Showing posts with label 1974. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1974. Show all posts

Thursday, July 9, 2009

People vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-28108, March 27, 1974

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28108 March 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUIRINO RAMOLETE, ANDRES ACOSTA and FAUSTINO RABARA alias FAUS, defendants, QUIRINO RAMOLETE, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Pio Joven as counsel de oficio for defendant-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendant Quirino Ramolete from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, convicting him of "double murder with serious physical injuries", sentencing him to "double life imprisonment" "for the death of Severino Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete", and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the two victims "in the sum of P6,000"

For the lesiones graves sustained by Alfredo Rayray, appellant Ramolete was "sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty" ranging from four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correcional and to pay one-third of the costs. (Criminal Case No. 4279).

Quirino Ramolete, Andres Acosta and Faustino Rabara were charged, as co-principals, with the murder of Mariano Ramolete and Severino Refuerzo and with frustrated murder in connection with the injuries inflicted on Alfredo Rayray. After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court granted the demurrer to the evidence interposed by Acosta and Rabara. As to them, the case was dismissed.

At the trial Quirino Ramolete admitted that he inflicted injuries on Rayray. He denied having shot Refuerzo and his uncle, Mariano Ramolete (their fathers were cousins). In this appeal, Pio Joven, his counsel de oficio, submits that portion of the trial court's judgment, convicting Quirino Ramolete of lesiones graves, should not be disturbed. Counsel admits that Ramolete is responsible for Refuerzo's death. But he argues that the offense was homicide and not murder. He contends that the prosecution failed to prove that Quirino Ramolete killed Mariano Ramolete.

The Solicitor General recommends that the death penalty, instead of reclusion perpetua, be imposed for appellant's killing of Mariano Ramolete. His view is that the offense committed by the appellant with respect to Rayray was attempted murder rather than lesiones graves.

So, the controverted points in this appeal are (a) whether appellant Quirino Ramolete killed Mariano Ramolete and whether capital punishment should be imposed on him for that crime; (b) whether the killing of Refuerzo should be categorized as simple homicide or as murder qualified by treachery and premeditation, and (c) whether appellant's admitted infliction of physical injuries on Rayray should be regarded as attempted murder and not lesiones graves.

The case for the prosecution rests on the testimonies of Calixta Rabot, the forty-eight year old widow of Mariano Ramolete, and Enriqueta Refuerzo, the fifteen-year old, Grade Six sister of the deceased victim, Severino Refuerzo. They were eyewitnesses of the assaults which had a tragic denouncement for Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete.

From their testimonies, it appears that in the evening of June 24, 1961 there was a gathering in the house of the spouses, Mariano Ramolete and Calixta Rabot, located at Barrio Paratong, Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur. A few relatives, neighbors and friends of the couple were celebrating the birth of a grandchild begotten by Nicasia Rabanal, their daughter-in-law (her husband, Mateo Regaspi is the son of Calixta Rabot by her first marriage). A game of cards known as briska was being played near the door of the sala. Among the players were Rayray and Refuerzo. The stakes were pieces of candy called lemon candies or vicks drops. The house was lighted by a Coleman lamp and a lantern.

At about ten o'clock, Quirino Ramolete, a twenty-four-year old farmer, came to the house, entered the sala were the game was being played and asked for candy. Refuerzo and Rayray gave him candy. After eating it, he left the house. About a minute later, he returned, accompanied by Acosta and Rabara. Each of them was armed with a gun. Quirino Ramolete stood at the door, the only ingress and egress of the house (Exh. 1). Behind him were his minions, Acosta and Rabara. They pointed their weapons at the astounded and trapped persons playing briska.

Quirino Ramolete, addressing to Rayray, said: "You stand up, Alfredo, and I will shoot you." Calixta Rabot said: "Oh, my son, please don't do that". A commotion ensued. The guests inside the sala shouted simultaneously. They dispersed, scurried away and tried to hide or flee. Quirino Ramolete instructed Rabara and Acosta to go down and watch for those persons who were going to jump out of the house. Quirino shot Refuerzo while the latter was jumping through the window into the batalan or porch. He shot Mariano Ramolete who was in the batalan. He also shot Rayray downstairs. Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete died on that same night Rayray was wounded.

Doctor B.C. Eduarte, a junior resident physician of the Ilocos Sur Provincial Hospital at Vigan, found that the deceased seventy-year old Mariano Ramolete, sustained (1) a gunshot wound in the left buttocks without any exit and (2) a through-and-through gunshot wound of entry in the abdomen with an exit on the flank or right iliac region. The second wound was fatal. His findings are quoted below:

Wound, gunshot, left buttocks at upper outer quadrant about one centimeter in diameter directed medially and downwards. No wound of exit.

Wound, gunshot, abdomen thru and thru. Entrance of anterior superior iliac spine, one centimeter in diameter directed medially and slightly upwards. (Exit. — right iliac region, a slit 2 centimeters long).

Autopsy Findings. — Small intestines perforated nine (9) times and mesentery three (3) times. Hemorrhage, severe secondary.

Cause of Death. — Shock with hemorrhage, severe secondary to gunshot wound of abdomen.

Doctor Moises R. Arce, the rural health physician of Sta. Catalina, who performed a postmortem examination on the body of the deceased twenty- year old Severino Refuerzo, found that he sustained through-and-through gunshot wounds. There were three gunshot wounds of entry on his back and three corresponding wounds of exit on the front as shown below:

1. Gunshot wound, thorax, back, right, between 10-11 costal ribs, .3 centimeter diameter, 1-1/4 centimeter from spinal column, going inward medially, smashing the liver and blood vessels extensively to the right side, and come out from gunshot wound No. 4.

2. Gunshot wound, back, left, at the level of the navel, 3-3/4 centimeters from spinal column, .8 centimeter diameter, going inward and come out from gunshot wound No. 5. Organ involved intestine.

3. Gunshot wound, back, buttocks, right, 3-3/4 centimeters from coccyx horizontally, going inward and come out from gunshot wound No. 6.9 centimeter diameter.

4. Gunshot wound, thorax, front, left-side, 2 centimeters from the xiphoid process, 1-½ centimeters in diameter, piercing the 6th costal cartilage.

5. Gunshot wound, abdomen, front, left at the navel line, 9-½ centimeters from umbilicus, 1 centimeter in diameter.

6. Gunshot wound, hypogastric region, left along the pubic tubercle, 2 centimeters in diameter 1-½ from root of penis. No organ involved.

Cause of death — Internal and external hemorrhage due to the above-mentioned wounds Nos. 1 to 6. (Exh. F).

Doctor Arce concluded that the assailant was behind Refuerzo when he was shot. Inasmuch as the three wounds of entry have almost the same diameter, they were probably inflicted by one gun only, possibly a thirty-caliber rifle.

Rayray, a twenty-one year old farmer, suffered gunshot wounds on the arm and leg (Exh. D). He was hospitalized for more than one month and incapacitated in his work as farmer for one year. He spent one thousand pesos for hospitalization and medical treatment in addition to suffering a loss of income in the amount of four hundred pesos.

Appellant Quirino Ramolete said that, after leaving the house of Mariano Ramolete, he slept in the house of Francisco Ramolete at Barrio Sinaban, Sta. Catalina. On the following morning, he went to the house of Andres Acosta. Then, he did in the ricefields. On June 30, 1961 he and Andres Acosta boarded a bus and went to Barrio Sta. Cruz, Ballesteros, Cagayan. He stayed in the house of Jacobo Olanino. On July 27, 1961 he was arrested by a Constabulary sergeant.

In his statement dated July 31, 1961 before Corporal Jaime C. Foronda of the Constabulary detachment at Tamag, Vigan, he stated that on the night of June 24, 1961, while he was in the house of Mariano Ramolete, he shot Alfredo Rayray with his paltik gun. He affirmed that on the occasion Acosta shot Mariano Ramolete while Rabara shot Refuerzo. The two used forty-five caliber pistols (Exhs. A to B-2, pages 31 to 36 of the Record).

However, in his testimony he gave a different version. He said that Rabara shot and killed Mariano Ramolete. He was non-committal as to who shot Refuerzo.

What was the motive for the assaults? On that point, there is a hiatus valde deflendus in the prosecution's evidence. Motive places the case in proper judicial perspective. The record yields some intimation as to the motivation of Quirino Ramolete in killing Refuerzo and in wounding Rayray. About three months before the killing, Refuerzo stabbed one Patricio Ragil, a friend of Quirino Ramolete and Acosta. Rayray was implicated in that incident. Quirino Ramolete testified against Rayray in that case (No. 23, Exh. A-2; No. 9, Exh. D; Statements of Daniel Refuerzo and Miguel Rapanut, pages 10 to 13 of the Record). So, it seems that Quirino Ramolete had a score to settle with Refuerzo and Rayray.

On the other hand, Quirino Ramolete denied that he had any misunderstanding with his uncle, Mariano. Quirino said that Mariano even invited him to play briska in Mariano's house. Calixta Rabot declared she did not know why Quirino Ramolete should kill Mariano Ramolete. She said that, whenever Quirino went to their house, he dined with them.

One curious piece of evidence presented at the last hearing by appellant Quirino Ramolete was an alleged "dying declaration" of Mariano Ramolete, taken by the thirty-nine year old Corporal Cirilo Ducay of the Constabulary detachment at Tamag, Vigan in the early morning of June 25, 1961. He said that he took the statement of Mariano Ramolete near the kitchen of his house while Ramolete was on the point of death. Corporal Laguesma was present. The declaration is in English in the handwriting of Ducay. It was witnessed by the Chief of Police and supposed to have been thumbmarked by Mariano Ramolete with his blood (Exhibit 4, page 17 of the record). The typewritten copy was authenticated by Justice of the Peace Pedro R. Arce. Mariano Ramolete was asked by Ducay:

Q. Who shoot (sic) you? — A. I don't know only Quirino (sic) Ramolete who was holding a gun who come inside my house and his companion whom I don't know his name" (sic). (Page 17 of the Record).

Ducay propounded the questions in English, translated them into Ilocano and translated into English Ramolete's answers. After Mariano Ramolete had made his declaration, Ducay held Ramolete's right thumb, "placed it in his (Ramolete's) blood" and affixed his thumbmark at the bottom of the paper containing the dying declaration as written in English by Ducay. The thumbmark is reddish-brown. Ducay is a native of Santa Maria, Ilocos Sur. He said that he wrote the ante-mortem statement in English because that is the language used in court.

The trial court, in not attaching any probative value to the "dying declaration" and to Ducay's testimony, observed that Mariano Ramolete declared that he did not know his assailant because he was shot in the back. He did not see the aggressor. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses positively identified the culprit as Quirino Ramolete.

The "dying declaration" has an ambiguous, double meaning. While the declarant said that he did not know who was his assailant, in the same breath he pointed to Quirino Ramolete as the gunwielder who, with a companion, entered his domicile. It may be implied from the "dying declaration" that Quirino Ramolete had complicity in the killing of Mariano Ramolete.

Finally, for a complete view of the case, it should be stated that, according to Quirino Ramolete's version, gunshots were also fired under the batalan or porch of Mariano Ramolete's house (6 tsn December 13, 1966).

As already stated, appellant's counsel admits that Quirino Ramolete killed Refuerzo and shot Rayray. The trial court correctly viewed, as a "sign of guilt", Ramolete's flight to Ballesteros. It observed that the two prosecution witnesses, Enriqueta Refuerzo and Calixta Rabot, were positive in their identification of Quirino Ramolete, as the malefactor who shot Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete. It commented that the defense failed to impair their credibility in spite of rigid cross examination. On the basis of their testimony, the trial court was convinced that Quirino Ramolete killed Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete.

Appellant's counsel, in support of his contention that Quirino Ramolete did not kill Mariano Ramolete, quotes in his brief a portion of Enriqueta Refuerzo's testimony that she did not see Quirino firing at Mariano. However, counsel omitted Enriqueta's subsequent declaration that she knew "that Quirino Ramolete fired at her brother", Severino, and at "Mariano Ramolete" (16 tsn April 3, 1963). An impartial perusal of Enriqueta's entire testimony reveals that she categorically testified that Quirino Ramolete killed Mariano Ramolete (4 and 7 tsn April 3, 1963).

Appellant's counsel impugns the trial court's finding that Calixta Rabot testified that Quirino Ramolete shot Mariano Ramolete. Counsel cites her declaration that, because a wall separated her and her husband, Mariano Ramolete, she did not see Quirino Ramolete shooting Mariano. As shown below, her declaration was quoted out of context.

Whether the killing of Refuerzo was treacherous and whether Quirino Ramolete killed Mariano Ramolete may be deduced from the pertinent portions of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses quoted hereunder:

Testimony of Enriqueta Refuerzo

Q. You said Quirino Ramolete killed some, do you know ... who were those that were killed? — A ... Severino Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete, sir. (4 tsn April 3, 1963).

Q. And when Quirino Ramolete fired his gun what happened next? — A ... There was someone who was killed.

Q. Who was that was killed? — A. Severino Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete, sir.

Q. How about his two companions, Andres Acosta and Fausto Rabara, how far were you to them? — A. They were farther to me than Quirino Ramolete.

Q. And what did they do with their guns that they were holding? — A. They fired their guns, sir.

Q. Can you tell the Court the direction where they fired their guns? — A. Quirino Ramolete pointed his gun to Severino Refuerzo. I don't know to whom the others pointed their guns. (7 tsn).

Q. And when you heard a noise which seems that someone was coming up, you made a conclusion that Quirino Ramolete was going up? — A. No, sir. He talked when he came up and said, "Stand up, Alfredo, and I will shoot you." (14 tsn).

Q. When Quirino Ramolete uttered those words to Alfredo Rayray, what did Alfredo Rayray do? — A. They went out because they were afraid, sir. ... Our companions including Severino Refuerzo went out, sir. ... When Severino Refuerzo jumped from the batalan, it was at that moment when Quirino Ramolete fired at him.

Q. How far were you when Quirino Ramolete fired at Severino Refuerzo? — A. I was about one meter from them, Your Honor. I was at the doorway. (15 tsn).

Q. And neither did you see also Quirino Ramolete fire at Mariano
Ramolete? — A. No, sir. When Quirino Ramolete fired at Severino Refuerzo, Mariano Ramolete was at the batalan.

Q. So, all that you know is that Quirino Ramolete fired at your brother (Refuerzo) and to Mariano Ramolete? — A. Yes, sir. (16 tsn).

Court: — Q: Are you sure that it was Quirino Ramolete who fired at your deceased brother? — A. Yes, Your Honor, I saw him. (23 tsn).

Q. So you saw Quirino Ramolete pointing his gun? He was not particularly trying to shoot your brother because all of you were scampering, is that right? — A. I was sure, sir. When my brother jumped to go down, it was then that he, Quirino Ramolete, pointed his gun at him. (24 tsn).

Q. To where did you ran? — A. When we ran away, Severino Refuerzo jumped out of the window west of the door (8 tsn March 15, 1966).

Q. Then what happened? — A. When we had been running, scampering towards any direction, I remembered Severino Refuerzo, and when I looked, that was the time when I saw Quirino Ramolete shot him. (9 tsn).

Q. What was the position of Severino Refuerzo when he was fired at by Quirino Ramolete? — A. He was in the act of jumping over the window so he could go to the batalan because that is where the stairs were. (10 tsn).

Q. How far was Quirino Ramolete when he fired at Severino Refuerzo? — A. It was near, sir. (The witness indicating a distance of about two and a half meters).

Q. Afterwards, what did you do and what happened next? — A. When there was no more firing, I went out and I saw Severino Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete on the batalan and Mariano Ramolete was at his head.

Q. What was their condition? — A. Severino Refuerzo was then dead and Ramolete was agonizing. (10-11 tsn).

Q. After you heard Quirino Ramolete say that he will shoot Alfredo Rayray, you ran inside the room where Nicasia Rabanal was, is it not? — A. Not immediately, sir, because I stood up near the door where he was and that was the time when he fired at Severino (Refuerzo).

Q. Everybody who was inside the house had to pass that door where Quirino Ramolete was at that time? — A. Yes, sir. (16-17 tsn).

Testimony of Calixta Rabot

Q. When did your husband, Mariano Ramolete, die? — A. He died two years ago, sir.

Q. What was the cause of his death? — A. He was shot by Quirino Ramolete, sir. (3 tsn).

Q. And about you, how far were you in relation to Quirino Ramolete? — A. I was not very far, sir. He was close to me.

Q. How close was it? Will you indicate the distance from your place? — A. A distance of about one yard, sir.

Q. What else happened when the players ran away? — A. Quirino Ramolete fired his gun, sir.

Q. What else happened? — A. He shot Severino (Refuerzo) and my husband, Mariano (Ramolete), sir. (4-5 tsn April 4, 1963).

Q. And you said that Severino Refuerzo ran and was fired at. Do you know or did you see the one who fired at him? — A. Quirino Ramolete, sir.

Q. And where was your husband at the time when Quirino Ramolete fired at Severino Refuerzo? — A. He was in the batalan, sir.

Q. But you did not actually see your husband being fired upon, is it not? — A. As soon as Severino Refuerzo fell prostrate, my husband also fell. (7-8 tsn April 4, 1963).

Q. But your husband was in your batalan and between the batalan and where you were was a wall? — A. Yes, sir. The wall is here and here is where my husband fell (the witness indicating the walling to be between her and the place where her husband fell) (10 tsn).

Q. As a matter of fact, while you were near Quirino Ramolete, you did not see him in the batalan and you only knew that he was there when your husband was moaning? — A. Yes, sir, because when Severino Refuerzo fell, my husband fell also. (10 tsn).

Q. ... You mean to say that what you had stated that only Quirino Ramolete fired at Severino Refuerzo and your husband is not true? — A. What I saw Quirino Ramolete fired at Severino Refuerzo and my husband. (Id. 13 tsn).

Q. Can you tell the Court who was the accused who shot your husband? — A. Quirino Ramolete, your Honor. (18 tsn).

Q. When you saw Quirino Ramolete shoot your husband, was your husband inside the house? — A. He was at the batalan, your Honor. (18 tsn).

Q. When you were at the doorway of the kitchen that was the time when he shot your husband? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you were very near the place where your husband was shot? — A. I was close to him, your Honor.

Q. How near were you from him? — A. From here to there, your Honor (the witness indicating a length of two meters).

Q. From the place where Quirino Ramolete shot your husband, how far was your husband to Quirino Ramolete at the time he was shot? — A. He was very close, your Honor. He was here while Severino Refuerzo and my husband were here dead (the witness indicating (where) she, the witness, was from the two deceased Mariano Ramolete and Severino Refuerzo).

Q. When you said Quirino Ramolete shot Severino Refuerzo and your husband, were they shot simultaneously? — A. As soon as Severino Refuerzo fell prostrate, my husband also fell, your Honor.

Q. Did Severino Refuerzo and your husband fall to the ground when they were shot? — A. They fell on the front of the batalan, your Honor.

Q. So they were both dying and killed on the batalan? — A. Yes, your Honor. (18-19 tsn).

Considering the foregoing oral evidence, appellant's claim that he did not kill Mariano Ramolete is not borne out by the record.

A close scrutiny and dispassionate appraisal of the testimonies of Calixta Rabot and Enriqueta Refuerzo confirm the trial court's finding that they witnessed the shooting of Refuerzo by Quirino Ramolete. However, there is a palpable nebulousness in their testimonies as to how Mariano Ramolete was shot by Quirino Ramolete or how Mariano received the fatal gunshot wound of entry in the abdomen whose corresponding exit wound was in the left iliac region and how the other gunshot wound in his buttocks was inflicted.

Appellant's counsel de oficio contends that the killing of Refuerzo by Quirino Ramolete was not attended with treachery because "no deceit and trickery" were employed. He argues that "while it is true that the wounds of Severino Refuerzo were at his back", there was no treachery since he "was not waylaid or trapped" pursuant to "a preconceived plot by his aggressor". Counsel says that there is no proof that there was treachery at the inception of the attack and that there is no showing that Quirino Ramolete, in shooting Refuerzo, was not exposed to any risk which would "require him to put up a defense". Hence, while admitting that Quirino Ramolete killed Refuerzo, counsel concludes that the killing was only homicide.

These contentions are untenable. The trial court found that the killings of Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete were attended with treachery because the wounds which they sustained were on the back. The Solicitor General agrees that treachery was present because the wounds on the back indicate that the victims were shot from behind.

A conscientious review of the circumstances surrounding the killing of Refuerzo supports the finding that there was treachery. Appellant Quirino Ramolete first came to the house unarmed and ostensibly with pacific intentions. As it turned out, his purpose was to reconnoiter or to case the house and ascertain whether the intended victims were present and unarmed. That conduct of Quirino Ramolete amounted to "trickery or deceit". He dissembled and camouflaged his murderous intention by giving the inmates of the house the impression that he would not do them any harm.

Having satisfied himself that the place and time were propitious for the execution of his diabolical plan, he left the house and fetched his confederates, Acosta and Rabara. After equipping themselves with deadly weapons, they entered the house to put into effect their felonious design. They surprised the persons inside the house particularly Refuerzo. Ramolete strategically stationed himself near the door, "the only exit in the house". (8, 17 tsn March 15, 1966).

Refuerzo must have instinctively felt that he was one of the objects of Quirino Ramolete's vindictive hostility in view of the prior incident regarding Ragil, Quirino's friend. Inasmuch as Refuerzo was unarmed and utterly defenseless, he tried to escape through the window. Quirino Ramolete shot him in that situation. Refuerzo fell into the batalan with three serious gunshot wounds of entry on his back. Treachery (alevosia) was manifest in that manner of assault because it insured the killing without any risk to the assailant (Par. 16, Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code).

An attack made on a person who was running away and who was completely defenseless was held to be treacherous (People vs. Logroño 96 Phil. 975; Cf. People vs. Sawit, 100 Phil. 507, 512). Where the attack was made with firearms and the victims were unarmed and with no means of defense or escape because they were trapped inside a house, the assault in that situation was held to be treacherous (People vs. Hairal and Tajiril, 97 Phil. 966).

As to the culpability of appellant Quirino Ramolete for the death of Mariano Ramolete, the Court is not convinced that the killing was attended with treachery. As already noted, although the prosecution had established Quirino Ramolete's responsibility for the killing of Mariano Ramolete, it failed to establish clearly the circumstances surrounding the killing. Consequently, the killing of Mariano Ramolete should be characterized as homicide aggravated by dwelling. He was killed in his own house without having given any provocations (Par. 3, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code).

But dwelling is not aggravating in the killing of Refuerzo since he was a mere visitor in Mariano Ramolete's house (Cf. People vs. Basa, 83 Phil. 622, citing 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, Cuarta Edicion, page 338 and People vs. Celespara, 82 Phil. 399).

The trial court held that there was no abuse of superiority because only Quirino Ramolete committed the three offenses. It is not necessary to pass upon that point and upon its finding that nocturnity was also aggravating. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength and nocturnity.

It is alleged in the information that the killings were also qualified with premeditation. While it is manifest that the assaults were not perpetrated on a momentary impulse and that there must have been some planning and deliberation, yet it cannot be held that there was premeditacion conocida. As correctly observed by the trial court, the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) an appreciable interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime that was sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and to overcome the resolution of his will (vencer las determinaciones de la voluntad) if he desired to hearken to its warnings (People vs. Fuentesuela, 73 Phil. 553; U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, 547).

How to do justice in the case involving Rayray is rendered difficult by the contradictory and confusing evidence in the record. As already noted, Quirino Ramolete was charged with frustrated murder for having assaulted Rayray. The lower court convicted him of lesiones graves. His counsel in this appeal prays that judgment be affirmed. The Solicitor General recommends that he be convicted of attempted murder.

Rayray himself, as an ambivalent witness, was not helpful in dissipating the discrepancies in the testimonial evidence. Listed as a prosecution witness for being an offended party, he testified for the defense. Obviously, he must have been under heavy pressure to sabotage the prosecution of his assailant or assailants.

Two days after the shooting, Rayray signed a statement before Constabulary Corporal Rodolfo Purisima while confined in the hospital. It was sworn to before the justice of the peace of Vigan. Rayray said that Quirino Ramolete shot him in the arm while he (Rayray) "was at the stairs". Then, Acosta shot him in the leg. He collapsed. (Exh. D).

Rayray, testifying as a defense witness more than five years after the tragic occurrence, said on direct examination that he had an altercation with Quirino Ramolete in the house of Mariano Ramolete during the card game. He told Quirino: "I have been losing and it is only my first time to win this game, 'yot' ". Quirino went out. Rayray followed Quirino. Then, there was a gunshot and Rayray "felt a stinging pain" in his body. He was bleeding. He ran and went downstairs, where he collapsed.

On cross-examination, Rayray said that his statement before the justice of the peace (Exh. D) was fabricated by the late Mayor Jose Rapisura. He said that he was intimidated by the mayor and by Policeman Racsa. Rayray categorically testified that Quirino Ramolete shot him (36 tsn November 22, 1966). A prosecution witness testified that Rayray was shot downstairs or when he went down (17 tsn April 3, 1963; 10 tsn March 15, 1966).

Quirino Ramolete's version on the witness stand was that, after his altercation with Rayray, the latter gripped his (Rayray's) gun and rushed at him (Ramolete), saying: "Why do you have bad feelings?" Quirino shot Rayray twice in the arm. The trial court did not accord any credence to Quirino's story.

After weighing carefully the evidence, the Court concludes that the shooting of Rayray by Quirino Ramolete was attempted homicide. Appellant Ramolete intended to kill Rayray but he was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the killing. The wounds suffered by Rayray on his arm and leg did not affect his vital organs. They were not mortal. There was no treachery because Quirino Ramolete first warned Rayray that he would be shot. No modifying circumstances can be considered in the assault against Rayray.

WHEREFORE, as to the killing of Severino Refuerzo, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code), with the modification that the indemnity should be twelve thousand pesos. The penalty should be designated as reclusion perpetua. The term "life imprisonment" is not correct (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).

For the killing of Mariano Ramolete, appellant Quirino Ramolete is guilty of homicide aggravated by dwelling (morada). He is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos.

In the third case the lower court's judgment is also modified. Appellant Quirino Ramolete is convicted of attempted homicide as to Alfredo Rayray instead of lesiones graves. There being no modifying circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six months of arresto mayor to three (3) years of prision correccional and to indemnify Rayray in the sum of one thousand four hundred pesos (P1,400) to cover his medical expenses and loss of income. Costs against the appellant.

The maximum duration of forty years fixed in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the service of the three sentences.

So ordered.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Antonio, JJ., concurs in the result.

Makasiar, J., took no part.

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

People vs. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-30307, August 15, 1974

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30307 August 15, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JORGE FELICIANO Y GARCIA AND ABRAHAM GARCIA Y PURIFICACION, defendants and appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose S. Sarte for defendants-appellants. .

ESGUERRA, J.:p

This case is before this Court for automatic review of the death sentence for Robbery with Homicide imposed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, in its Criminal Case No. 85500, on accused Abraham Purificacion Garcia and Jorge Garcia Feliciano, who were found guilty upon an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1967, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with three others whose true names and whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of violence, take, steal and carry away the following motor vehicle, to wit:

One (1) passenger jeepney, Ford with plate No. PUJ-1398 '66 Manila, Motor No. GPW 144741, Steel top, painted maroon (body) with lining colored white, and with nickel plated words "Jerry" on the lower center of the windshield frame, valued .... P8,000.00

belonging to one Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat, against the latter's consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat, in the said amount of P8,000.00, Philippine currency; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said motor vehicle, said accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon said Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat, by then and there shooting him and hitting him with an iron pipe and wooden clubs on the head and other parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

All contrary to law, and with the generic aggravating circumstances of having been committed in the nighttime, in an uninhabited place and by a band which facilitated the commission of said offense.

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Thereupon trial ensued and upon its termination, judgment was rendered finding the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged with the attendant aggravating circumstances of craft, nighttime, abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle and without any mitigating circumstance to offset any of them. The extreme penalty of death was imposed on the accused and they were likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 plus P7,000.00 representing the value of the jeepney of the deceased which was never recovered.

It is not disputed that the late Alberto Ila Y Liongson alias Alberto Salamat, alias Vicente Ila was, married to Virginia Ila with whom he had two children; that they had acquired a jeep which he used for transporting passengers for fare; that he took out this vehicle to the streets on February 8, 1967, to solicit passengers along the Divisoria-Quiapo route and earn for the day, but he never returned; that Virginia grew apprehensive and she tried to locate him but failed; that she reported the matter to the police in the morning of February 10, 1967; that thereupon a search was conducted and the next day, Fidel Santos, a taxi-driver and neighbor of the victim, informed Virginia that he saw her husband driving his jeep northbound on the national highway near the San Miguel Brewery plant at Valenzuela, Bulacan, with 3 or 4 passengers aboard. (t.s.n. pp. 3-6, July 24, 1967; pp. 6-13 November 20, 1967)

On February 11, 1967, an unidentified body of a dead man was discovered in Barrio Salangan, Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, by one Quintin Bautista who reported his discovery to the parochial priest. The latter together with the Barrio Captain reported the matter to the municipal authorities. Thereafter, Pat. Rodriguez along with Patrolmen Sanguyo and Salazar and four detainees of the San Miguel municipal jail repaired to the scene where the cadaver was and found the body inside a burlap sack concealed among the tall grasses (talahib). They waited for the arrival of Dr. Verde, the medico-legal officer, and in his presence slashed the sack open. They saw the victim naked with hands bound and face covered with cloth. The knees were bent close to the body and the arms bound to the knees with abaca twine and tie wire in a squatting position. (t.s.n. pp. 3-7 September 12, 1967) During the trial, Pat. Rodriguez declared that he made a sketch of the place where the body was found and the position of the body. After an examination was conducted by the medico-legal officer, he (Pat. Rodriguez) noted the identifying marks of the victim and lifted his fingerprints. impressions of which he indorsed to Det. Manuel Javier of the Manila Police Department (Exh. "E", "E-1",, "F",, "J-1", "J-2" and "J-3" pp. 49, 50, 250-253 Record).

Mrs. Virginia Ila widow of Alberto, upon learning that a dead man was found in San Miguel, Bulacan, went to the Municipal Building of San Miguel, Bulacan, and inquired about the discovered body. She was informed that subject had been buried but she was asked if her husband had identifying marks and she answered that her missing husband had four false teeth with gold crown and a tattoo on his left leg with the name, "Virgie", and with the drawing of a woman. The authorities who earlier noted the dead man's identifying marks informed Mrs. Ila that they noted a tattoo mark on the dead man's left leg. Mrs. Ila then requested that the body be taken to Manila. An exhumation followed and a necropsy thereof was made (t.s.n. November 20, 1967 pp. 13-20).

Dr. Cesar Verde, medico-legal officer of Bulacan, who conducted the autopsy of the deceased, testified that he found the marks around the right and left wrists and right and left ankles measuring 0.5 cm. which he said could have been caused by a rope tied around those parts of the body. He also found lacerated wound on the right occipital side measuring 2 x 1 cm. which could have been caused by a blunt instrument and a gunshot wound on the right chest (Exh. "Q" p. 130 Criminal Case Record Wrapper) He attributed the cause of death to hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound. The retrieved slug was sent to the NBI for ballistic examination. .

Roberto Garcia, Chief. of the fingerprint section, Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Manila Police Department, declared that on February 15, 1967, he received from Det. Javier a set of post mortem fingerprints with a request that a study and comparison be made of said fingerprints lifted from the discovered cadaver with the standard fingerprints of one Alberto Salamat which were on file with Central Records and Identification Division of the MPD. Garcia caused enlarged reproductions of both fingerprints to be made, and after a study arrived at the conclusion that the fingerprint impressions from the dead body were the same as those of Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat on file. In his study, he noted 13 identical characteristics obtaining in the middle right finger of both specimen and according to him (Roberto Garcia) "modern authorities sustain the opinion that 6 to 8 characteristics are sufficient to warrant positive identification." (t.s.n. p. 17 December 27, 1967)

The evidence also shows that when Mrs. Virginia Ila reported the disappearance of her husband to the authorities, an investigation was initiated. Detective Cano interviewed Jose Liongson alias Tisoy and Danilo Esteban who told him that they heard the accused herein say that if it could be confirmed that it was Alberto Ila who was responsible for his (Feliciano) dismissal by Rene Payumo, operator of the jeep he was driving, something would befall him (Alberto) (t.s.n. pp. 33, 34, July 24, 1967; pp. 70-72 t.s.n. September 11, 1967). Feliciano was found to have been dismissed in January 1967 (pp. 72, 73 t.s.n. September 11, 1967). These inquiries led to the apprehension of Abraham Garcia and Jorge Feliciano, herein accused who, when brought to the headquarters of the Manila Police Department (MPD), signed statements. (Exh. "A" and "B" pp. 35, 38, Record Wrapper). They likewise executed a waiver of their rights against detention beyond the period provided for in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, while under investigation. (Exh. "I" p. 135 Record Wrapper). Based on their signed statements which were taken by Detectives Buenaventura, Erfe and Javier, Det. Cano who was given charge of the case proceeded to Valenzuela, Bulacan to check on the statements of defendants, particularly their claim that they brought Alberto Ila alias Alberto Salamat to a house in said municipality and left the vehicle used in bringing him to the place to somebody also in that municipality (t.s.n. p. 13 July 24, 1967). Unfortunately, he failed to find the person and the vehicle he was looking for. Hence he conjectured that the two were not telling the whole truth. With the discovery of a dead man in Bulacan, accused Feliciano and Garcia readily admitted that their previous statements were not true and in subsequent separate statements given before Det. Cano, in the presence of Pat. San Miguel and Jaranilla (t.s.n. p. 15 July 24, 1967) they narrated in detail how they lured the victim to go to Marilao, Bulacan, on the pretext of fetching a woman (Exh. "C" and "I" pp. 39-48, Record, Wrapper), In his subsequent statement, accused Feliciano related that he had an axe to grind against Alberto whom he suspected as having triggered his, dismissal from his job. He also implication the names "Rene and Ding" as their confederates in the plot of revenge. He mentioned that they brought the victim and his jeepney somewhere on the national highway in San Miguel where he was divested of his jeep and where he (Feliciano) struck the victim with an iron pipe, with Garcia and Ding using pieces of wood also to strike Alberto. They pointed to Rene however as the gun-wielder, with all of them helping in, tying Alberto with abaca twine and tie wire and later slipping him into a burlap sock, tying the ends of the sack and leaving the victim in that pitiable state. They then fled back to Manila on a car painted white which was traced back to an auto repair shop owned by Rafael Bondoc at Lakas ng Mahirap, Caloocan (t.s.n. pp. 17, 18 July 24, 1967; Exh. "C", "D" pp. 39-48 Record Wrapper). The jeep of Alberto was allegedly sold by Rene to someone not personally known to them and they (Garcia and Feliciano) were given their share of the loot.

When the body was taken to Manila, the accused herein identified the deceased (Exh. "H" and "I"). A few days thereafter, a re-enactment of the commission of the crime was made in the presence of Lt. Jesus Buenaventura, Assistant Chief of the Detective and Robbery Division, Sgts. Manguyo and Villanueva and Pat. Dacanay, and the body was photographed. (Exh. "M-O-1")

Accused Jorge Feliciano and Abraham Garcia during the trial repudiated the extra-judicial confessions they made and signed. They now disown the documents purporting to be their confession. (Exh. "A, B, C, D, H and I" pp. 35,36, 37, 38, 53, 54 record; pp. 5, 6, t.s.n. October 17, 1968; pp. 4, 5 t.s.n. September 24, 1968) and claim that the statements were extracted from them by force or through "third degree" methods.

Jorge Feliciano declared that all he remembers was that he was forcibly made to sign many papers by the police officers who arrested him but "did not know exactly" what they were all about (pp. 6, 13, 14, 18 t.s.n. October 17, 1968); and that he was brought to a hotel and to the Detective Bureau where he was "3rd degreed". (pp. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 t.s.n. October 17, 1968). On the other hand, Abraham Garcia claimed that after he was arrested, he was brought to the Manila Police Headquarters at Isaac Peral (now United Nations Street) was maltreated and, at the point of a gun, was made to sign statements (pp. 1-15 t.s.n. September 24, 1968). They however admitted the genuineness of their signatures and that the signatures on the different statements are their normal signatures, a fact aptly noted by the trial judge, viz:

Against their repeated admissions, the defendants entered a defense of complete denial. Defendant Garcia alleged further by way of defense that has become a standard defense that he was maltreated. The claim of maltreatment, however, deserves no credence. Thus the defendant claims with respect to his statement Exh. B that he does not know anything about its contents. Yet, he admitted on cross examination that many of the questions in the statement were asked of him. Again the defendant admitted that the signatures in the statements are his. If it were true as he said that he was maltreated every day for two weeks, his physical condition must have been such that his signatures in the said statements would surely show a marked difference from each other because of the tension and the pain he must have suffered. An examination of the signatures in his different statements taken after days of interval clearly show that they were written with the same sure and firm hand. The defendant claims that the re-enactment was not voluntary on their part. Yet, the defendant admitted that they were told to pose as they pleased. In fact the defendant admitted that he was not actually forced.

The defense in its ably-written brief exerted mighty efforts to discredit the confessions by attempting to prove that they were extorted by torture and maltreatment of the accused. The trial judge, however, after a careful deliberation did not view their contention of a forced confession with sympathy and rejected their claim. Our own study of the record reveals that no error was committed by the court a quo in admitting the confessions of the accused. Their assertions of maltreatment are belied by their own testimonies. The facts contained in the written statements could not have been given by any one else who did not perform the acts narrated therein. They are so replete with details which the police officers could not have known if they merely concocted the confessions. Information such as that Jorge Feliciano was without a drivers license a week before he was arrested or the fact that he had a quarrel with one "Tisoy", an uncle of the deceased, and during which fight Abraham Garcia, the other defendant, was also with him; or that he reached the 7th grade at Tayuman Elementary School or the names of their teachers and other personal circumstances could not have been supplied by the police officers. Likewise their sworn statements contained a narrative detail of how they went about the plot to avenge their grudges against Alberto; their use of the wires and abaca twine to tie the victim's wrists and knees; their use of a burlap sack which contained the deceased and the gunning of the victim, these details dovetailed with the findings of the medico-legal officer.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial judge are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked or which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. (People vs. Pareja
L-21937, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA, 693, 703; People vs. Bautista L-23303-04, May 20, 1969, p. 185, 190). We hold that the trial court did not err when it did not give credence to the accused's claim of involuntary confession.

One additional factor that militates against appellants' claim of maltreatment is that it appears that accused Garcia and Feliciano were transferred to the custody of the NBI in 1968 on motion of the late Delegate Enrique Voltaire Garcia in connection with the hearings of the Senate Committee on Justice on Senate Bills Nos. 801 and 802 which were intended as a remedial legislation on the use of extra-judicial confession in cases. However counsel for appellants never bothered to secure and present in evidence a copy of the result of the Committee Investigation to lend support to their claim of maltreatment. Neither did counsel for appellants file a complaint or charge against the "erring" policemen inspite of alleged prior requests of accused. (t.s.n. pp. 11, 12 September 24, 1968; pp. 18, 19 October 17, 1968).

We have observed too that during the trial defendants alleged that they knew the police officers who maltreated them and in fact they were so positive about their identity. On cross examination, however, the prosecuting officer tried to let the accused identify a police officer through exhibits 0-28 (photographs taken during the re-enactment which accused previously identified as having been taken on said occasion). Accused Garcia identified the man with a hat on as Pat. San Miguel. The prosecuting officer noted that it was not San Miguel but Pat. Jaranilia on the picture whom he identified (t.s.n. p. 11, September 24, 1968; p. 3 October 17, 1968).

Similarly, defendants' claim that they had been forced into signing their respective confessions loses weight in the face of the fact that they had re-enacted the crime before many spectators and before the camera. The trial judge, We have noted in the record, elicited during the hearing an admission from the accused that they were not really pressured into posing before the camera in the re-enactment of the crime. (t.s.n. p. 5 October 17, 1968)

Appellants also question the validity of the signed confessions by mentioning the fact that they were subscribed and sworn to before Col. Morales, Chief of the Detective Bureau of the MPD, and not before a Fiscal or Judge. However, as held in several cases (U.S. versus Corrales L-9230 November 10, 1914, 28 Phil. 362, 366; People vs. Jose Pardo L-562), "there is no provision of law which prescribes that either confessions or admissions are not competent evidence unless made under oath. It is the fact that they are voluntarily made by the accused and against his own interest which gives to them their evidentiary value. Provided that fact is established, it does not matter whether or not they are made under oath." Moreover, confessions are not even required to be in writing as can be gleaned from our ruling in People vs. Bantagan L-33045, August 15, 1930,54 Phil. 834, 839, where it said:

... no explanation is given of the failure of Luis Bantagan to sign the statement, but the fact that he did not accredit the statement with his signature does not render inadmissible the oral testimony of Crisologo and Alvarez as to the substance of his previous admission.

Also the fact that the confessions were made while the accused were under arrest does not render the same inadmissible (People vs. Marimpong L- 43514, 62 Phil. 70) since the confessions were made and admitted prior to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution. Of significance too is the fact that the confessions were made in Tagalog, a dialect fully within the comprehension of, and well-spoken by, the accused, they being residents of Tondo, Manila.

Appellants likewise contend that prosecution has failed to present any eye- witness to the perpetration of the crime, or to adduce any concrete evidence showing the motive of the accused in committing such a heinous crime as robbery with homicide. While the question of motive is important to the person who committed the criminal act, yet when there is no longer any doubt that the defendant was the culprit, it becomes unimportant to know the exact reason or purpose for the commission of the crime. The failure to establish motive in that case becomes inconsequential (People vs. Diva L-22946, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 332, 346). Here We entertain no doubt that the defendants committed the crime.

Accused also raised the issue of jurisdiction, contending that since the cadaver of the deceased was found in a barrio in San Miguel, Bulacan, and there is no evidence as to where the victim was killed, it is doubtful whether the Court of First Instance of Manila can take cognizance of the same. Section 14 (a) Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 14 (a) — In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

Since the commission of the crime was started in Manila, in front of the Vista Theater along Claro M. Recto Avenue, where the victim was lured into going with defendants to Marilao, Bulacan, on the pretext of fetching a woman, then to San Miguel where he was liquidated, the Court of First Instance of Manila unquestionably has jurisdiction of the case.

WHEREFORE, judgment of conviction against the accused, with the civil indemnities therein provided, is hereby affirmed. However, for lack of the required votes to impose the extreme penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment), with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law, shall be suffered by both accused.

Costs against the accused.

Makalintal, C.J, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ. concur.

Barredo, J., cannot conceive of any legal reason why the penalty of death imposed by the lower court should be reduced to life. He voted to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Makasiar, J, took no part.

People vs. Beltran, G.R. No. L-31860, November 29, 1974

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31860 November 29, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO BELTRAN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Simfronio I. Ancheta for plaintiff-appellee.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Agusan dated May 13, 1969, finding appellant Amelito Beltran guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 2769 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of Clemente Pingol in the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs.

There appears to be no dispute as to the basic fact that on the evening of September 21, 1963, Clement Pingol was fatally shot from behind with a shotgun while he was in the sala of the unfinished house of Crisanto Tubo at Barrio Tagpangahoy of the Town of Tubay, Province of Agusan. A report of the incident reached the Chief of Police of Tubay and on the following day, September 22, 1963, Chief of Police Zotico Cepeda, Pat. Juanito Antiporda, Municipal Judge Edgardo Batitang, and Dr. Jose Encarnado, of Tubay, proceeded to the scene of the crime. They saw the body of Clemente Pingol sprawled on the floor of the sala in the unfinished house of Crisanto Tubo. As shown by the sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Pat. Antiporda, the house is situated 19 meters from the seashore, and consisted of a small sala which was completely open because it had no walls, and the living quarters on the western portion thereof which was enclosed with walls. On the western wall were found two pellet holes (Exhibits "E-3" and "E-4"). Northeast of the sala about four and a half (4-½) meters away was a coconut tree (Exhibit "A-6"). An autopsy on the deceased was performed. According to the necropsy report, the victim sustained eight (8) punctured wounds which were caused by shotgun pellets, the right lung was totally mutilated and the third right rib fractured. Death was due to internal hemorrhage as a consequence of the injury to the right lung and to the brain.

It was only on September 30, 1963, however, when Ernesto Dua and Raymundo Dua implicated Amelito Beltran as the person who fatally shot the deceased. On the basis of the statements of the Dua brothers, Sgt. Francisco Umbao of the constabulary filed, on October 1, 1963, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tubay, a complaint for murder against appellant Amelito Beltran. Solely on the basis of the identification made by the Dua brothers, the court a quo found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and rendered the judgment heretofore adverted to.

Since the conviction of appellant was based on the testimonies of Ernesto Dua and Raymundo Dua, there is, therefore, a need to scrutinize carefully their respective testimonies. Raymundo Dua, 25 years of age, farmer of Tubay, Agusan, testified that at about 8:00 o'clock on the evening of September 21, 1963, while he was at the porch of their house at Bo. Tagpangahoy, Town of Tubay, Agusan, conversing with his brothers, mother and father, he saw appellant helping one Felimon Sandigan haul a banca from the sea to the shore; that afterwards, appellant walked past their house carrying a shotgun on his shoulders and proceeded directly towards the house of Crisanto Tubo and upon reaching a coconut tree in front of the house, concealed himself behind said tree and fired with his shotgun at Clemente Pingol; that at the time of the shooting, Pingol was then sitting and facing Crisanto Tubo with whom he was conversing; that Tubo was with his wife and adopted child; that appellant was then about three (3) arms length from Pingol when he fired the shot; that he could recognize the face of Amelito Beltran because of the light coming from a torch locally known as "moron"; that after shooting the victim, appellant Beltran fled from the scene by taking the same route, passing near the porch of the house of the witness; and on the following morning, he went to the house of Crisanto Tubo where the police were already investigating the incident and saw the body of the deceased still sprawled on the floor. On cross-examination, he indicated that their house was about fifty to sixty meters distant from that of Crisanto Tubo, and between those two houses was the unoccupied house of Eulogio Tilleno; that in spite of that distance, he claimed that he could distinctly hear the ordinary conversation going on between Tubo and Pingol who were talking and joking with each other for quite some time in the presence of Anselma, Tubo's wife; that at the time they were conversing, they were facing each other with the back of Clemente Pingol towards the coconut tree; that when he saw somebody aim a shotgun at Pingol, he did not shout because he was afraid; that he did not inform the police immediately of what he saw.

His younger brother, Ernesto Dua, gave substantially identical testimony.

I

The important question to be determined is whether the appellant was the person who perpetrated the offense. Examining carefully the evidence of the prosecution about the identity of the assailant, We find that the prosecution's evidence leaves much to be desired. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The question of the identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an offense might seem to be the simplest that could possibly come before a court. But the fact is precisely the reverse. The question of identification has proved itself over and over again, by far, instead the most perplexing. As one court has observed: "There are few more difficult subjects with which the administration of justice has to deal. The carelessness or superficiality of observers, the rarity of powers of graphic description, and the different force with which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different persons, make recognition or identification one of the least reliable of facts testified to even by actual witness who have seen the parties in question. ..." 1

In the case at bar, the identification of appellant bears heavily on the reasonableness or probability of the testimony of these witnesses. It has been observed that the most positive testimony of a witness may be contradicted by the fact that the testimony is contrary to common observation or experience, 2 or the common principles by which the conduct of mankind is governed. 3 The courts are not required to believe that which they judicially know to be incredible. 4

II

According to appellant, the credibility of the testimonies of Raymundo and Ernesto Dua is impaired by their apparent improbability. We agree. We find it highly improbable that appellant would make his presence so conspicuous to these witnesses by passing near them with a shotgun on his shoulders immediately before and even after shooting the victim. According to the prosecution witnesses, a person can bring his banca ashore immediately behind the house of Crisanto Tubo, and, therefore, can go to the coconut tree in front of Tubo's house without passing by the house of the Duas. It is quite incredible, therefore, that appellant, instead of taking the shorter and more direct route, should have taken the longer and more circuitous route by landing behind the house of the Dua brothers, then walk past the porch of their house where the Dua brothers were conversing with the rest of their family and in plain view of these people, proceed to the place of the victim.

Considering that visibility was practically nil, as according to the prosecution evidence, the night was so dark that a person ten meters away could not be seen, much less recognized, it is highly improbable that the Dua brothers could have distinctly recognized appellant who was allegedly hiding behind a coconut tree about fifty to sixty meters away. It is true that they claim that they were able to recognize appellant by the light of a torch ("moron"), but the infirmity of this assertion lies in the fact that an assassin hiding behind a coconut tree would certainly not expose his face to the light to enable others to identify and recognize him. Apart from this, according to the sketch prepared by the police (Exhibit "A"), the kerosene lamp was placed inside the sleeping quarters of Crisanto Tubo which was partly enclosed with walls, and not in the sala of the house where Tubo, with his wife and adopted child, were conversing with the victim. Considering the location of the lamp, its limited luminosity and the pitch-black darkness of the night, it is highly implausible that even with the aid of such light, Raymundo and Ernesto Dua could have positively recognized the face of an assailant hiding behind a coconut tree about fifty or sixty meters away. Moreover, if it were true that Crisanto Tubo was talking with Pingol at the time when the latter was shot from behind, it is evident that Tubo was in the best position to see the assailant, but it appears that this person was neither investigated nor questioned by the police in connection with the incident. This indicates that the assailant was able to conceal his presence in such a manner that even Tubo was not able to see him. It should be noted also that the conduct of these witnesses immediately after witnessing a startling occurrence shows lack of spontaneity and sincerity. Thus, after seeing a neighbor killed in a shocking manner, in an apparent indication of lack of concern, they continued chatting until nine o'clock that night, then retired and slept soundly, and although they saw the police authorities inquiring from the people there as to how and by whom the victim was killed, when they went to see the cadaver of the victim in the house of Tubo the following morning, they never bothered to inform the police of what they knew.

Q. After that conversation that night, you slept?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So with Raymundo Dua you were able to sleep?

A. Raymundo Dua did not go to bed yet.

Q. You mean to say you left Raymundo Dua when you went to sleep?

A. No, sir, we were still conversing.

Q. Up to what time were you conversing in the evening?

A. Up to nine o'clock in the evening.

Q. And after nine o'clock you and Raymundo Dua and your parents went to sleep?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you woke up the next morning already?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you woke up you had your breakfast?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You did not go to your farm that morning?

A. No, sir.

Q. And you said you went to the house of Tubo that morning, you went there because you saw some persons and policemen going to the house of Tubo that morning, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you went there you did not talk with anybody?

A. Nobody.

Q. And nobody talked to you?

A. Nobody.

Q. You feel uneasy on the witness stand, are you sick?

A. I have just recovered from malaria.

Q. On that morning after the incident, you did not go to the municipal building of Tubay, Agusan, is it not?

A. No, sir.

Q. As a matter of fact, when the policemen brought the body of Pingol to the municipal building you did not go with them?

A. I did not go.

Q. How about your brother Raymundo Dua, did he go with them or not?

A. He did not go. (t.s.n., April 15, 1968, pp. 41-42).

The testimony of Raymundo on this point is the same (t.s.n., April 3, 1968, p. 20):

Q. You went to the house of Tubo because you noticed there were already policemen there?

A. Yes, sir. .

Q. If you did not see any policemen, you would not have gone to the house of Tubo?.

A. That is right. .

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You did not bother to talk or give them any information?

A. No sir, I did not.

It should be noted that the Dua brothers themselves were also arrested as suspects in the commission of the crime and it was only then that they executed their respective statement implicating the appellant. This circumstance renders their motive in so incriminating appellant highly suspicions:

Q. Agusan, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As a matter of fact, when the policemen brought the body of Pingol to the municipal building you did not go with them?

A. I did not go.

Q. How about your brother Raymundo Dua, did he go with them or not?

A. He did not go.

Q. From that date you did not go anymore or report the matter to what you narrated to the authorities in the municipal building of Tubay, Agusan?

A. We were arrested by the police.

Q. You were arrested because you were suspected as having shot Clemente Pingol?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As a matter of fact the PC soldier told you that if you will not testify against Amelito Beltran you will be the one in jail, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And because you were afraid that you will be sent to jail, you agreed to testify against Amelito Beltran?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you were brought to the municipal building of Tubay you were told by the PC Sgt. Umbao to sign a certain paper or affidavit, is it not?

A. Yes, sir, he made us sign.

Q. And this is the affidavit which we request to be marked as Exhibit 2, which is found on pages 3 and 4 of the record, which Sgt. Umbao told you to sign, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And after you signed, PC soldier Umbao told you that he will bring you to the judge and to tell the judge that the contents of this affidavit are true and you will answer yes, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in compliance with his order, when you were brought before the judge and when the judge asked you whether the contents of the affidavit were true, you answered "Yes", is it not?

A. We were made to swear before him.

Q. And after you have appeared before Judge Batitang you were released and you were told to go home, is it not?

A. Yes, sir. (t.s.n., supra, pp. 42-43, Sanchez).

Finally, there is nothing in the record any fact or circumstance from which We can deduce or infer the existence of any possible motive on the part of appellant to commit this heinous crime. It is true that motive is not essential for the conviction of an accused where there is no doubt as to his identity as the culprit, but where the identification proceeds from an unreliable source and the testimony is inconclusive and not free from doubt, then evidence of motive becomes necessary. 5 Here, the identification of the appellant as the assailant of the victim is not convincing. In view of the unreliability of the identification of appellant, the defense of alibi interposed by him, therefore, assumes importance. According to appellant, he was in Barrio Lucbon of the said municipality from the afternoon of September 21, 1963 to the early morning of September 22, 1963 attending to the making of coprax for Ofemio Novero. This testimony was corroborated by Realino Botoy, a farmer and resident of Tubay, and by Ofemio Novero, the person who employed appellant. These witnesses also affirm that on the evening of September 21, 1963, it was dangerous to travel by means of a baroto or small banca from Lucbon to Tagpangahoy, the situs of the incident, as the tide was not only high but the waves were very big. Appellant also explained that prior to this incident, Ernesto and Raymundo Dua were ejected from the land of his grandfather because they stole his coconuts, which act the Duas must have resented.

While it is true that an "alibi is the weakest defense that an accused can avail of, it acquires commensurate strength where, as in this case, no positive and proper identification has been made by the witnesses of the offender. The prosecution has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility." 6

Considering the aforecited infirmities of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, We are not satisfied that the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to appellant has been overcome. To overcome that presumption, the guilt of appellant must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not connote absolute certainty, it means that degree of proof which after an investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of appellant's culpability. It signifies such proof "that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it" that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. 7

As Justice Fernando emphasized: "The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime." 8

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the appellant, Amelito Beltran, is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Estate of Bryant, 176 Pa. 309, 318, 35 Atl. 571, 577 cited in Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases, 1965 ed.

2 People vs. Vergara, 82 Phil., 207 People v. Bentley, 191 NE. 230, 357 Ill. 82, 98 C.J.S. p. 340, note 45.

3 People v. Sagayno, Nos. L-15961-62, October 31, 1963; Tierney v. Hotz, 55 A. 2d 39, 141 N.J. Eq. 114, 98 C.J.S. p. 341, note 46.

4 People v. Zapata, No. L-11074, February 27, 1960; Larsen v. Bliss, 91 P. 2d 811, 43 N.M. 265, 98 C.J.S., p. 341, note 47.

5 Cf. U.S. v. McMann, 4 Phil., 561; People v. Tagasa, 68 Phil., 153; People v. Caggavan, 94 Phil., 118; U.S. v. Suspense, et al., 102 Phil., 209, 210; People v. Murray, 105 Phil., 591; People v. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769, 781; and People v. Herila, 51 SCRA 31.

6 People v. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, 460-61; and People v. Cruz, 32 SCRA 181, 187.

7 People v. Lavarias, L-24239, June 29, 1968; and People v. Dramayo, L-21325, October 25, 1971.

8 People v. Reyes, L-36874-76, September 30, 1974.

People vs. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Attorney Concepcion F. Torrijos for plaintiff-appellee.

Accused-appellant in her own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p

Convicted for having killed her husband, Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero seeks a reversal of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City finding her guilty of PARRICIDE and sentencing her "to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period, as the minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Francisco Caballero in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs", and prays for an acquittal based on her plea of self-defense. 1

The Solicitor General however asks for the affirmance of the appealed decision predicated on the following testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution before the trial court:

Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married on June 7, 1956, at a ceremony solemnized by the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Ormoc City. 2 The marriage was not a happy one and before the end of the year 1957 the couple separated. Late in the evening of January 2, 1958, Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio Barabad and Kakong Sacay, drank "tuba" in a certain house in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. At about midnight, Francisco Caballero and his companions proceeded home. On the way, they saw Francisco's wife, Cunigunda, standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter approached her, Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a knife marked by the prosecution as its Exhibit C. Francisco called for help to his two companions who upon seeing that Francisco was wounded, brought him to the St. Jude Hospital. 3 Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital, personally attended to the victim and found a "punctured wound on the left lumbar region measuring 1 inch externally" (Exhibit B). First aid was given, but because there was a need for blood transfusion and the facilities of the hospital were inadequate to provide the necessary treatment, Dr. Samson suggested that the patient be transported to Cebu City. 4 In the meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the Police Department of Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant Restituto Mariveles and informed the latter that she stabbed her husband. 5 While Francisco Caballero was confined at the hospital, he was interrogated by Patrolman Francisco Covero concerning the identity of his assailant and he pointed to his wife Cunigunda. The questions propounded by Pat. Covero and the answers given by the victim were written down in a piece of paper on which the victim affixed his thumbmark (Exhibit D) in the presence of his brother, Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman, Francisco Tomada. 6 On January 4, 1958, Francisco Caballero was brought to Cebu City on board the "MV Ormoc" but the trip proved futile because the victim died at noontime of the same day from the stab wound sustained by him. 7

Appellant, on the other hand, pleads that We discard the proof adduced by the prosecution and believe instead what she declared before the trial judge briefly summarized as follows:

After her marriage to Francisco Caballero on June 7, 1956, appellant lived with her husband in the house of her parents in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City, and their marriage, although not a harmonious one, was blessed with a daughter; her married life was marked by frequent quarrels caused by her husband's "gambling, drinking, and serenading", and there were times when he maltreated and beat her; after more than a year she and her husband transferred to a house of their own, but a month had hardly passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to go back to live with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child; in the month of November, 1957, her daughter became sick and she went to her husband and asked for some help for her sick child but he drove her away and said "I don't care if you all would die"; in the evening of January 2, 1958, she went out carolling with her friend, Crispina Barabad, and several men who played the musical instruments; at about 12:00 o'clock midnight they divided the proceeds of the carolling in the house of Crispina Barabad after which she went home, but before she could leave the vicinity of the house of Crispina, she met her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she held on to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the left side of his body; because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to the ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh; when she finally released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife; in the morning of January 3, she went to town, surrendered to the police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her on the night of the incident (see Exhibit I); Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the weapon but because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any knife, and she did, and she gave a knife to the desk sergeant which is the knife now marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution. 8

The sole question thus presented in this appeal is: did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her person?

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being. Thus, in the words of the Romans of ancient history: Quod quisque ob tutelam sui fecerit, jure suo ficisse existimetur. 9 To the Classicists in penal law, lawful defense is grounded on the impossibility on the part of the State to avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a person unlawfully attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require that the innocent succumb to an unlawful aggression without resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful defense is an exercise of a right, an act of social justice done to repel the attack of an aggressor. 10

Our law on self-defense is found in Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

xxx xxx xxx

As part of this law is the settled jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of the aforecited circumstances, the rationale being that having admitted the wounding or killing of his adversary which is a felony, he is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. 11

In this case of Cunigunda Caballero, the trial court did not find her evidence clear and convincing, and gave these reasons for its conclusion: a) appellant's testimony is inherently improbable as brought out by her demonstration of the incident in question during the trial of the case; b) there was no wound or injury on appellant's body treated by any physician: c) appellant's insistence that the weapon used by her was Moro hunting knife and not Exh. C is incredible; d) she gave contradictory statements concerning the report made by her to the police authorities that she was choked by her husband; and e) her husband's abandonment of her and her child afforded the motive behind appellant's
attack.
12

We are constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from the rule that appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified to by the witnesses.

An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give due importance to one piece of evidence which more than the testimony of any witness eloquently confirms the narration of appellant on how she happened to stab her husband on that unfortunate night. We refer to the location of the wound inflicted on the victim.

Appellant's account of that fatal occurrence as given in her direct testimony follows:

Q At that precise time when you were going home to the place of your parents, did any unusual incident occur?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was it?

A At the time when I went down from the house of Crispina Barabad, when I reached near the banana hill, my husband held me.

Q What happened when your husband, Francisco Caballero, held you?

A He asked me from where did I prostitute myself.

Q What did you answer?

A I answered that I did not go (on) prostituting. I told him that I was only forced to accompany with the carolling in order to earn money for our child.

Q What part of your body did your husband, Francisco Caballero, hold you?

A He held me at the collar of my dress. (Witness holding the right portion of the collar of her dress.)

Q After you answered Francisco, what did he do?

A He said "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." Then I told him "What is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us."

Q When Francisco heard these words, what did he do?

A Francisco said "What do you mean by saying l have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all. I will kill you all."

Q And then, what happened?

A He held my hair and slapped my face twice. Then I staggered and my nose was bleeding.

Q Do you mean to say that blood flowed out of your nose?

A Yes, sir.

Q After you were slapped twice and your nose begun to bleed, what happened next?

A He held the front part of my dress just below the collar and pushed me towards the ground. .

Q While your husband was holding your dress below the neck and tried to push you down, what did you do?

A I held a part of his body in order that I would not fall to the ground.

Q And then what happened?

A Because I struggled hard in order that I would not fall to the ground I held his belt and that was the time I got hold of a weapon along his belt line.

Q After that what happened?

A He shoved my hands upward and pushed me to the ground and that was the time my hands were released. He was choking me.

Q When you said your hands were released, was that before or after you were choked by Francisco Caballero?

A At that time when I was about to fall to the ground that was the time I released my hands.

Q When you were almost fallen to the ground, where were the hands of Francisco Caballero?

A On my hair.

Q You mean to say the two hands of Francisco Caballero?

A One of his hands was holding my hair. The other hand pushed me.

COURT:

Q What hand was holding your hair?

A His right hand was holding my hair while his left hand pushed me.

ATTORNEY GARCIA:

Q When you were fallen to the ground what happened?

A While I lay prostrate on the ground and believing that I have no other recourse, while his left hand was holding my neck, I was able to take hold of the weapon from his belt line and I thrust it to him.

Q What was this weapon which you were able to get from his belt line?

A It was a hunting knife." (tsn. pp. 53-55, witness Cunigunda Caballero)

On cross-examination, appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show her position when she stabbed her husband and she did, and although the stenographic notes on that demonstration are very sketchy which We quote:

Q Please demonstrate to this Court when you made the thrust to your husband?

A When I took hold of the hunting knife I made the thrust in this manner. (Witness held the ruler with her right hand kneeled on the floor)" (tsn. p. 67, ibid)

still We can get a clear picture of what appellant must have done, from the questions and answers immediately following the above-quoted portion of the transcript, viz:

Q You want to make us understand that when you thrust the weapon to the body of your husband you were lying down flat to the ground?

A I was lying flat on the ground face upward. I was a little bit inclined because tried to struggle trying to get away from the hold of my husband.

Q You want to make us understand that your back was touching the ground when you made the thrust to your husband?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q Where were you kneeled by your, husband?

A On my right thigh. (ibid; emphasis supplied)

Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck, appellant, as she said, had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband's belt and plunge it at his body hitting the left back portion just below the waist, described by the attending physician, Dr. Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar region. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man's belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.

We do not agree with the trial judge's observation that as demonstrated by the accused it was physically impossible for her to get hold of the weapon because the two knees of her husband were on her right thigh "which would have forced her to put her right elbow towards the ground"(see p. 9 of Decision), for even if it were true that the two knees of Francisco were on his wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in the record to show that the right arm of the accused was held, pinned down or rendered immobile, or that she pressed her elbow to the ground, as conjectured by the trial judge, in such a manner that she could not reach for the knife. On the contrary, as indicated earlier, accused testified and so demonstrated that she was lying flat on her back, her husband kneeling over her and her right arm free to pull out the knife and strike with it.

The trial judge also referred the a demonstration made by appellant of that portion of her testimony when she was held by the hair and pushed down to the ground, and His Honor commented that "(S)he could not be falling to the ground, as shown to the Court by her, considering the fact that the pushing was to and fro as shown in her demonstration." (p. 8, Decision) The trial judge, however, failed to consider that it is humanly impossible to have an exact and accurate reproduction or reenactment of an occurrence especially if it involves the participation of persons other than the very protagonists of the incident being re-enacted. In this particular instance appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she was pushed down by her husband, and her demonstration is described in the stenographic transcript as follows:

Q Please demonstrate to this Court the position of your husband and you while your husband held your hair.

A He did this way. (Witness held the hair of the Court Interpreter with his left hand and his right hand held the right shoulder of the Interpreter and pulled the Interpreter to and fro. The Interpreter represented as the accused and the accused as the deceased.)

Q Where were your two hands?

A My two hands held his waist line. (tsn. 66, witness Cunigunda Caballero; emphasis supplied)

In that demonstration, accused represented the victim while she in turn was impersonated by the court interpreter, and so it was difficult if not impossible for the two to give an accurate reenactment considering that the accused assumed a role not hers during the actual incident and the court interpreter played a part which was not truly his. At any rate, the accused showed how one hand of her husband held her hair while the other pushed her down by the shoulder, and to portray how she in turn struggled and tried to push back her husband to keep herself from falling, she "pulled the interpreter (representing the accused) to and fro." The fact is that Francisco succeeded in forcing appellant down to the ground as portrayed by the latter when, following the foregoing demonstration, she was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she stabbed her husband — a matter which is discussed in pages 8 and 9 of this Decision.

It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the victim which strongly militates against the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Ignacio Barabad. This witness declared that on that night when husband and wife met on the road, Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter was near, she immediately stabbed him. If that were true, that is, husband and wife were standing face to face at a distance of one-half meter when the stabbing occurred (tsn. p. 11, witness Ignacio Barabad), it would have been more natural and probable for the weapon to have been directed towards the front part of the body of the victim such as his abdomen or chest, rather than at his back, left side, just above the left thigh.

In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the incident object of the accusation, the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or circumstances which can be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony, for after all the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence 13, so much so that when a court as a judicial fact-finder pronounces judgment that a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal knowledge but as the result of an evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be proved.

Thus, in People vs. Aquino, L-32390, December 28, 1973, a decision of the First Division of this Court penned by Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, the plea of self-defense of the accused-appellant was sustained on the basis of certain "physical and objective circumstances" which proved to be of "decisive importance" in ascertaining the veracity of the plea of self-defense, to wit: the location of the wound on the right side of the throat and right arm of the deceased, the direction of the trajectories of the bullets fired by the accused, the discovery of bloodstains at the driver's seat, the finding of the dagger and scabbard of the deceased, and so on. 14

In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-defense.

Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her husband on that particular night of January 2. Although it is the general rule that the presence of motive in the killing of a person is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not disputed, as in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killings. 15

We disagree with the statement of the court a quo that appellant's motive for killing her husband was his abandonment of her and his failure to support her and her child. While appellant admitted in the course of her testimony that her marriage was not a happy one, that she and her husband separated in the month of October, 1957, and since then she and her child lived with her parents who supported them, nevertheless she declared that notwithstanding their separation she still loved her husband (tsn. p. 59, cross-examination of appellant). As a matter of fact, appellant had been living with her parents for several months prior to the incident in question and appeared resigned to her fate. Furthermore, there is no record of any event which occurred immediately prior to January 2 which could have aroused her feelings to such a degree as to drive her to plan and carry out the killing of her husband.

On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason for attacking his wife, Cunigunda. Meeting his wife unexpectedly at past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted angrily, and suspecting that she was out for some bad purpose he held her by the collar of her dress and said: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." This was followed by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda's nose bled, pulling of her hair, pushing her down to the ground, and strangling her — all of which constituted the unlawful aggression against which appellant had to defend herself.

Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is her conduct shortly after the occurrence. As soon as the sun was up that morning of January 3 (the stabbing occurred past midnight of January 2), Cunigunda went to the city and presented herself at the police headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband and surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this point, the trial judge stated that appellant made contradictory statements in her testimony concerning the report made by her to the police authorities, for while at the start she declared that she did not report the "choking by her husband", she later changed her testimony and stated that she did relate that fact. (p. 10, Decision)

We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of appellant on direct examination and nowhere is there a positive and direct statement of hers that she did not report that she was choked by her husband. What the trial judge asked of appellant was whether or not she told the police about the fist mark on her face and her answer was "No, sir, I forgot." (tsn. p. 55, supra) And on appellant's cross-examination, there was no question propounded and therefore there was no answer given on the subject-matter of appellant's report to the police concerning the incident except for the following:

COURT:

Q Did you show that dress to the police authorities the following day?

A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor, because it was torn out.

Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?

A I showed it to the police authorities, and they told me to keep it, not to touch it. (Tsn. p. 65, ibid)

We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant's testimony which was singled out by His Honor as one of his reasons for discrediting her plea of self-defense.

That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her husband because he attacked her is confirmed by no less than the prosecution witness, Patrolman Restituto Mariveles, who was on duty at the desk when appellant arrived at the police headquarters. This witness on cross-examination declared:

Q And she also told you that on that night previous to the incident her husband Francisco Caballero beat her up, is that right?

A She told me that she was met on the way by her husband immediately after carolling and she was manhandled by her husband and when she was struggling to get loose from her husband she happened to take hold of a knife that was placed under the belt of her husband and because she was already half conscious she did not know that she was able to thrust said knife to the stomach of her husband. (tsn. p. 23, witness R. Mariveles)

It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the police upon her surrender were not taken down in writing to serve as a faithful and reliable account of her report, nevertheless, We are satisfied by the fact, which is not disputed, that of her own accord appellant went to the police authorities early in the morning of January 3, informed Policeman Mariveles that she stabbed her husband because he manhandled her which rendered her "half-conscious", and brought and showed the dress she wore during the incident which was torn by the collar and with blood stains due to the bleeding of her nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who at the time was property custodian of the Ormoc City police, corroborated appellant's testimony concerning the dress marked Exhibit 1 for the defense. (tsn. p. 70 witness J. de Leon) If there was no clear and positive statement in appellant's testimony either on direct or cross examination that she informed the police that she was choked by her husband, it was because, as We noted, no question was propounded to her on that point.

While We are on this subject of appellant's surrender, mention is to be made of the knife marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution. In her testimony, appellant stated that Exhibit C was not the knife actually used by her in stabbing her husband because the true weapon was her husband's Moro hunting knife with a blade of around six inches which she threw away immediately after the incident; that when she was asked by Pat. Mariveles to look for the weapon and she could not find it, she was advised by policeman Cabral who helped her in the search to get any knife and surrender it to the desk officer and so she took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to Pat. Mariveles. (tsn. appellant pp. 56-57, 60) This testimony of appellant was taken against her by the court a quo which held that her declaration could not have been true. We find however no strong reason for disbelieving the accused on this point. Appellant does not deny that she turned over Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles as the knife with which she stabbed her husband but she claims that she did so upon advise of another policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter was not called upon by the prosecution to refute such declaration. There is sincerity in appellant's attempt to rectify a misstatement made by her to Pat. Mariveles and We are inclined to believe and in fact We do believe that the fatal weapon must have had indeed a blade of around six inches as stated by appellant for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to the victim's large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter (tsn. Dr. C. Samson, p. 6)

All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case.

The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.

The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise present. Here we have a woman who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself from impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle that the reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (U.S. vs. Paras, 1907, 9 Phil. 367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact that there was no visible injury caused on the body of the appellant which necessitated medical attention, a circumstance noted by the trial court, is no ground for discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was imminent peril to appellant's life caused by the unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from being strangled and choked to death. What this Court expressed in the case of People vs. Lara, 1925, 48 Phil. 153, 160, is very true and applicable to the situation now before Us, and We quote:

It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences. 16

Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no law.

The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-
defense.
17 Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being confronted by her husband for being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse that she went carolling with some friends to earn some money for their child. January 2 was indeed within the Christmas season during which by tradition people carol from house to house and receive monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill. The deceased therefore should have given some consideration to his wife's excuse before jumping to conclusions and taking the extreme measure of attempting to kill his wife.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-appellant acted in the legitimate defense of her person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.

So Ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Castro, J, is on leave.

Footnotes

1 This appeal was originally elevated to the Court of Appeals; however, in a Resolution promulgated on May 7, 1964, it forwarded the case to this Court on the ground that the penalty for the crime committed by the accused is reclusion perpetua.

2 Marriage contract marked Exhibit G.

3 T.s.n. March 19, 1958, pp. 3-7, witness Ignacio Barabad.

4 T.s.n. April 18, 1958, pp. 2-7, witness Dr. Cesar Samson.

5 T.s.n. June 24, 1958, pp. 16-17, witness Restituto Mariveles.

6 T.s.n. June 24, 1958, pp. 28-32, witness Covero; t.s.n. June 24, 1958. pp. 54-62, 67, witness Tomada; t.s.n. pp. 72-73 witness Cresencio Caballero.

7 see death certificate marked Exhibit H.

8 T.s.n. August 12, 1958, pp. 58-68, witness Cunigunda Caballero.

9 see 1 Viada, 172, 5th edition. "That which anyone should do for the safety of his own person is to be adjudged as having been done justly in his own favor." (Writer's translation).

10 Guillermo B. Guevara's Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, 1974 ed. p. 82, citing: Pessina par. 73, Carrara par. 291; and Calon Derecho Penal, 292.

11 U.S. vs. Coronet, 30 Phil. 112, People vs. Cruz, 53 Phil. 635; People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772; People vs. Davis, L-13337, Feb. 16, 1961, 1 SCRA 473; People vs. Solana, L-13967, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 60; People vs. Mendoza, L-16392, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 11; People vs. Talaboc, L-25004, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Ordiales, November 23, 1971, 42 SCRA 238; People vs. Tingson, L-31228, October 24, 1972, 47 SCRA 243; People vs. Llamera, L-21604-5-6", May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 48.

12 pp. 7-9, Decision found in pp. 267-269, original record.

13 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 5th edition, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3, cited in Francisco's Evidence, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 68.

14 see also People vs. Maliwanag, et al., L-30302, August 14, 1974 (1st Division)

15 People vs. Zamora, 59 Phil. 568; People vs. Ramponit 62 Phil. 284; People vs. Divinagracia, 105 Phil. 281; People vs. Ester Murray, 105 Phil. 591; People vs. Macabenta, 106 Phil. 77.

16 see also People vs. Encomienda, No. L-26750, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA p. 522.

17 Guevara's supra p. 89, citing Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, February 20, 1893, 50 Jur. Crim. 166-168; Padilla's Criminal Law, Book I, 1971 ed., p. 197.