2009 Bar Questions - CIVIL LAW

PART I

I

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)

1. The doctrine of "processual presumption" allows the court of the forum to presume that the foreign law applicable to the case is the same as the local or domestic law.

2. In reserva troncal, all reservatarios (reservees) inherit as a class and in equal shares regardless of their proximity in degree to the prepositus.

3. An oral partnership is valid.

4. An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding.

5. A dead child can be legitimated.

II

Dr. Lopez, a 70-year old widower, and his son Roberto both died in a fire that gutted their home while they were sleeping in their air-conditioned rooms. Roberto’s wife, Marilyn, and their two children were spared because they were in the province at the time. Dr. Lopez left an estate worth P20M and a life insurance policy in the amount of P1M with his three children --- one of whom is Roberto --- as beneficiaries.

Marilyn is now claiming for herself and her children her husband’s share in the estate left by Dr. Lopez, and her husband’s share in the proceeds of Dr. Lopez’s life insurance policy. Rule on the validity of Marilyn’s claims with reasons. (4%)

III

In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license, went to the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not there, but the Mayor’s secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up and sign the required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait, and went out to look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring municipality.

When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she showed him the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their witnesses were waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the marriage contract, gave them to the secretary who returned to the Mayor’s office. She then gave copies of the marriage contract to the parties, and told Michael and Anna that they were already married. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and wife, and had three sons.

1. Is the marriage of Michael and Anna valid, voidable, or void? Explain your answer. (3%)

2. What is the status of the three children of Michael and Anna? Explain your answer. (2%)

3. What property regime governs the properties acquired by the couple? Explain. (2%)

IV

Harry married Wilma, a very wealthy woman. Barely five (5) years into the marriage, Wilma fell in love with Joseph. Thus, Wilma went to a small country in Europe, became a naturalized citizen of that country, divorced Harry, and married Joseph. A year thereafter, Wilma and Joseph returned and established permanent residence in the Philippines.

1. Is the divorce obtained by Wilma from Harry recognized in the Philippines? Explain your answer. (3%)

2. If Harry hires you as his lawyer, what legal recourse would you advise him to take? Why? (2%)

3. Harry tells you that he has fallen in love with another woman, Elizabeth, and wants to marry her because, after all, Wilma is already married to Joseph. Can Harry legally marry Elizabeth? Explain. (2%)

V

Four children, namely: Alberto, Baldomero, Caridad, and Dioscoro, were born to the spouses Conrado and Clarita de la Costa. The children’s birth certificates were duly signed by Conrado, showing them to be the couple’s legitimate children.

Later, one Edilberto de la Cruz executed a notarial document acknowledging Alberto and Baldomero as his illegitimate children >with Clarita. Edilberto died leaving substantial properties. In the settlement of his estate, Alberto and Baldomero intervened claiming shares as the deceased’s illegitimate children. The legitimate family of Edilberto opposed the claim.

Are Alberto and Baldomero entitled to share in the estate of Edilberto? Explain. (4%)

VI

On December 1, 2000, Dr. Juanito Fuentes executed a holographic will, wherein he gave nothing to his recognized illegitimate son, Jay. Dr. Fuentes left for the United States, passed the New York medical licensure examinations, resided therein, and became a naturalized American citizen. He died in New York in 2007. The laws of New York do not recognize holographic wills or compulsory heirs.

1. Can the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes be admitted to probate in the Philippines? Why or why not? (3%)

2. Assuming that the will is probated in the Philippines, can Jay validly insist that he be given his legitime? Why or why not? (3%)

VII

Ramon Mayaman died intestate, leaving a net estate of P10,000,000.00. Determine how much each heir will receive from the estate:

1. If Ramon is survived by his wife, three full-blood brothers, two half-brothers, and one nephew (the son of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%)

2. If Ramon is survived by his wife, a half-sister, and three nephews (sons of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%)

VIII

Jude owned a building which he had leased to several tenants. Without informing his tenants, Jude sold the building to Ildefonso. Thereafter, the latter notified all the tenants that he is the new owner of the building. Ildefonso ordered the tenants to vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from notice because he had other plans for the building. The tenants refused to vacate, insisting that they will only do so when the term of their lease shall have expired. Is Ildefonso bound to respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants? Explain your answer. (3%)

IX

Before migrating to Canada in 1992, the spouses Teodoro and Anita entrusted all their legal papers and documents to their nephew, Atty. Tan. Taking advantage of the situation, Atty. Tan forged a deed of sale, making it appear that he had bought the couple’s property in Quezon City. In 2000, he succeeded in obtaining a TCT over the property in his name. Subsequently, Atty. Tan sold the same property to Luis, who built an auto repair shop on the property. In 2004, Luis registered the deed of conveyance, and title over the property was transferred in his name.

In 2006, the spouses Teodoro and Anita came to the Philippines for a visit and discovered what had happened to their property. They immediately hire you as lawyer. What action or actions will you institute in order to vindicate their rights? Explain fully. (4%)

X

Rommel’s private car, while being driven by the regular family driver, Amado, hits a pedestrian causing the latter’s death. Rommel is not in the car when the incident happened.

1. Is Rommel liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased? Explain. (2%)

2. Would your answer be the same if Rommel was in the car at the time of the accident? Explain. (2%)

PART II

XI

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)

1. A clause in an arbitration contract granting one of the parties the power to choose more arbitrators than the other renders the arbitration contract void.

2. If there is no marriage settlement, the salary of a "spouse" in an adulterous marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains.

3. Acquisitive prescription of a negative easement runs from the time the owner of the dominant estate forbids, in a notarized document, the owner of the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement.

4. The renunciation by a co-owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property in lieu of the performance of his obligation to contribute to taxes and expenses for the preservation of the property constitutes dacion en pago.

5. A person can dispose of his corpse through an act intervivos.

XII

Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State Department, got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a ground for annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Manila. On the first year of the spouses’ tour of duty in the Philippines, Margarita filed an annulment case against Emmanuel before a Philippine court on the ground of her husband’s sterility at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

1. Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer. (3%)

2. Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their wedding in Kenya, they come back and take up residence in the Philippines. Can their marriage be annulled on the ground of Emmanuel’s sterility? Explain. (3%)

XIII

Rafael, a wealthy bachelor, filed a petition for the adoption of Dolly, a one-year old foundling who had a severe heart ailment. During the pendency of the adoption proceedings, Rafael died of natural causes. The Office of the Solicitor General files a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the case can no longer proceed because of the petitioner’s death.

1. Should the case be dismissed? Explain. (2%)

2. Will your answer be the same if it was Dolly who died during the pendency of the adoption proceedings? Explain. (2%)

XIV

Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital and other medical expenses in delivering the child by caesarean section; moral, claiming that Rodolfo promised to marry her, representing that he was single when, in fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.

1. If you were the judge, would you award all the claims of Nanette? Explain. (3%)

2. Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular support, can he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)

3. When Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she prefers to live with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files an action for the custody of Rona, alleging that he is Rona’s choice as custodial parent, will the court grant Rodolfo’s petition? Why or why not? (2%)

XV

Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new car, she obtained a loan from the same bank in the amount of P1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments. Sarah issued in favor of the bank post-dated checks, each in the amount of P100,000.00, to cover the twelve monthly installment payments. On the third, fourth and fifth months, the corresponding checks bounced.

The bank then declared the whole obligation due, and proceeded to deduct the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Sarah’s deposit after notice to her that this is a form of compensation allowed by law. Is the bank correct? Explain. (4%)

XVI

Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the sea. The land had been brought under the Torrens System, and is cultivated by Ulpiano and his family as farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river has brought silt and sediment from its sources up in the mountains and forests so that gradually the land owned by Marciano increased in area by three hectares. Ulpiano built three huts on this additional area, where he and his two married children live. On this same area, Ulpiano and his family planted peanuts, monggo beans and vegetables. Ulpiano also regularly paid taxes on the land, as shown by tax declarations, for over thirty years.

When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land, he ordered Ulpiano to demolish the huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of the harvest. Marciano claims that under the Civil Code, the alluvium belongs to him as a registered riparian owner to whose land the accretion attaches, and that his right is enforceable against the whole world.

1. Is Marciano correct? Explain. (3%)

2. What rights, if any, does Ulpiano have against Marciano? Explain. (3%)

XVII

Rosario obtained a loan of P100,000.00 from Jennifer, and pledged her diamond ring. The contract signed by the parties stipulated that if Rosario is unable to redeem the ring on due date, she will execute a document in favor of Jennifer providing that the ring shall automatically be considered full payment of the loan.

1. Is the contract valid? Explain. (3%)

2. Will your answer to [a] be the same if the contract stipulates that upon failure of Rosario to redeem the ring on due date, Jennifer may immediately sell the ring and appropriate the entire proceeds thereof for herself as full payment of the loan? Reasons. (3%)

XVIII

The Ifugao Arms is a condominium project in Baguio City. A strong earthquake occurred which left huge cracks in the outer walls of the building. As a result, a number of condominium units were rendered unfit for use. May Edwin, owner of one of the condominium units affected, legally sue for partition by sale of the whole project? Explain. (4%)

XIX

In 1972, Luciano de la Cruz sold to Chua Chung Chun, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land in Binondo. Chua died in 1990, leaving behind his wife and three children, one of whom, Julian, is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Six years after Chua’s death, the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate, and the parcel of land was allocated to Julian. In 2007, Luciano filed suit to recover the land he sold to Chua, alleging that the sale was void because it contravened the Constitution which prohibits the sale of private lands to aliens. Julian moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of pari delicto, laches and acquisitive prescription. Decide the case with reasons. (4%)

XX

1. If Ligaya, a Filipino citizen residing in the United States, files a petition for change of name before the District Court of New York, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)

2. If Henry, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, files a petition for change of name before a Philippine court, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.

The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.

The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact, intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.

There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it should be reversed.

Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.

We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy question raised by the petitioner.

We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946, be set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual questions and render a new decision accordingly.

Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, G.R. No. L-15499, February 28, 1962

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila dismissing the action for legal redemption filed by plaintiff-appellant.

It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of the following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.

On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending up to the present on account of the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.

Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution by her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.

On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte c/o her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta, Manila, and having received the same on December 10, 1958, said law office delivered them to plaintiff-appellant's son, Mr. Miguel Papa, who in turn personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs. Butte, on December 11 and 12, 1958. Aside from this letter of defendant-appellant, the vendor, thru her attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers, wrote said bank on December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's letter regarding the sale of her 1/6 share in the Sta. Cruz property for the sum of P500,000.00. Said letter was received by the bank on December 15, 1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's counsel, the latter received the same on December 16, 1958. Appellant received the letter on December 19, 1958.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.

After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto, trial was held, after which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and that, if ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal redemptions provided by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for damages was likewise dismissed for not being sufficiently established. Both parties appealed directly to this Court.

Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of her share in the testate proceedings; and (2) whether or not she exercised the right of legal redemption within the period prescribed by law.

The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other-co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)

ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)

That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is clear. As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the decedent.

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. (659)

ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment(Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935),and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and from that instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original surviving co-owners of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a co-owner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner (Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's share which the law nowhere takes into account.

The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the decedent's debts and the expenses of administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and the administrator may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy & Company by Mrs. Garnier Ramirez. The reason is obvious: this right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was perfected, eight (8) years after the death of Jose V. Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate. The redemption right vested in the heirs originally, in their individual capacity, they did not derivatively acquire it from their decedent, for when Jose V. Ramirez died, none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property had as yet sold his undivided share to a stranger. Hence, there was nothing to redeem and no right of redemption; and if the late Ramirez had no such right at his death, he could not transmit it to his own heirs. Much less could Ramirez acquire such right of redemption eight years after his death, when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made; because death extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore, all further juridical capacity to acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind (Civil Code of the Phil., Art. 42).

It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez has not been specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation of estate of Jose V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided portion in the Sta. Cruz property, in which event Mrs. Butte would have no interest in said undivided portion. Even if it were true, the fact would remain that so long as that undivided share remains in the estate, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it before his demise, so that his heirs are now as much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V. Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his lifetime. As co-owners of the property, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or any one of them, became personally vested with right of legal redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso interest to Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the undivided share of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should eventually be sold to satisfy the creditors of the estate, it would not destroy their ownership of it before the sale, but would only convey or transfer it as in turn sold (of it actually is sold) to pay his creditors. Hence, the right of any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem the Garnier share will not be retroactively affected. All that the law requires is that the legal redemptioner should be a co-owner at the time the undivided share of another co-owner is sold to a stranger. Whether or not the redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after exercising the legal redemptioner is irrelevant for the purposes of law.

Nor it can be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his heirs would stand in law as never having acquired that share. This would only be true if the inheritance is repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the heirship is undisputed, the purchaser of hereditary property is not deemed to have acquired the title directly from the deceased Ramirez, because a dead man can not convey title, nor from the administrator who owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can only derive his title from the Ramirez heirs, represented by the administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.

The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the redemption being established, the next point of inquiry is whether she had made or tendered the redemption price within the 30 days from notices as prescribed by law. This period, be it noted, is peremptory, because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. In considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that method must be deemed exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] 528). As ruled in Wampler vs. Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law Ed. [U.S.] 275) —

Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume until the contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed, which warranted the legislature in so legislating.

The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer, are easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation thereof, so that the party need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer.

The notice which became operative is that given by Mrs. Chambers, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of the vendor Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under date of December 11, 1958, she wrote the Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her principal's one-sixth (1/6) share in the Sta. Cruz property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for P500,000.00. The Bank received this notice on December 15, 1958, and on the same day endorsed it to Mrs. Butte, care of Delgado, Flores and Macapagal (her attorneys), who received the same on December 16, 1958. Mrs. Butte tendered redemption and upon the vendee's refusal, judicially consigned the price of P500,000.00 on January 15, 1959. The latter date was the last one of the thirty days allowed by the Code for the redemption, counted by excluding December 16, 1958 and including January 15, 1959, pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the redemption was made in due time.

The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the Administrator Bank (December 15) can not be counted as determining the start of thirty days; for the Administrator of the estate was not a proper redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to redeem the share of Marie Garnier did not form part of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez.

We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the P500,000,00. paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for the Garnier share is grossly excessive. Gross excess cannot be predicated on mere individual estimates of market price by a single realtor.

The redemption and consignation having been properly made, the Uy counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees predicated on the assumption that plaintiff's action was clearly unfounded, becomes untenable.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one entered:

(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by appellant Angela M. Butte duly and properly made;

(b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due time the legal redemption of the one-sixth (1/6) undivided portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No. 59363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to convey to Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days from the time our decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals and fruits of the redeemed share from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and.

(d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.

Without finding as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Paredes and De Leon, JJ., took no part.

Engle vs. Doe, G.R. No. L-23317,August 7, 1925

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23317 August 7, 1925

FLOYD ENGLE, by his next friend E. Womack, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIA DOE (alias SILVESTRA PULGA), defendant-appellant.

Feria and La O for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

STATEMENT

By E. Womack, his next friend, it is alleged that Floyd Engle for about two months has been an inmate of the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila, where he was being treated for serious physical and mental disorders by Doctor N.M. Saleeby, the Director of the Hospital. That the defendant is a resident of the town of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, but at present is somewhere in the City of Manila. That on or about December 9, 1922, and in the hospital in the City of Manila, the defendant, through the aid of her friends and agents, induced and coerced Floyd Engle to go through some sort of a marriage ceremony with her, knowing at the time that he, Floyd Engle, was out of his mind and mentally deranged. That after the procuring of the certificate of the so-called marriage, the defendant forthwith returned to Tacloban, and endeavored to take possession of all of Engle's property who was worth at least P50,000. That the conspiracy of the defendant to marry him was for the sole purpose of obtaining his property, and to default Engle and his legitimate heirs of their property. That it is proper that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem under the provisions of sections 116 and 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Wherefore, plaintiff prays that a special provisional guardian be appointed for Engle and that a preliminary injunction issue against the defendant, restraining her from interfering with his property, and that the alleged marriage be declared void ab initio, and for costs, and such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable.

For answer, the defendant made a general and specific denial of all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense, alleges that for the last fourteen years she has been living maritally under the same roof with the plaintiff by whom she has had six children, the oldest of whom is twelve years of age. That on December 7th of last year, they were legally married. That in contracting the marriage, plaintiff was in the full enjoyment of all of his mental faculties, and that he entered into the contract freely, not only for the purpose of making his status and that of the defendant and her children legal, but to provide for her future in case of his death. That induced by his alleged friends, the plaintiff has caused and consented to the filing of the complaint, together with the application for the appointment of a guardian of his person and property, to make it appear that he is not of sound mind, when in truth and in fact he was then and is now in the full enjoyment of all of his mental faculties, and as a counterclaim, defendant alleges that when they began living together, plaintiff did not have any property, and that through her aid and assistance, he has amassed a considerable fortune, which at present is not less than P200,000. That the defendant has nothing with which to support herself and her children, and that P80 which at present the plaintiff is giving the defendant is not sufficient for that purpose. That to properly support herself and the children and to employ an attorney to defend the suit, she requires a pension of P500 per month and the sum of P800 to be paid in advance on account of attorney's fees, and the defendant prays that she be absolved from the complaint, and that the court make an order requiring the plaintiff to make such allowances for her pension and attorney's fees.

Upon such issues, testimony was taken, and in a well written opinion the lower court found:

That plaintiff at the time of said marriage ceremony in St. Luke's Hospital was mentally deranged to such an extent that he was incapable of entering into the marriage contract or any other contract, and that for this reason the marriage ceremony was null and void.

The court also finds that the defendant is not entitled to anything under her so-called counterclaim, and said counterclaim is hereby dismissed, and rendered a decree to the effect that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was "illegal, null, and void ab initio, and without any legal effect as to plaintiff's and defendant's property rights, without costs to either party.

The defendant appeals, contending:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was mentally deranged to such an extent that he was incapable of entering into the marriage contract, and therefore

II. The lower court erred in declaring the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant to be illegal, null, and void ab initio.

JOHNS, J.:

Opposing counsel have submitted able and exhaustive briefs. The question submitted is largely one of fact.

October 18, 1922. Floyd Engle became an inmate of St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila with Dr. N.M. Saleeby as his physician. It appears from the hospital records that at the time of his admission his disease was defined as:

Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis.

He remained in the hospital under the care of Doctor Saleeby until some time in March, 1923, when he was taken to Baguio, and upon his return to Manila in June, he left for the United States. The marriage ceremony between Engle and the defendant was performed in the hospital on December 7, 1922. December 20, 1922, a petition for the appointment of a guardian for him, alleging insanity, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on December 29, 1922. H.C. Powers was appointed guardian of his person and J.V. House guardian of his property. After the marriage Engle and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and on the following day the defendant left Manila and went back to Tacloban, Leyte, which was Engle's former residence, and made an effort to obtain possession of all his business and property.

The question presented is whether or not at the time of the marriage Engle was of sound mind and mentally capable of entering into a marriage contract. It will be noted that he was admitted to the hospital October 18, 1922, and the nature of his disease at the time of his admission was described in the hospital records as: "Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis," and that his alleged marriage to the defendant took place on December 7, 1922, fifty days after that time.

It appears from his testimony that Doctor Saleeby is 54 years old, and that he graduated from the University of New York Medical College in 1897, and, with the exception of four years, he has engaged in the active practice of his profession ever since and that he was in charge of St. Luke's Hospital from March, 1907, to September, 1912, and from March 1, 1921, to the present time. That during all of the time that Engle was in the hospital, he was under the personal charge of Doctor Saleeby, who was his only physician, and who testifies:

Q. Will you state to the court what was his mental condition during all the time that he was there; that is, from the time he entered the hospital in October, 1922, up to the time he left in March, 1923? — A. All the time he was under my care he was unable to exercise judgment or express his will or decision definitely on any question of any significance.

Q. Will you state to the court whether or not during all that time he had sufficient mentality to knowingly enter into a contract of any kind? — A. He was absolutely unable to make any decision of any kind, and was not fit to make a contract with any one in any business transaction of any significance.

Q. Was the mental condition of Mr. Engle the same from the time he entered the hospital up to the time he left, or did it suffer any change? — A. He was at his worst at the time the priest visited him, and he kept in that same condition until about a month prior to his discharge from the hospital. At the time of his discharge he was in better condition than when the priest visited him, but he was by no means in a fit mental condition.

Q. Will you state to the court whether or not during the time that Mr. Engle was in the hospital he was sane or insane? — A. Mr. Engle was insane from the date he entered the hospital until he was discharged.

The record is conclusive that Doctor Saleeby was a fair and impartial witness, and that he had no interest whatever in the result of this suit, and that he was in daily attendance upon Engle from the time that he entered until he left the hospital, covering a period of about five months. His testimony is materially strengthened and corroborated by the evidence of J.V. House, H.C. Powers, and E. Womack, who were lifelong personal and intimate friends of Engle.

Opposed to this is the evidence of the defendant and the Reverend H.J. Parker, who performed the marriage ceremony.

It must be conceded that the defendant is a party in interest, and the evidence of the Reverend Parker does not carry conviction. It is true that he gave it as his opinion that Engle was mentally sound, but he did not testify as to any fact or circumstance upon which he based his opinion. All of his answers to the questions propounded were more or less categorical, and it appears that any knowledge which he had as to the mental condition of Engle was confined and limited to the two conversations which he had with him in the hospital and which were about and concerning his marriage to the defendant. Much is also said about the evidence of Miguel Romualdez, the present Mayor of the City of Manila. But giving to it full force and credit, he did not see Engle after the 5th of December, 1922, and the marriage was on December 7th, and in answer to the question: "Did you notice any change or difference, in the manner of his conversation and behavior on December 5, 1922, as compared to previous conversation with Engle?" he said, "I have not noticed any change." That may all be true, and yet Engle would be of unsound mind. Be that as it may, the evidence for the defense is not sufficient to overcome that of the plaintiff.

The records of the admission of Engle to the hospital are authentic, and were made when there was no thought of any litigation.

Section 10 of General Orders No. 68 provides, among other things, that a marriage may be annulled for any of the following cases, existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x x x x x x

3. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

x x x x x x x x x

6. That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the marriage state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.

Section 9 of Act No. 2122 provides:

Within the meaning of this Act, insanity is a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.

The evidence is conclusive that at the time he was admitted to the hospital Engle was of unsound mind, and it tends to show that his disease was incurable. The fact that Engle was received and treated as an insane patient on October 18, 1922, and that he was not discharged from the hospital until March, 1923, throws the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish the fact that he was of sound mind at the time of the alleged marriage.

In Corpus Juris, volume 32, pages 757 and 758, it is said:

(SEC. 561) 2. Continuance of Insanity — (a) In General. — General insanity admitted, or once proved to exist, is presumed to continue; and, if a recovery or a lucid interval is alleged to have occurred, the burden to prove such allegation is on the person making it. . . .

(SEC. 562) (b) Rebuttal of Presumption. — The presumption that a person shown to be insane continued so is rebuttable. In order to rebut the presumption of continuance of insanity it is not necessary to show that the person has been restored to the full possession of his mental vigor. However, when insanity has once existed and it is sought to be proved that a subsequent act of its subject was done in a lucid interval, sanity must be shown as of the very time of the act in question; it is not sufficient to show a lucid interval before and after the day of the act.

Ruling Case Law, vol. 14, page 622, says:

74. Burden of Proof in Civil Cases Generally. — In all civil actions it is generally held that the burden of proof of insanity rests upon him who alleges insanity, or seeks to avoid an act on account of it, and it devolves upon him to establish the fact of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. If, however, a previous state of insanity as proved, the burden of proof is then usually considered to shift to him who asserts that the act was done while the person was sane, though it has frequently been held that insanity which is not shown to be settled or general as contradistinguished from a mere temporary aberration or hallucination will not be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. A lucid interval is in its nature temporary and uncertain in its duration, and there is no legal presumption of its continuance.

Applying this rule, there is a failure of proof on the part of the defendant. It is not sufficient to overcome the clear, positive and convincing testimony for the plaintiff, that Engle was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage. Again, on all questions of fact the lower court found for the plaintiff, and its findings are entitled to some weight.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs to either party. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

People vs. Echavez, G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980,

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

Jackson vs. Blum, G.R. No. 26, August 24, 1901

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26 August 24, 1901

WALTER JACKSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAUL BLUM, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Charles C. Cohn, for appellants.
WM. J. Rohde, for appellee.

COOPER, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Intramuros (Manila) in an action for an accounting instituted by Walter Jackson against Paul Blum, H. Blum, W.A. Whaley, and L.M. Johnson. The matter involved is a leasehold interest in the business property known as the "Alhambra," situated on the Escolta in Manila, together with the furniture and fixtures and other appurtenances.

In August, 1898, Señor Roca took a lease from the owner of the Alhambra and a short time afterwards transferred the same to Evans, Jackson, and Williams. Williams conveyed his interest to Evans and Jackson and the establishment was conducted by Evans & Jackson. The firm of Evans & Jackson, being in need of money, on the 21st day of October, 1898, made an arrangement by which the interest of Jackson in the property was transferred to Evans. In this transfer it was agreed that when the establishment was free from all incumbrances there should be a settlement between Jackson and Evans, and that Jackson should remain the owner of his interest in the property. On the same day Evans, being then the apparent sole owner of the establishment, obtained a loan from Paul Blum in the sum of 32,443 pesos, and in carrying out the transaction a partnership was formed between Evans and Whaley, and a conveyance, absolute in form, was then made by Evans & Whaley to Paul Blum, transferring to him the establishment, and a contract was also entered into between Evans and Whaley on the one part and Paul Blum on the other part, in which agreement it was recited that Evans & Whaley had borrowed from Paul Blum the said sum of 32,443 pesos and that they had executed to Blum the conveyance of the establishment mentioned. It was stipulated that Whaley was to be the managing partner of the firm of Evans & Whaley, Evans having the right to enter the premises at any time and to inspect the books of account. Each was to receive out of the business for his personal expenses the sum of 300 pesos per month. It was also agreed by Evans & Whaley to purchase from the American Commercial Company, of which Paul Blum was then a member, all supplies which they needed for the establishment. The loan made by Paul Blum to Evans & Whaley was to be paid off from the net proceeds of each day's business, which were to be deposited with American Commercial Company to the credit of the Alhambra account, or to be paid from any other funds, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, and Evans & Whaley had the right to pay the whole or any part of the debt at any time to Blum and from funds other than the profits of the Alhambra. Whaley was mentioned in the instrument as representative of Blum. It does not appear, however, from the instrument that Blum was to be considered a partner or in any way interested in the business. Blum perhaps required that Whaley should become the managing partner of the firm of Evans & Whaley for the protection of his interests in advancing the money to them. No term for the duration of the partnership between Evans and Whaley was fixed, nor can any particular term be inferred from the nature of the business to be carried on by them. On the 13th day of November, 1899, a partnership settlement of the firm of Evans & Jackson was made between Evans and Jackson and the balance of $5,000 was found to be due from Evans to Jackson, and an agreement was then entered into between Evans and Jackson in which it was recited that the sum of 20,000 pesos was the estimated amount due on the mortgage of the property to Blum and that the equity of redemption was of the value of 40,000 pesos, which belonged to each of the partners in equal parts. In payment of the balance of 5,000 pesos due Jackson on the settlement of account, and in consideration of the sum of 5,000 pesos, Evans transferred all of his interest in the Alhambra property to Jackson. On the following day Evans applied to Blum to ascertain the amount due him on the mortgage, offering to pay the same. Blum refused to recognize Jackson as having any rights in the establishment. Afterwards Blum demanded of Evans & Whaley the payment of the sum of 28,000 pesos as due upon the mortgage, and Whaley, being then in exclusive possession of the property, turned over the same to Blum.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance was in favor of the plaintiff and an accounting was decreed. The contention of the defendants is: First, that by the sale from Evans and Whaley to Blum the property passed absolutely to Blum; second, that Evans could not substitute Jackson as debtor to Blum without the consent of the latter; third, that the partnership between Evans and Whaley was based upon confidence, and that Jackson could not be substituted as a member of the firm; fourth, that the juridical relation does not exist between the plaintiff Jackson and the defendants.

We shall briefly state the law applicable to the facts in the case: A partnership may be terminated by the will or renunciation of one of the partners, provided no term has been fixed for its duration or when a term is not fixed by the nature of the business. (Arts. 1700 and 1705 of the Civil Code.)

Personal or real property which each partner possesses at the time of the execution of the contract continues to be his private property, the usufruct only passing to the partnership. (Art. 1675 of the Civil Code.)

Each co-owner has the absolute ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits belonging thereto, and he therefore may sell, assign, or mortgage the same or substitute another in its enjoyment unless personal rights are involved. The effect of the sale or mortgage, however, so far as affects and co-owners, shall be limited to that portion which may be allotted to him in the distribution at the termination of the community. (Art. 399 of the Civil Code.)

No co-owner is obliged to remain in the community. (Art. 400 of the Civil Code.)

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with costs on appeal taxed to the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Smith, Willard, and Ladd, JJ., concur.
Mapa, J., did not sit in this case.