entered in the record of the four rape cases. The defense proceeded to cross-examine complainant and thereafter presented accused-appellant for the purpose of proving mitigating circumstances. Later, accused-appellant moved for the reinstatement of his plea of not guilty, but this was denied by the trial court in its order dated October 4, 1996.

On November 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape, and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds accused RODRIGO BELLO, alias "Rudy", guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the consummated four counts of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Art. 225 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and he is hereby sentenced accordingly to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, for each count. In addition thereto, the accused's estate, if any, is ordered to indemnify the offended party, JENALYN A. BELLO, the sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, for each count of rape, as the subjects of this case, or the total amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The accused's properties is also condemned to pay exemplary damages to the complainant in the sum of P20,000.00 per count, or a total of eighty thousand (P80,000.00) pesos in all.1âwphi1.nêt

With costs de oficio.

(pp. 35-36, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant assails said judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in: (a) convicting accused-appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and (b) in not allowing him to present additional evidence.

After a meticulous and objective evaluation of the record of this case, this Court is of the carefully considered opinion that the court a quo failed to observe the required procedure for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.

Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that "when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf." Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires (Pamaran, Manuel, R., 1995 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Annotated, Rules 110-127, 1998 Edition, p. 307, citing People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 [1987]). This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion (People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 [1990]).

In People vs. Albert (251 SCRA 293 [1995]), we pointed out that the rationale behind the aforequoted rule is that courts must prove with more care wherever the possible punishment is in its severest form — death — for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.

A careful perusal of the record of this case reveals a measure of shortcoming on the part of the trial court to explain fully to accused-appellant the consequences of his plea of guilty, the trial court failing as it did to conduct the requisite searching inquiry so as to determine whether accused-appellant's plea possessed all the requirements of an acceptable one. The proceedings below on this point transpired as follows:

ATTY. ESBER:

For the accused. Before I proceed to cross-examine the witness, the accused intimated to me that he be allowed to change his previous plea of not guilty to "yes guilty."

COURT:

ORDER

Before the cross-examination of the complainant in her joint testimony for all the four (4) rape cases, the defense counsel moved the Court that the accused be allowed to withdraw his former plea of "Not Guilty" to the charge of "Rape" and substitute the same with that of "Yes Guilty."

There being no objection from the prosecution, let the accused be re-arraigned.

SO ORDERED.

INTERPRETER:

Accused pleading guilty, Your Honor.

ATTY. ESBER:

With the change of the plea of the accused from a former plea of "Not Guilty" to "Yes Guilty" to the four (4) counts of Rape, that a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death be imposed.

PROS. CAÑA:

In the meanwhile, we would like to be allowed to present evidence if only to determine the degree of the culpability of the accused pursuant to the Rules of Court.

COURT:

ORDER

After the re-arraignment, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to the four (4) counts of Rape. However, the Court insisted that Fiscal Caña should continue presenting the evidence constituting the testimony of complainant to comply with the requirements of law on procedure to determine the gravity of the offense charged and, likewise, the defense is required to present evidence to satisfy the requirement of the law.

SO ORDERED.

(tsn, April 16, 1996, pp. 2-3.)

Evidently, there is no showing that accused-appellant was put on the stand for purposes of inquiring whether he fully comprehended the legal consequences of his plea of guilt. The original record of this case is completely bereft of any document concerning accused-appellant's supposed re-arraignment. We cannot presume that the re-arraignment of accused-appellant was regularly conducted. We cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption especially when a man's life is at stake. We cannot anchor our judgment based on mere speculations and conjectures. Rather, we must be positively convinced. Where a capital offense like incestuous rape becomes the subject of a positive plea, it becomes imperative for the trial court to administer a searching inquiry and receive evidence undisputably showing that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of such a plea (People vs. Albert, supra). And a plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort is even made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense may result in the imposition of the death penalty (People vs. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633 [1997]).

A "searching inquiry", under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment, or upon bad advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions (People vs. Dayot, supra).

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry", it would be well for the court, for instance, to require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance (People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 429 [1996]). In the case under review, the record does not reveal any information about the personality profile of accused-appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. Questions pertaining to the age, socio-economic status, and educational background of accused-appellant which may provide contributory insights for a proper verdict in this case were not propounded by the trial court.

Further, the trial court did not bother to explain to accused-appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 violation of which he was charged with. The trial judge also failed to inform accused-appellant that he would be made to indemnify his victim. As a result, accused-appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, which is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution (People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, March 29, 1999).

Likewise, there is no showing that accused-appellant was specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be given the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659. He was categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or as it may have been erroneously suggested to him. Such mistaken belief on the part of accused-appellant which may have impelled him to plead guilty is demonstrated in his testimony, to wit:

PROS. CAÑA:

Q: Knowing the contents of the four Informations during the re-arraignment, you pleaded "Guilty" to each of them?

A: I was afraid because, according to them, I will be hanged and I do not want to be hanged because who will support my wife and my children. My wife has no work.

(tsn, May 9, 1996, p. 6.)

COURT:

Q: As a whole, you deny these four (4) incidents of Rape you have committed against your daughter?

A: I do not know about that.

Q: Inspite of the fact that previously you entered a plea of "guilty" to each of these four (4) counts?

A: Because I am afraid, I might be killed.

(tsn, ibid., p. 5.)

These repeated and emphatic declarations of accused-appellant should have attracted the attention of the trial court that accused-appellant did not have full knowledge of the consequences of his plea. The trial judge at this instance should have informed and forewarned accused-appellant, in ordinary language, of three things: First, that accused-appellant's plea of guilty cannot be considered mitigating as it was made after the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, thus, foreclosing the application of Paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Second, that the penalty of death shall be imposed when the rape is committed by a father against a minor daughter, in accordance with Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Third, that inasmuch as death is a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the offense, as provided by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Verily, accused-appellant cannot be reasonably expected to fully understand all the implications of his plea without the necessary detailed elucidation on the part of the trial judge. Clearly, the latter failed to observe the quantum of care which the Court had prescribed for the valid admission of a plea of guilty by an accused. As a dispenser of justice, the trial judge should have endeavored to discharge his duties competently and efficiently so as not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.

Finally, a plea of guilty must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law (People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204 [1989]). An accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Likewise, a formal plea of not guilty should properly be entered if an accused admits the truth of some or all the allegations of the information, but interposes excuses or additional facts which, if duly established would exempt or relieve him in whole or in part of criminal responsibility (People vs. Albert, supra). The ungrammatical answers of accused-appellant to equally fractured questions during his direct examination is, on this point, revealing:

ATTY. ESBER:

Q: What happened to Jenalyn, who is now being a subject matter of this case? The question now is: Is it your own will that what happened to Jenalyn is intentionally done by you?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why do you say that it was not done intentionally by you?

A: Because, that time, I was drank. I usually do not drink I am not a habitual drinker.

Q: As a follow-up question. Do you mean to convey that because you were drank at that time you do not know what you were doing?

A: No, sir.

(tsn, May 9, 1996, p. 4.)

COURT:

Q: One of the charge against you for Rape was allegedly committed, according to the Information, was on August 13, 1996, do you know that?

A: I do not know, Your Honor.

Q: So, you do not know what happened to you and your daughter on this particular date of August 13, 1995?

A: I do not know. I was not even at home on that day.

Q: Where were you then?

A: I was at my place of work.

Q: Did you, at any time, met your daughter and have a contact with her on said date the whole day?

A: No, sir, because I have an overtime with my work.

Q: Your daughter testified in court that she was raped by you on August 13, 1995, was she telling a lie?

A: Yes, she was telling a lie because she is being coached by her sister and by her aunt.

Q: Your daughter testified in court under oath that on August 13, 1995, at 10 o'clock in the evening, while she was in the bedroom, she was awakened by you and you inserted your penis in her vagina, is this true?

A: That is a lie because my wife, myself and my daughter are sleeping together.

Q: Your daughter further testified that on August 14, 1995, at 1 o'clock in the early morning, you requested her to boil water in her kitchen because you were drank, you took advantage of her, you layed her down and took advantage of her. Did you hear that statement of your daughter here in court?

A: Yes, I have heard the testimony but I did not do it.

Q: Another incident. On August 19, 1995, at 3 o'clock in the early morning, you woke her up while she was sleeping in the bedroom and then told her to go to the kitchen, and while at the kitchen you commanded her to undress, and then you even told her that before you will die you should be able to abuse herself first or have sexual intercourse with her. Did you hear that statement of your daughter here in court?

A: She is telling a lie.

Q: As a whole, you deny these four (4) incidents of Rape you have committed against your daughter?

A: I do not know about that.

Q: Inspite of the fact that previously you entered a plea of "Guilty" to each of these four (4) counts?

A: Because I am afraid, I might be killed.

(tsn, p. 5, May 9, 1996.)

It is without doubt that accused-appellant was adamant in his denial of the charges filed against him. Such being the case, the trial court should have required accused-appellant to plead anew to the charges, or at least, it should have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him since said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. Thereafter, the court a quo should have proceeded with the trial of the case to determine the guilt or innocence of accused-appellant (People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119 [1966]).

Let it be clearly understood that the administration of justice, including among other things, the punishment of guilty persons and the protection of the innocent, is the very reason for the existence of courts. While justice demands speedy administration, courts are in duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of his inevitable conviction. Any court which abets injustice or neglects to ascertain the truth with the use of all the faculties at its command abdicates its most important function and forfeits its very right to existence (Nitafan, David G., Arraignment in Serious Offenses, 251 SCRA 161 [1995]).1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting accused-appellant Rodrigo Bello of four counts of rape is hereby vacated. The four rape cases are REMANDED to the court of origin for proper arraignment and trial of the accused, with instructions that the same be given topmost priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and circumspection.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave on official business.

Monday, July 20, 2009

RA 9208 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003

Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Twelfth Congress
Second Regular Session


Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-second day of July, two thousand two

Republic Act No. 9208 May 26, 2003

AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees the respect of individual rights. In pursuit of this policy, the State shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures and development of programs that will promote human dignity, protect the people from any threat of violence and exploitation, eliminate trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures for involuntary migration and servitude of persons, not only to support trafficked persons but more importantly, to ensure their recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of society.

It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights and inherent human dignity of women and men as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and all other relevant and universally accepted human rights instruments and other international conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.

(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.

(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.

(e) Sex Tourism - refers to a program organized by travel and tourism-related establishments and individuals which consists of tourism packages or activities, utilizing and offering escort and sexual services as enticement for tourists. This includes sexual services and practices offered during rest and recreation periods for members of the military.

(f) Sexual Exploitation - refers to participation by a person in prostitution or the production of pornographic materials as a result of being subjected to a threat, deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt bondage, fraud or through abuse of a victim's vulnerability.

(g) Debt Bondage - refers to the pledging by the debtor of his/her personal services or labor or those of a person under his/her control as security or payment for a debt, when the length and nature of services is not clearly defined or when the value of the services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt.

(h) Pornography - refers to any representation, through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent shows, information technology, or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual purposes.

(i) Council - shall mean the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking created under Section 20 of this Act.

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other consideration, any person or, as provided for under Republic Act No. 6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism packages or activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering persons for prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;

(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;

(f) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(g) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a person, by means of threat or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of removal or sale of organs of said person; and

(h) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the Philippines or abroad.

Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:

(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute unissued, tampered or fake counseling certificates, registration stickers and certificates of any government agency which issues these certificates and stickers as proof of compliance with government regulatory and pre-departure requirements for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(c) To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or distribute, or cause the advertisement, publication, printing, broadcasting or distribution by any means, including the use of information technology and the internet, of any brochure, flyer, or any propaganda material that promotes trafficking in persons;

(d) To assist in the conduct of misrepresentation or fraud for purposes of facilitating the acquisition of clearances and necessary exit documents from government agencies that are mandated to provide pre-departure registration and services for departing persons for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at international and local airports, territorial boundaries and seaports who are in possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(f) To confiscate, conceal, or destroy the passport, travel documents, or personal documents or belongings of trafficked persons in furtherance of trafficking or to prevent them from leaving the country or seeking redress from the government or appropriate agencies; and

(g) To knowingly benefit from, financial or otherwise, or make use of, the labor or services of a person held to a condition of involuntary servitude, forced labor, or slavery.

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

(b) When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

(e) When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law enforcement agencies;

(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).

Section 6. Confidentiality. - At any stage of the investigation, prosecution and trial of an offense under this Act, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, court personnel and medical practitioners, as well as parties to the case, shall recognize the right to privacy of the trafficked person and the accused. Towards this end, law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges to whom the complaint has been referred may, whenever necessary to ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, and after considering all circumstances for the best interest of the parties, order a closed-door investigation, prosecution or trial. The name and personal circumstances of the trafficked person or of the accused, or any other information tending to establish their identities and such circumstances or information shall not be disclosed to the public.

In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind closed-doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio, producer and director of a film in case of the movie industry, or any person utilizing tri-media facilities or information technology to cause publicity of any case of trafficking in persons.

Section 8. Prosecution of Cases. - Any person who has personal knowledge of the commission of any offense under this Act, the trafficked person, the parents, spouse, siblings, children or legal guardian may file a complaint for trafficking.

Section 9. Venue. - A criminal action arising from violation of this Act shall be filed where the offense was committed, or where any of its elements occurred, or where the trafficked person actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:

(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);

(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);

(d) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

(e) If the offender is a corporation, partnership, association, club, establishment or any juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, partner, manager, and/or any responsible officer who participated in the commission of the crime or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its commission;

(f) The registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and license to operate of the erring agency, corporation, association, religious group, tour or travel agent, club or establishment, or any place of entertainment shall be cancelled and revoked permanently. The owner, president, partner or manager thereof shall not be allowed to operate similar establishments in a different name;

(g) If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately deported after serving his sentence and be barred permanently from entering the country;

(h) Any employee or official of government agencies who shall issue or approve the issuance of travel exit clearances, passports, registration certificates, counseling certificates, marriage license, and other similar documents to persons, whether juridical or natural, recruitment agencies, establishments or other individuals or groups, who fail to observe the prescribed procedures and the requirement as provided for by laws, rules and regulations, shall be held administratively liable, without prejudice to criminal liability under this Act. The concerned government official or employee shall, upon conviction, be dismissed from the service and be barred permanently to hold public office. His/her retirement and other benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and

(i) Conviction by final judgment of the adopter for any offense under this Act shall result in the immediate rescission of the decree of adoption.

Section 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. - Any person who buys or engages the services of trafficked persons for prostitution shall be penalized as follows:

(a) First offense - six (6) months of community service as may be determined by the court and a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); and

(b) Second and subsequent offenses - imprisonment of one (1) year and a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).

Section 12. Prescriptive Period. - Trafficking cases under this Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years: Provided, however, That trafficking cases committed by a syndicate or in a large scale as defined under Section 6 shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.

The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the day on which the trafficked person is delivered or released from the conditions of bondage and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to the accused.

Section 13. Exemption from Filing Fees. - When the trafficked person institutes a separate civil action for the recovery of civil damages, he/she shall be exempt from the payment of filing fees.

Section 14. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds and Instruments Derived from Trafficking in Persons. - In addition to the penalty imposed for the violation of this Act, the court shall order the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and properties derived from the commission of the crime, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards for damages shall be taken from the personal and separate properties of the offender; Provided, further, That if such properties are insufficient, the balance shall be taken from the confiscated and forfeited properties.

When the proceeds, properties and instruments of the offense have been destroyed, diminished in value or otherwise rendered worthless by any act or omission, directly or indirectly, of the offender, or it has been concealed, removed, converted or transferred to prevent the same from being found or to avoid forfeiture or confiscation, the offender shall be ordered to pay the amount equal to the value of the proceeds, property or instruments of the offense.

Section 15. Trust Fund. - All fines imposed under this Act and the proceeds and properties forfeited and confiscated pursuant to Section 14 hereof shall accrue to a Trust Fund to be administered and managed by the Council to be used exclusively for programs that will prevent acts of trafficking and protect, rehabilitate, reintegrate trafficked persons into the mainstream of society. Such programs shall include, but not limited to, the following:

(a) Provision for mandatory services set forth in Section 23 of this Act;

(b) Sponsorship of a national research program on trafficking and establishment of a data collection system for monitoring and evaluation purposes;

(c) Provision of necessary technical and material support services to appropriate government agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs);

(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars to provide venue for consensus building amongst the public, the academe, government, NGOs and international organizations; and

(e) Promotion of information and education campaign on trafficking.

Section 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in Persons. - The government shall establish and implement preventive, protective and rehabilitative programs for trafficked persons. For this purpose, the following agencies are hereby mandated to implement the following programs;

(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) - shall make available its resources and facilities overseas for trafficked persons regardless of their manner of entry to the receiving country, and explore means to further enhance its assistance in eliminating trafficking activities through closer networking with government agencies in the country and overseas, particularly in the formulation of policies and implementation of relevant programs.

The DFA shall take necessary measures for the efficient implementation of the Machine Readable Passports to protect the integrity of Philippine passports, visas and other travel documents to reduce the incidence of trafficking through the use of fraudulent identification documents.

It shall establish and implement a pre-marriage, on-site and pre-departure counseling program on intermarriages.

(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) - shall implement rehabilitative and protective programs for trafficked persons. It shall provide counseling and temporary shelter to trafficked persons and develop a system for accreditation among NGOs for purposes of establishing centers and programs for intervention in various levels of the community.

(c) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) - shall ensure the strict implementation and compliance with the rules and guidelines relative to the employment of persons locally and overseas. It shall likewise monitor, document and report cases of trafficking in persons involving employers and labor recruiters.

(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) - shall ensure the prosecution of persons accused of trafficking and designate and train special prosecutors who shall handle and prosecute cases of trafficking. It shall also establish a mechanism for free legal assistance for trafficked persons, in coordination with the DSWD, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and other NGOs and volunteer groups.

(e) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) - shall actively participate and coordinate in the formulation and monitoring of policies addressing the issue of trafficking in persons in coordination with relevant government agencies. It shall likewise advocate for the inclusion of the issue of trafficking in persons in both its local and international advocacy for women's issues.

(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) - shall strictly administer and enforce immigration and alien administration laws. It shall adopt measures for the apprehension of suspected traffickers both at the place of arrival and departure and shall ensure compliance by the Filipino fiancés/fiancées and spouses of foreign nationals with the guidance and counseling requirement as provided for in this Act.

(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) - shall be the primary law enforcement agency to undertake surveillance, investigation and arrest of individuals or persons suspected to be engaged in trafficking. It shall closely coordinate with various law enforcement agencies to secure concerted efforts for effective investigation and apprehension of suspected traffickers. It shall also establish a system to receive complaints and calls to assist trafficked persons and conduct rescue operations.

(h) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) - shall implement an effective pre-employment orientation seminars and pre-departure counseling programs to applicants for overseas employment. It shall likewise formulate a system of providing free legal assistance to trafficked persons.

(i) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) - shall institute a systematic information and prevention campaign and likewise maintain a databank for the effective monitoring, documentation and prosecution of cases on trafficking in persons.

(j) Local government units (LGUs) - shall monitor and document cases of trafficking in persons in their areas of jurisdiction, effect the cancellation of licenses of establishments which violate the provisions of this Act and ensure effective prosecution of such cases. They shall also undertake an information campaign against trafficking in persons through the establishment of the Migrants Advisory and Information Network (MAIN) desks in municipalities or provinces in coordination with DILG, Philippine Information Agency (PIA), Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), NGOs and other concerned agencies. They shall encourage and support community based initiatives which address the trafficking in persons.

In implementing this Act, the agencies concerned may seek and enlist the assistance of NGOs, people's organizations (Pos), civic organizations and other volunteer groups.

Section 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons. - Trafficked persons shall be recognized as victims of the act or acts of trafficking and as such shall not be penalized for crimes directly related to the acts of trafficking enumerated in this Act or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in relation thereto. In this regard, the consent of a trafficked person to the intended exploitation set forth in this Act shall be irrelevant.

Section 18. Preferential Entitlement Under the Witness Protection Program. - Any provision of Republic Act No. 6981 to the contrary notwithstanding, any trafficked person shall be entitled to the witness protection program provided therein.

Section 19. Trafficked Persons Who are Foreign Nationals. - Subject to the guidelines issued by the Council, trafficked persons in the Philippines who are nationals of a foreign country shall also be entitled to appropriate protection, assistance and services available to trafficked persons under this Act: Provided, That they shall be permitted continued presence in the Philippines for a length of time prescribed by the Council as necessary to effect the prosecution of offenders.

Section 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. - There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking, to be composed of the Secretary of the Department of Justice as Chairperson and the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development as Co-Chairperson and shall have the following as members:

(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;

(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment;

(c) Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration;

(d) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;

(e) Director-General, Philippine National Police;

(f) Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women; and

(g) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who shall be composed of one (1) representative each from among the sectors representing women, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and children, with a proven record of involvement in the prevention and suppression of trafficking in persons. These representatives shall be nominated by the government agency representatives of the Council, for appointment by the President for a term of three (3) years.

The members of the Council may designate their permanent representatives who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent to meetings, and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting, rules and regulations.

Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Formulate a comprehensive and integrated program to prevent and suppress the trafficking in persons;

(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of this Act;

(c) Monitor and oversee the strict implementation of this Act;

(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the various member agencies to effectively address the issues and problems attendant to trafficking in persons;

(e) Coordinate the conduct of massive information dissemination and campaign on the existence of the law and the various issues and problems attendant to trafficking through the LGUs, concerned agencies, and NGOs;

(f) Direct other agencies to immediately respond to the problems brought to their attention and report to the Council on action taken;

(g) Assist in filing of cases against individuals, agencies, institutions or establishments that violate the provisions of this Act;

(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of trafficked persons in cooperation with DOLE, DSWD, Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), LGUs and NGOs;

(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government or from NGOs and other civic organizations such assistance as may be needed to effectively implement this Act;

(j) Complement the shared government information system for migration established under Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" with data on cases of trafficking in persons, and ensure that the proper agencies conduct a continuing research and study on the patterns and scheme of trafficking in persons which shall form the basis for policy formulation and program direction;

(k) Develop the mechanism to ensure the timely, coordinated, and effective response to cases of trafficking in persons;

(l) Recommend measures to enhance cooperative efforts and mutual assistance among foreign countries through bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements to prevent and suppress international trafficking in persons;

(m) Coordinate with the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and other NGOs in monitoring the promotion of advertisement of trafficking in the internet;

(n) Adopt measures and policies to protect the rights and needs of trafficked persons who are foreign nationals in the Philippines;

(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and providing the necessary intervention or assistance to trafficked persons; and

(p) Exercise all the powers and perform such other functions necessary to attain the purposes and objectives of this Act.

Section 22. Secretariat to the Council. - The Department of Justice shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the Council.

Section 23. Mandatory Services to Trafficked Persons. - To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of society, concerned government agencies shall make available the following services to trafficked persons:

(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;

(b) Counseling;

(c) Free legal services which shall include information about the victims' rights and the procedure for filing complaints, claiming compensation and such other legal remedies available to them, in a language understood by the trafficked person;

(d) Medical or psychological services;

(e) Livelihood and skills training; and

(f) Educational assistance to a trafficked child.

Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism that will track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration of the trafficked persons shall be adopted and carried out.

Section 24. Other Services for Trafficked Persons. -

(a) Legal Assistance. - Trafficked persons shall be considered under the category "Overseas Filipino in Distress" and may avail of the legal assistance created by Republic Act No. 8042, subject to the guidelines as provided by law.

(b) Overseas Filipino Resource Centers. - The services available to overseas Filipinos as provided for by Republic Act No. 8042 shall also be extended to trafficked persons regardless of their immigration status in the host country.

(c) The Country Team Approach. - The country team approach under Executive Order No. 74 of 1993, shall be the operational scheme under which Philippine embassies abroad shall provide protection to trafficked persons insofar as the promotion of their welfare, dignity and fundamental rights are concerned.

Section 25. Repatriation of Trafficked Persons. - The DFA, in coordination with DOLE and other appropriate agencies, shall have the primary responsibility for the repatriation of trafficked persons, regardless of whether they are documented or undocumented.

If, however, the repatriation of the trafficked persons shall expose the victims to greater risks, the DFA shall make representation with the host government for the extension of appropriate residency permits and protection, as may be legally permissible in the host country.

Section 26. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with DFA, shall endeavor to include offenses of trafficking in persons among extraditable offenses.

Section 27. Reporting Requirements. - The Council shall submit to the President of the Philippines and to Congress an annual report of the policies, programs and activities relative to the implementation of this Act.

Section 28. Funding. - The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall immediately include in their programs and issue such rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act, the funding of which shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 29. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Council shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 30. Non-restriction of Freedom of Speech and of Association, Religion and the Right to Travel. - Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of speech and of association, religion and the right to travel for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Section 31. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof shall not be affected thereby.

Section 32. Repealing clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That this Act shall not in any way amend or repeal the provision of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act".

Section 33. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.


Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate
JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2444 and House Bill No. 4432 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 12, 2003 respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: May 26, 2003.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines