Showing posts with label June 24. Show all posts
Showing posts with label June 24. Show all posts

Sunday, July 19, 2009

People vs. Pasco, G.R. No. L-45715,June 24, 1985

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45715 June 24, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO PASCO, JR., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-45716 June 24, 1985.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
PABLO LACAY alias PABLING, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Uldarico B. Mejorada & Associates for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte finding the appellants guilty of Murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of their victims in the amount of P37,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

It appears that in the afternoon of September 13, 1974, Aproniano Ladera, also known as Aniano Ladera, Leo Maylon Careso Ladera, Elias Tagbacaula, and about 30 others were planting corn in the cornfield of Aproniano Ladera located at Barrio Linabo, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte. At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon the four named persons stopped working and crossed the river to Barrio Dilawa Piñan Zamboanga del Norte to have some refreshments. They went to the store of one Baby Romacho where they bought a small bottle (pocket size) of rum which they drank in the store. After consuming the contents of the bottle, they went to the store of Rosalinda Indong where they bought another small bottle of rum. While they were drinking, the accused Liberato Pasco, Jr. arrived. They offered him a drink, and after drinking the glass of rum, Liberato Pasco. Jr. left.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Aproniano Ladera, Careso Ladera, Leo Maylon, and Elias Tagbacaula left for home. They had a torch, locally called a "tingkarol", made from an empty bottle of rum filled with kerosene. They followed one another with Aproniano Ladera in the lead, followed by Careso Ladera, then Leo Maylon, and finally, Elias Tagbacaula at the rear.

At about this same time, Liberato Pasco, Jr. and Pablo Lacay stopped in the house of Indalecio Caidic, some 180 meters from the river crossing, on the pretext of lighting their cigarettes. Pablo Lacay was armed with a double-bladed hunting knife, while Liberato Pasco, Jr. was armed with a small bolo, called a "pisao", which they were holding in their hands. Pablo Lacay inquired from Indalecio Caidic if Aproniano Ladera and his companions had already passed by, and when Caidic answered that they had not, Pablo Lacay and Liberato Pasco, Jr. hurriedly left towards the river crossing. Not long thereafter, Aproniano Ladera and his companions passed by the house of Indalecio Caidic and gave him the customary greeting, saying: "We are passing by, Do" 1

When Aproniano Ladera and his companions reached the Layawan River, they found the waters rising so that they removed their trousers and wound them around their necks to keep them dry. Careso Ladera, with the "tingkarol", then took the lead. When he was almost at the middle of the river, and Elias Tagbacaula, who was at the rear, was about 5 meters from the shore, Liberato Pasco, Jr. and Pablo Lacay suddenly emerged from the bushes growing in an island in the middle of the river, and attacked them. Liberato Pasco, Jr. first stabbed Leo Maylon, but the latter was not hit. Liberato Pasco, Jr. then turned on Aproniano Ladera, but the blow was parried Then, Pasco stabbed Careso Ladera, hitting him at the chest below the right nipple. Pablo Lacay, on the other hand, stabbed Elias Tagbacaula below the left nipple, leaving the knife embedded on his chest. Thereafter, Liberato Pasco, Jr. and Pablo Lacay ran away towards the Piñan side of the river. Aproniano Ladera and Leo Maylon, also went home, leaving Careso Ladera and Elias Tagbacaula where they fell. They went to the house of Elias Tagbacaula and informed his wife of the incident. From there, they proceeded to the house of Luciano Agad, barrio captain of Linabo, to report the attack on them. 2

Luciano Agad was reluctant at first to act on the complaint because the incident took place at the Dilawa side of the river, but relented when informed that the barrio captain of Dilawa, Felix Celecios, was no longer residing in Dilawa. Barrio Captain Luciano Agad and two ICHDF members then accompanied Aproniano Ladera and Leo Maylon to the river. They brought along with them "petromax" lamps to light their way.

At the river, they found the floating bodies of Careso Ladera and Elias Tagbacaula snagged in a knee-deep portion, near the Dilawa side. The trousers of Careso Ladera was still tied around his neck, and underneath his body, they found the "tingkarol" which Careso Ladera was carrying when they were crossing the river. Luciano Agad and his companions moved the bodies of the victims to the Linabo side of the river so that they would not be carried away by the rising waters of the river and placed the "tingkarol" beside the body of Careso Ladera.

In the morning, Luciano Agad reported the incident to the police authorities of Piñan and Chief of Police Francisco Jamoralin and two policemen and Dr. Carmencita Pangasian, Rural Health Physician of Piñan went with Barrio Captain Luciano Agad to the Layawan River. 3

Dr. Pangasian conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadavers and found that Careso Ladera suffered a "stab wound, about 2 1/2 inches in diameter located about 5 inches below the right nipple measuring about 6 inches deep penetrating the liver," and an "abrasion about 1 inch in diameter located at the anterior leg." The cause of death was "cardio respiratory failure secondary to severe internal hemorrhage." 4 She also found that Elias Tagbacaula sustained a stab wound about 2 inches in diameter by 7 inches deep located at the epigastric area." A double-bladed hunting knife, without a handle, is still stuck in the body. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory failure secondary to severe internal hemorrhage of the abdominal aorta." 5

As a consequence, Liberato Pasco, Jr. and Pablo Lacay were separately charged with murder, in two separate informations, before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, docketed therein as Crim. Case Nos. 1296 and 1297, respectively Liberato Pasco, Jr. was charged with the killing of Careso Ladera while Pablo Lacay was charged with the murder of Elias Tagbacaula. As these two cases occurred at the same time and place and involved the same witnesses for the prosecution, they were tried jointly, after which judgment was rendered as aforesaid. From this judgment both accused appealed.

The defendant-appellant, Liberate Pasco, Jr. admitted having killed not only Careso Ladera as charged in the information, but also Elias Tagbacaula. He claims, however, that he acted in self-defense,

Liberato Pasco, Jr. declared that at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of September 13, 1974, while he was resting in his house after a hard day's work sawing logs, his neighbor, Pablo Lacay came to him, asking his help in looking for some missing carabaos. He armed himself with a hunting knife and went with Pablo Lacay who was armed with a small bolo. But, before he left, he told his younger sister, Rosalinda, to leave some food for him. He and Pablo Lacay followed the trail towards Linabo. On their way, they met some men, but he could not recognize them as it was very dark. Upon reaching the Layawan River, they overtook the men who took Pablo Lacay's carabaos. Pablo Lacay was able to get back his carabaos. However, two of the men attacked him so that he stabbed them in return. 6

The trial court, however, ruled that the accused Liberato Pasco Jr. had failed to establish the elements of self-defense which would exculpate him.

We agree. In order that the plea of self-defense can prosper it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the defendant's life in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist the said attack. The uncorroborated testimony of Liberato Pasco, Jr. regarding the attack upon him is, as follows:

Q. After meeting that man where did you proceed?

A. We reached the river and while in that river we overtook persons who were bringing carabaos and one of the persons attacked me so I stabbed him.

Q. How did that person attack you?

A. He attacked me by thrusting himself towards me and I back stepped but he continued approaching me so I stabbed him.

Q. Do you know that man who attacked you?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Why did you stab him?

A. Because he was forcing himself to attack me so I stabbed him.

Q. Was that in the river?

A. In the stones in the water of the river.

Q. What happened next?

A. After that another man attacked me and stabbed me with a scythe hitting me on my leg and in that instance I also stabbed him.

Q. Why did you stab him?

A. Because he attacked me first.

Q. You said you were hit on the legs, can you show that part of your body which was hit to the court?

A. Yes Sir (pointing to a round scar just perpendicular to the knee at the left leg).

COURT:

Place on record that the scar is round

MEJORADA:

Q. Which portion of the scythe hit your leg?

A. The tip of the scythe.

Q. At the time when you were stabbed or hacked with a scythe what were you doing?

A. When I was hacked I parried it with my hunting knife and in return I also thrusted my hunting knife and the person was hit.

Q. You said you were attacked, were you not moving at the time you were attacked and if you were moving to what direction were you moving?

A. I backstepped.

COURT:

Interrupting—

Q. Which of the two persons continued attacking you?

A. The second person.

Q. When the second person continued attacking you was he already stabbed or not yet?

A. He was not yet stabbed.

Q. After he was stabbed did he continue attacking you.

A. No more.

Q. How about you, what did you do after stabbing two persons?

A. I went home.

Q. After you were attacked by the first man and followed by the second man, did you hear any voice?

A. Yes, I heard a voice saying "Pusila Nian, kay nasamad na ako' meaning Shot him Nian, because I'm already wounded.

Q. When you heard somebody shouted did you see any gun?

A. I did not see because it was dark.

Q. At the time you were attacked by the two persons where was Pablo Lacay, your companion.

A. I did not see him.

Q. After the stabbing incident where did you see him again?

A. I saw him already at a distance pulling his two carabaos and one offspring.

Q. Now what did you tell him?

A. I told him let us hurry because I stabbed two persons. 7

Such testimony, even if true, does not make a case of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be present in self-defense, there must be an actual sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.

Besides, it appears that the deceased Careso Ladera was unarmed at the time so that the use of the knife is unjustified. There is a hint that a gun was carried at the time in view of the testimony of the accused that he had allegedly heard the person he had stabbed say: "Pusila, Nian, kay nasamad na ako, " but. as could be inferred from his testimony, the gun was carried by one Nian and not by the deceased Careso Ladera. The appellant also stated that he was stabbed with a scythe. This scythe, however, was wielded by the second person he had allegedly stabbed (Elias Tagbacaula and not by Careso Ladera.)

Counsel for the appellants assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which he claims to be incredible, unbelievable, and improbable. The rule, however, is that once the defendant in a criminal case has admitted that he killed a human being, the burden of proof is on him to establish the existence of a circumstance which may relieve him from responsibility. To prove justification, the defendant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.

The accused-appellant, Pablo Lacay, on the other hand, while admitting that he was at the scene of the crime when it was committed, denied having participated in the killing of Elias Tagbacaula, as testified to by two eyewitnesses, Aproniano Ladera and Leo Maylon. His testimony is that in the evening of September 13, 1974, he found his three (3) carabaos, which were pastured near the barrio hall of Dilawa, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte missing. When he could not find them in the neighborhood, he enlisted the help of his neighbor Liberato Pasco, Jr., in looking for them. They followed a trail leading to the hinterlands. On their way, they met one Amador Gahuman who informed them that he (Gahuman) had encountered four (4) persons, two of whom were riding on two Carabaos, and two others walking on foot, going towards the river. They hurried towards the river and were able to overtake the men in the middle of the river. But, he could not recognize the men as it was very dark. He retrieved his carabaos and pulled them home. After crossing the river, he heard his companion, Liberato Pasco, Jr., from behind, urging him to walk faster as he (Pasco) had stabbed a person. 8

The bare denial of the accused, however, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimonies of Aproniano Ladera and Leo Maylon that the accused Pablo Lacay was the one who stabbed the deceased Elias Tagbacaula. We have scrutinized the testimonies of the said witnesses with care and do not find any plausible ground to disbelieve them, not only because the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and the manner they testified, found out that they were reliable witnesses, a conclusion supported by the evidence of record, but also because the said witnesses had no reason to testify falsely against him. Besides, the trial court stated that he had observed both accused Pablo Lacay and Liberato Pasco, Jr. during the trial and reached the conclusion that only Pablo Lacay, because of his build and physique, could have inflicted the wound sustained by the late Elias Tagbacaula. Said the court:

... Another fact which negates the denial of Pablo Lacay in the commission of the crime is the fact that the knife or dagger which was used in stabbing Elias Tagbacaula was driven so hard into the body of the victim that it took all the strength of the Chief of Police of Piñan Zamboanga del Norte, Francisco Jamarolin, a very big muscular man to pull out the dagger from the breast of the victim, indicating that the point of said knife must have lodged in the back bone of the victim which indicated an extra-ordinary amount of strength to have driven it to that extent. Only Pablo Lacay and not Liberato Pasco, Jr. could have done that.

The Court has watched both accused, Pablo Lacay and Liberato Pasco, Jr. and the Court is convinced that Liberato Pasco, Jr. could not have driven the dagger into the victim, Elias Tagbacaula, to that extent, while Pablo Lacay has the body and strength as to drive the knife and hit the bone of the victim making it difficult to pull out the knife so that when he attempted to pull the knife out, he was able to pull out the handle and not the knife itself from the body of the victim. Pablo Lacay is well built, muscular and tall man. He has the strength to inflict the wound suffered by Elias Tagbacaula.

The trial court correctly found that the crimes committed are murder, qualified by treachery since the victims and their companions were waylaid as they were crossing the river by the two accused who had hidden themselves in the bushes growing in the island in the middle of the river. The attack was sudden and unexpected, giving the victims no chance to defend themselves.

However, it erred in finding that evident premeditation was present in the commission of the offenses it appearing that the execution of the criminal acts was not preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. The period, from the time Liberato Pasco, Jr. saw Aproniano Ladera and his companions, drinking in the store of Rosalinda Indong at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening up to about 8:00 o'clock in the same evening when the killing took place, cannot be considered sufficient time for the two accused to have cooly deliberated on a decision to kill their victims.

But, it appears that the offenses were committed in an uninhabited place which was purposely sought and chosen by the two accused to accomplish their evil design. There being an aggravating circumstance, which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposed upon the accused-appellants, is proper.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 tsn of June l7, 1976, pp.111-113, 115, 116.

2 tsn of Jan. 22, 1975, pp, 10-15.

3 tsn of April 15, 1975, pp. 46-50.

4 Exh. A, Crim. Case No. 1296.

5 Exh. A, Crim. Case No. 1291: see also tsn of Jan. 22, 1975, pp, 1-7.

6 tsn of Dec. 22, 1975 pp. 36-41.

7 Id., pp. 38-40.

8 tsn of Nov. 11, 1975, pp. 84-87

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

People vs. Oquiño, G.R. No. L-37483, June 24, 1983

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-37483 June 24, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO OQUIÑO, ROMULO LAGARIO alias "Rogelio Lagario", and ARNIDO CALOSOR, accused, ROMULO LAGARIO alias "Rogelio Lagario", appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose T. Nery for appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Criminal Case No. 580 finding the accused, Romulo Lagario alias "Rogelio Lagario," guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in spite of a personal wish of the undersigned trial Judge, that he be not constrained so to do, but finding herein accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and considering the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, recidivism and habitual delinquency, not having been offset by any mitigating circumstance, accused Romulo Lagario is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. The Court further orders the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Done this 10th day of July 1973, in the City of Tacloban, Phils.

(Sgd.) Godolfredo P. Quisumbing
District Judge

The information for robbery with homicide in the instant case was originally filed on November 11, 1971 charging three accused, namely: Antonio Oquiño Romulo Lagario alias "Rogelio Lagario" and Arnido Calosor. An amended information was later filed on October 23, 1972 likewise charging the said three accused but adding four (4) aggravating circumstances which reads as follows:

That on or about the 10th of October, 1971, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bolos (pisao) with deliberate intent and with intent to kill and with the use of violence and with intent to gain did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away a wrist watch marked "RADO" with serial No. 11658 valued in the amount of P650.00 and by reason thereof and or on occasion thereof, attack, assault and stab one Anecito Parades with a bolo (pisao) which accused have provided for the purposes causing his instantaneous death.

Contrary to Art. 294, par. I of the Revised Penal Code, with the following aggravating circumstances:

(1) That the crime was committed in the nighttime thereby facilitating its commission and enabling the accused to commit the crime with impunity.

(2) That the accused all of whom were armed, took advantage of their superior strength;

(3) That the accused is a recidivist, having been convicted by final judgment of three (3) counts of Theft which, together with the present charge, are embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code;

(4) That the accused, Romulo Lagario is a habitual delinquent, having been previously found guilty by final judgment in the City Court of Tacloban, in the following cases, to wit:

Crime

Date Committed

Convicted

Date Released

Theft (R-12,997)

4-15-68

5-28-68

March 28, 1969

Theft (R-13,689)

4-19-69

7-2-69

February 2, 1971

Theft (R-13,691)

3-29-69

10-28-69

February 2, 1971

Tacloban City, October 23, 1972. 1

Accused Antonio Oquiño died on February 5, 1972 2 while accused Arnido Calosor was never apprehended and remained at large. 3 Hence, only accused Romulo Lagario was arraigned on October 26, 1972. He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and trial on the merits followed.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as follows:

At about 7:25 o'clock in the evening of October 10, 1971, Marina Uy and her deceased sweetheart, Aniceto Parades, were strolling and conversing at the Children's Park in Tacloban City. It rained. They took shelter in one of the miniature houses and sat on one of the protruding beams of the balcony facing the door. Suddenly accused Calosor opened the door together with his co-accused, Lagario (sic) and Oquiño (pp. 2-4, tsn, Bugho, March 8, 1973). They went inside, brandished their boloes (pisaoan eight-inch knife) and threatened them. Surprised, the duo fell backward. Oquiño held Marina's right hand and dragged her away. Lagario and Calosor took Aniceto to the side of the small house and wanted to take his wrist watch (pp. 5-9, tsn, Id.). Marina was able to free herself from Oquiños hold, for her hand was wet and slippery. Oquiño joined Lagario and Calosor. He took hold of Aniceto's front T-shirt. Then, Lagario stabbed Aniceto at the solar plexus (chest) and Calosor at the back.

The stab wound inflicted by Lagario perforated the heart through and through and Calosor's perforated the right lung (Exhibit "A", p. 100 Folder of Exhibits). Marina saw the stabbing as the place was lighted with a Mercury lamp. After Lagario and Calosor stabbed Aniceto, Marina ran away to ask for help. She went to the Leyte Provincial Jail accompanied by a man. Somebody at the jail tdalked to the telephone. After about twenty (20) minutes, she returned and found Aniceto wounded. His wrist watch was no longer with him (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.)

She saw again Oquiño and Lagario in jail. Pat, de la Peña showed to her the wrist watch taken which was recovered from a whom Lagario had asked to sell the watch (pp. 14-16, tsn., Id.). They took the bleeding Aniceto to the City Hospital where he died (p. 18, tsn, Id.). Accused Lagario had three convictions for theft in Criminal Case Nos. R-13691 dated October 20, 1969 (Exhibit "D", p. 102, Folder of Exhibits R-12997 dated May 28, 1968 (Exhibit "E", P. 103, Id.) and R-13689 dated July 2, 1969 (Exhibit "F" p. 104, Id.). Marina was emphatic in saying that she actually saw Oquiño help Lagario and Calosor in subduing Aniceto and in attempting to take the latter's wrist watch (pp. 40- 41, tsn, Id.).

Patrolman Wilfredo de la Peña of the Tacloban City Police Force investigated the stabbing incident in which the victim was Aniceto Parades. Among the three suspects, he apprehended only Lagario and Oquiño the latter, however, died before the case was terminated. The investigation was done in the presence of other police investigators and Lagario's relatives. At the instance of the two accused, Pat. de la Peña recovered the wrist watch of the deceased from one Agripino Aguilos, alias "Agri", a bus driver (p. 6, tsn, Santos, April 25, 1973). They admitted that they took the wrist watch from the victim (pp. 42-45, tsn, Bugho March 8, 1972).

The cadaver of Aniceto R. Parades was autopsied by Dr. Juanito C. de la Cruz, the assistant city fiscal health officer and medico-legal officer of Tacloban City (Exhibit "A", p. 100, Folder of Exhibits). The deceased received two (2) stab wounds: One (1) at the middle of the chest perforating the heart through and through and the other at the back perforating the right lung (Exhibit "B", "B-1", and "B-2", p. 101, Folder of Exhibits). Two (2) different sharp-pointed double-edged instruments were used in inflicting the two (2) fatal wounds (pp. 2-7, tsn, Santos, February 19, 1973). And, considering the location of the wounds, the assailant's were directly in front and directly at the back of the victim (p. 9, tsn, Id.).

The accused presented the following version of the inccident as submitted in his brief:

At the hearing of April 25, 1973, the accused Romulo Lagario, 20 years old, single, laborer and a resident of Tacloban City, testified that on October 10, 1971 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening he was strolling with Tony Oquiño at the children's park at Tacloban City, when somebody was killed; that while they were strolling, it rained and they took shelter in a small hut at the children's park (tsn, 2-3); that there he saw a man and a woman whose names he did not know; that Oquiño talked to the man and thereafter he saw Oquiño boxed the man and stabbed him in the middle part of the abdomen (tsn, 4); that the man slumped forward and he saw Oquiño again stabbed the man on the back, that he then ran away leaving Oquiño and the man there.

He also testified that he met Oquiño at the pier of Tacloban in the morning of the next day aboard the motorboat Samareno, who requested him to sell a watch (tsn 5); that he told Oquiño he could not sell the watch himself but would look for someone to sell the watch for Oquiño that he requested Agripino Aguilos to sell the watch; that Agripino was unable to sell the watch retaining possession of it (tsn, 6); that the watch came into the custody of the Secret Service Division because when he was apprehended he told the police where the watch was and they took possession of it (tsn, 7).

He also testified that he did not know a woman named Marina Uy who testified against him although he had occasion to see the woman he mentioned in that incident of Oct. 10, 1971 in the courtroom.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he was present when Oquiño stabbed the man he referred to in his direct examination (tsn, 8), that after the stabbing he left Oquiño at the place; that he executed an affidavit in connection with the case but he is not sure if Exh. " G " is the same affidavit he executed; that he did not subscribe and swear to the affidavit Exh. "G", before Fiscal Sano (tsn, 9-10); that Antonio Oquiño gave him the wrist watch; that he did not know a person by the name of Arnido Calosor (tsn, 11-12). "The accused was the only witness who testified in his behalf in view of the fact that at the time of the trial he was an inmate in the City Jail and, therefore, unable to sure a witness or at least contact them.

The trial court as aforesaid, refused to give credence to the evidence of the defendant and convicted him of the crime of robbery with homicide. In the instant review, defendant's counsel de oficio contends that trial court committed the following errors:

I

The lower court erred in giving fun faith and credence to the biased, unnatural, improbable and conflicting testimony of Marina Uy.

II

The lower court erred in finding that the accused is guilty of robbery.

III

The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit "G" an alleged sworn statement by the accused before Fiscal Sano over the objection of the accused.

IV

The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of Lagario and in not acquitting him of the offenses charged.

Under the first assignment of error, accused-appellant seeks to discredit the testimony of Marina Uy, first, because she is the girl friend of the deceased victim, Anecito Parades, second, because her testimony is uncorroborated, and third, because of the alleged inconsistencies that were attendant in her direct examination.

The rule is well-established that a witness' relationship to the victim does not, by itself, impair his credibility. 4 On the contrary, it would be unnatural for such persons interested in seeing retribution exacted for the crime to impute the same to any person other than those responsible for the crime. 5

While it may be true that Marina Uy is embittered by the irreparable loss of a loved one, her declaration is firm, cogent, credible and straightforward. It is far from being tainted and prejudiced.

It has also been held that even assuming that the testimony of the principal eyewitness was not properly corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses, it is still sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused, since it is also well-settled that "the testimony of a single witness which satisfies the court in a given case, is sufficient to convict. 6

The accused-appellant points to the flaws or inconsistencies in Marina Uy's testimony which refer to "the weapon or criminal agency that caused Parades' death, her distance from the alleged protagonists after the lapse of 3 minutes that she ran away to call for assistance, and her exaggerated and contradictory assertion that she saw the knife penetrate the body of the deceased." 7

Appellant claims that it is doubtful whether the weapon used to lull Parades was a pisao or a bolo or a knife because the principal eyewitness vacillated when she testified in court. At one time, she testified that the three accused threatened her and her deceased boyfriend with their pisao 8 only to admit later that she did not see the bolos brandished at the time. At another time, she claimed that the weapon was "a pisao, about eight (8) inches long" 9 only to claim later that she did not know what kind of weapon it was. 10 Then at another time, she testified that she actually saw the knife of Calosor enter the body of Parades 11 only to contradict herself again by testifying that she did not actually the knife penetrate the body. 12

Appellant next casts doubt on the claim of Marina Uy that she saw how Parades was stabbed because she also claimed that she ran away after she was able to free herself from the hold of Oquiño.

The above inconsistencies are too trivial and unsubstantial to merit a reversal of the decision. Owing to the fast succession of the events in addition to the fear engendered by the same an eyewitness' inability to see the minute details of every sequence, to measure by metes and bounds the distances between one point to another as well as tell the exact minutes that have elapsed, is not unusual. Besides, the seeming contradictions are explainable.

In general, the testimony of Marina Uy presents a credible set of facts. She testified that she and her boyfriend, while seated on one of the protruding beams of the balcony of a miniature house at the Children's Park, were threatened by appellant together with two other companions. She may not have seen clearly the weapons when the three opened the door as she was taken aback as in fact she fell with her boyfriend to the ground but eventually saw the weapons. 13 As to the kind of weapons, it should be noted that she did not make a categorical answer that "it was a pisao, about eight inches long." She preceded her statement with the "I did not actually see it at that time." 14 Then on cross-examination, she explicitly declared that she did not actually know the kind of the weapons they had. 15 Hence, there is no basis for the alleged contradictions.

With respect to the alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Marina Uy as to whether or not she saw the weapon actually penetrate the body of the victim, We find that her testimony in cross-examination is clear that she actually saw it. Whatever she may have said that she "saw it because of the action of the forward thrust" have been clarified in her later statements. Besides, whether she saw the actual penetration or the action of the forward thrust do not really matter as the latter does not mean any other thing. The stubborn fact remains that the defenseless victim was stabbed by a sharp-pointed instrument. 16

On the contention of the accused that Marina Uy could not have seen the stabbing as she also claimed that she ran away after she freed herself from the clutch of Oquiño suffice it to state that said argument departs from human nature. The knowledge that one is no longer pursued would naturally make him or her stop and look back especially when a loved one is left behind. This was what Marina did as clearly indicated in her testimony. Hence, she saw the actual assailants.

We disagree with appellant's contention that there was no unlawful taking of the wrist watch and that the prosecution failed to prove the element of intent of gain.

Proof as to motive for the crime, that is, the accused intended to rob or only to kill the victim, is important or essential when the evidence on the commission of the robbery is purely circumstantial or inclusive, 17 as in this case.

Motive may be inferred from the following circumstances: (1) that certain jewelry and money found to be missing from the house of the deceased a short time after the homicide was subsequently found at a place indicated by the accused; 18 and (2) that the money which the deceased had at the beginning of the assault had disappeared when the body was being removed, although strewn above were a handkerchief, buttons torn from his shirt, and other articles. 19

Similarly, the motive to rob was duly proven in this case by the categorical statement of Marina Uy that while appellant and Calosor were dragging Aniceto to the side of the hut, they "wanted to take his watch" 20 coupled with the disappearance of the wrist watch when she returned to the wounded Aniceto after seeking help and its subsequent recovery from a certain Agripino Aguilos whose name was supplied to the police by the appellant and his co-accused, Antonio Oquiño after their arrest.

The intent to gain from the taking of the watch is clearly indicated in appellant's testimony that he was asked by Oquiño to sell the watch. 21

We likewise do not find merit in the contention of appellant that his sworn statement (Exhibit "G") is inadmissible for the reason that he is illiterate and there is no evidence presented that he understood the same which was in the English language. Said sworn statement was admitted because Jose Sano, the Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban before whom the same was subscribed and sworn to, Identified in court appellant's right-hand thumbmark and declared that said thumbmark was affixed in the presence of a witness who also signed said statement. He also testified that prior to the g of the thumbmark, he explained to appellant the contents of the statement in a dialect he knew and understood.

Moreover, in his testimony, appellant admitted having executed an affidavit in connection with this case. 22 He merely denied having sworn to the truth of the statement. But never did he impugn the same from the time he executed it on October 14, 1971 up to the date he testified on April 25, 1973.

We quote hereunder pertinent portions of the sworn statement of the accused bearing on his participation in the crime charged:

Question and Answer No. 4:

Question — Why were you picked up by the police?

Answer — Because I had a participation in a robbing and stabbing incident.

Question and Answer No. 5:

Q — Who were your companions in this incident when happened?

A — My companions were Antonio Oquiño and Arnido Calosor, alias Arnel and Arnul.

Question and Answer No. 6:

Q — Where did this incident occur?

A — On or about 7:25 p.m. October 10, 1971 at Plaza Libertad, this City, inside the Children's Park. (pp. 25-26, Records)

The trial court in its decision made use of the said sworn statement to impeach the credibility of the accused in view of its inconsistency with his testimony in court on the time of the incident, the number of his companions, the person who gave him the watch as wen as on whether or not he witnessed the incident. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the principle that "the testimony of an accused does not merit credit or inspire confidence when it is inconsistent and incompatible with his statement on other occasions." 23

Nevertheless, even without the sworn statement, it is clear in the testimony of the accused that he was at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed, that he was in the company of Oquiño one of the perpetrators of the crime; and that the watch was recovered from the person indicated by him and Oquiño All these show his complicity in the crime. His sheer defense that he had nothing to do with it cannot be believed as against the positive and interlocking testimony of Marina Uy who identified him and Calosor as the one who stabbed her boyfriend at the solar plexus and the back, respectively, as corroborated by the testimony of the doctor who confirmed the possibility of the use of two different weapons and inevitably of two assailants, as well as by the testimony of Detective Wilfredo de la Peña who successfully retrieved the watch exactly from the person pointed to by the accused. The lower court correctly found the different testimonies of the prosecution witnesses far more credible than the sole and negative testimony of the accused. Besides, where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are given great weight, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial.

That the crime of robbery with homicide was committed by the accused has, thus, been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court properly took judicial notice of the documents marked as Exhibit "E", Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "D", proving the aggravating circumstance of recidivism against the herein accused. By reason of his previous three convictions by final judgment for the crime of theft, the lower court also rightly considered him as a habitual delinquent. The assault against the unarmed victim having been perpetrated by three armed men, there is no doubt that abuse of superior strength characterized the crime. We agree with the trial court that there was no evidence to show that nighttime was sought purposely or taken advantage of to facilitate the perpetration of the offense.

Finding no error in the decision of the trial court, We hereby AFFIRM the death sentence and the civil liability of P12,000.00 due to the heirs of the victim, imposed on accused Romulo Lagario owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of recidivism, habitual delinquency and abuse of superior strength with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernando, CJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

CONCEPCION, Jr. J., concurring:

RELOVA, J., concurring:

The penalty should be reclution perpetua.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

CONCEPCION, Jr. J., concurring:

RELOVA, J., concurring:

The penalty should be reclution perpetua.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 13-14.

2 Record, p. 27.

3 Record, p. 94.

4 People vs. Villalba, 17 SCRA 948; People vs. Bautista, 6 SCRA 522, People va. Valera. 5 SCRA 910.

5 People vs. Bagsican, 6 SCRA 400; People va. Reyes, 17 SCRA 309; People vs. Tagaro, 7 SCRA 187.

6 People va. Sope, et al., 75 Phil. 810.

7 Appellant's Brief, p. 14.

8 TSN, p. 5.

9 TSN, p. 6, March 8, 1973.

10 TSN, p. 23.

11 TSN, p. 35.

12 TSN, p. 36.

13 TSN, p. 23.

14 TSN, p. 6.

15 TSN, p. 23.

16 TSN, p, 5.

17 People vs, Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364.

18 U.S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil. 88.

19 People vs. Dumduma & Caindoy 55 Phil. 953. ,

20 pp. 8-9, tsn, Bugho, March 8,1973.

21 pp. 5-6, tsn, April 25, 1973.

22 p. 19, tsn, April. 25, 1973.

23 People vs. Ramos, 77 Phil. 4; People vs. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; and People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 391.