Showing posts with label persons and family relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label persons and family relations. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Lee vs. Court of Appeals


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118387.  October 11, 2001

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862.  The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers.  One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng.  The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.

Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners).  On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion.  On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.

Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931.  Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.

Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan.  She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng’s mistress.  As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners.  They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in.  All was well, therefore, before private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng’s demise on May 9, 1989.  Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng’s death that was to be published in the newspapers.  It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents’ curiosity, if not suspicion.7

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter.  After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following:

1. As per Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was “GRAVIDA I, PARA I” which means “first pregnancy, first live birth delivery” (refer to:  MASTER PATIENT’S RECORDS SUMMARY – Annex I).  Also, the age of the mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG’s age was then already 38 years old.  The address used by their father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila).  The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-2).  Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG’s 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4).  As per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11th child.  Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in the records.  If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old.  Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG.  Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG’S true age at that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant’s allegation, she was born at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old.  However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old.  Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO’s birth on 11 May 1950.  KEH SHIOK CHENG’s age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIO’s birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age.  As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO’s birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.  Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future.  The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions - SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 - on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.9

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course.  Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the City Hall of Manila.

Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.

Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:

It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was published in “Media Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the “Media Update” published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor General,  City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case. 

x x x x x x x x x.
SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.  Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.13

Finding no merit in petitioners’ arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15

Hence, this petition.
I. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners’ mother changed from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who is a completely different person.  What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.”16 Petitioners thus label private respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Debunking petitioners’ above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
x x x x x x x x x.

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment x x x, the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right.  Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.17
x x x x x x x x x.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.  Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children.  There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.19

Further sanctioning private respondents’ resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner’s minor children as stated in their records of birth from “Chinese” to “Filipino”, and “legitimate” to “illegitimate”, respectively.  Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.  Thus we held:

“Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

‘SEC. 3. Parties. -  When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.’
‘SEC. 4.  Notice and publication. -  Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.  The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.’
‘SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.’

“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.  Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.  The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as “summary”.  There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.”22 (Underscoring supplied.)

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.

We agree.  As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.  In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.  In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein.  Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions.  A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.23 (Underscoring supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower court’s order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.

We explained in this wise:
“x x x. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

“In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.  Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents.  They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby.  All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.
x x x x x x x x x.

“The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from ‘legitimate’ to ‘illegitimate’.  Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.  The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.  Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules ‘shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.’  If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights.  This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.”31 (Underscoring supplied).
Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register.  The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.  Thus:

“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake.  However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.  Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. x x x.”33 (Underscoring supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion.  But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary.  One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se.  Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3).  The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5).  Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.  It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.  The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child.  We ruled thus:

“This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals.  In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor.  He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the “non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage.” In debunking the trial court’s ruling granting such petition, the Court held as follows:

‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding “marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose.  However, it is not as simple as it looks.  Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage.  A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’

‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’

‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’ 

“Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as in Sarah Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.”39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.  The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:

“x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.  If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected.  If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.  Such action can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties.  This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.”41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said that:

“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register.  Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.’  If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”43 (Underscoring supplied).

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like.  Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues.  Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.

First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

“No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.”

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order.  As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and “changed”. In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set right”; “to remove the faults or errors from”44 while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute”.45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have.  Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412.  What are the entries in the civil register?  We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.

“Art. 407.  Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.”

“Art. 408.  The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.”

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality.  Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous.  This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.”

The above law speaks clearly.  Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general.  The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.  Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.  This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind.  For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is.  Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding.  Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application.  Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.

II.  The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death.48

Article 171 provides:
“The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
“(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
“(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
“(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.”

Petitioners’ contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births.  We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena CariƱosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50

We likewise held therein that:
“x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case.  A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child.  The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.  The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner.  In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all. x x x.”51

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:
“Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x.

“A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.  Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.  Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.  Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.  Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.  For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.  Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.  Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
‘Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken.  This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy.  It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.  They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all.  Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.’”53

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents’ cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.54

We disagree.  As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:

“Art. 1149.  All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.”

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.  It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.55

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action.  The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago.  Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right of action or right to sue accrued.  However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date.  This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate.  It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents’ suspicions were aroused and confirmed.  From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners’ birth records in 1989.  Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners’ thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world.  Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water.  Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by prescription.  One is either born of a particular mother or not.  It is that simple.

IV.  Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping.  They enumerate the other actions filed by private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal and against defendants as alleged accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate.57

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan.  They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.58

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for.  The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners’ birth records.  Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng’s naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents’ right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother’s estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Ninal vs. Bayadog


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIƑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIƑAL, INGRID NIƑAL, ARCHIE NIƑAL & PEPITO NIƑAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. 

D E C I S I O N

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito NiƱal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. NiƱal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. NiƱal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death.1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)7 in relation to Article 58.8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.17 The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" 

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. 

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. ScƤ juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Lao vs. Dee Tim


GRN  21017  February 25, 1924

In re estate of JOSE YAP SIONG, deceased. MARIA LAO and JOSE LAO, petitioners and appellees, vs. DEE TIM, YAP Kim TING, YAP Kim SENG, and YAP HU CHO, respondents, and appellants.

1. MARRIAGES BY CHINESE PERSONS IN CHINA.-A marriage ceremony performed in China will be sustained in this jurisdiction when it is proved that the ceremony took place in accordance with the laws and customs of China. When the marriage has been thus celebrated, it will be held to be legal and valid. The proof, however, must be clear and convincing.
2. MARRIAGE,; MARRIAGE OF ONE MAN TO TWO WOMEN.-When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children, and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. A woman who is deceived by a man, who represents himself as a single man, and who marries him, she and her children are entitled to all the rights of legitimate wife and children.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Guevara, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Salvador Barrios and Gabino S. Abaya for appellants.
Felix B. Bautista and Jose Gutierrez David for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in the municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1) and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.

Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap Siong were joined in holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.

In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a great deal of proof was presented. Exhibits I and 1-A, certificates of marriage, were presented to show that she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number of other documents (Exhibits 9 to 13) were presented to show that Yap Siong had admitted that he was a married man. Exhibits 14 to 17 were presented for the purpose of proving that Yap Siong had admitted in a public document that Maria Lao was his wife.

The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof to show that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong, lawfully joined to him in holy wedlock in China on the 14th day of September, 1893. To support that contention she presented what she contended was a certificate of marriage, marked Exhibit A-Exhibit A-1. She contended that Exhibit A was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of 52 years of age, swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China, and that Exhibit A was the ordinary and customary document issued to prove that the ceremony of marriage had taken place. He described in detail the ceremony of marriage performed in accordance with the customs and practice in China.

Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age and a lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the manner and form in which they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual proof or certificate issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had taken place. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual and ordinary proof, or certificate, if it may be called a certificate, issued to show that a marriage ceremony had been performed between the persons mentioned therein. Mr. Ty Cong Ting was, at the time he declared as a witness, the legal attorney of the Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila.

The respondent Dee Tim presented several witnesses who confirmed her contention that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong and that her three children Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children, born of her marriage with Yap Siong. To further sustain her contention she presented Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J, documents in which Yap Siong had expressly recognized his marriage to her.

To overcome the proof adduced by Dee Tim in support of her marriage to Yap Siong, the petitioner presented Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Said exhibits are alleged letters supposed to have been written by an uncle in China of Yap Siong during the years 1900 to 1906, urging him to return to China for the purpose of marrying, thus attempting to establish the fact that Yap Siong during that period was not a married man. When we first studied the record in this case we were inclined to give said letters great credit, but upon a further examination of the record and a further argument by the respective parties, we are now inclined to believe that said letters were fabricated for the very purpose of defeating the contention of Dee Tim. They were not identified properly by persons who had reason to know that they were genuine in character and were actually prepared in China and sent to Yap Siong in the Philippine Islands. We are of the opinion, and we believe that was the real opinion of the trial court, that said exhibits should not be admitted as proof to sustain the fact for which they were presented. We are now persuaded that said letters are pure fabrications.
The petitioner further presents two or three witnesses for the purpose of showing that the marriage between Dee Tim and Yap Siong never took place for the reason that Yap Siong was in the Philippine Islands on the 14th day of September, 1893, and that at that time he was living in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province of Pampanga, and that he never left that municipailty. A careful reading of their testimony, however, does not convince us that it is altogether reliable. The testimony which they gave was given in the month of January, 1923, and they testified positively as to exact dates, times, and places in the year 1897. Their testimony contains no facts, or data, or peculiar circumstances or conditions which caused them to remember the particular facts concerning which they testified. They gave no reason why they were able to remember the exact whereabouts of Yap Siong during the period to which their testimony referred. Upon the contrary there is much proof in the record that Yap Siong returned to China a number of times after his first arrival here. The petitioner further presents some proof to show that Yap Siong had admitted on several occasions that Dee Tim was his querida and not his wife.

The respondents further attempted to show that Maria Lao and Jose Lao, her son, were not the legitimate wife and son of Yap Siong, by presenting Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit L is the baptismal certificate issued by the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles, in which it is made to appear that on the 5th day of January, 1904, he baptized a child named Jose Martin, a natural son of Maria Lao, and whose father was unknown. Exhibit LL is a certificate of birth issued by the secretary of the municipality of Angeles, in which it appears that Jose Martin Lao, a child, was born on the first day of January, 1904, a natural son of Maria Lao. There is nothing, however, in Exhibits L or LL, which shows that Maria Lao was responsible for the facts which they contain. Exhibit LL contains the statement that the facts therein were not obtained from Maria Lao but from one Isabelo Lao.

There is a notable conflict between Exhibits L and 7LL. Exhibit LL certifies that Jose Martin Lao was born on the first day of January, 1904, while Exhibit L certifies that the baptism took place on the 5th day of January, 1904, and that the child was then 34 days old. It is apparent therefore that the facts stated in one or the other of said exhibits are untrue. And, moreover, when we consider the customs of the Filipino people in their relation with the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, it is easily understood, in view of the alleged fact that Maria Lao and Yap Siong had been joined in holy matrimony under the forms of the Protestant Church, why the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles stated in his certifi. cate that the father of the child, then Jose Martin, was unknown.

The respondents further attempted to show that Yap Siong and Maria Lao had never been joined legally in holy wedlock, by the testimony of a number of witnesses to the fact that Yap Siong had on numerous occasions asserted that Maria Lao was his querida only. It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions, depending upon his interest and convenience at the particular time, state that Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for the same reason, that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the information, that he was married to each of said women, from coming to the knowledge of the other, which, as the facts show, he was quite able to do, until he had passed to that bourn from which none returns, and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary.

From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the record, we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence shows the following:

(1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance with the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children born of that wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the fact that Yap Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born of that wedlock; and that they had, no reason to believe, until after the death of Yap Siong, that he was legally married to the petitioner herein.

(2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June, 1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man, without any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose Lao is the legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao.

In other words, we are fully convinced that a preponderance of the evidence shows that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing that each was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his double marriage. They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other.

Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between the two families? Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title .13, partida 4), where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U. S., 553.)

A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as single and who marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. To remedy that hardship under the common law and following the wise jurisprudence of Spain, both England and many of the states of the United States adopted statutes. (Glass vs. Glass, 114 Mass., 563; Spicer vs. Spicer, 16 Abbot's Practice [N. SJ, 114; Dyer vs. Brannock, 66 Mo., 39]; Graham vs. Bennet, 2 Cal., 503; Smith vs. Smith, I Tex., 621 [46 Am. Dec., 121]; Clendenning vs. Clendenning, 7 Martin [La.], 587; Patton vs. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann., 98; Abston vs. Abston, 15 La. Ann., 137; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U. S., 553; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 38 U. S., 404; Estate of Navarro, 24 La. Ann., 298; In re Taylor, 39 La. Ann., 823.)

The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the decision of this court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the reason that in each of said cases a preponderance of the evidence showed that no legal marriage had been performed in China, that is, that the alleged Chinese wife and the deceased in each of those cases had never been legally married.

Therefore the conclusion reached in the decision heretofore announced by this court in the present case is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be revoked and that the estate of Yap Siong be divided equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao, and the other one-half to Dee Tim and her three children. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, AvanceƱa, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed. 

Friday, October 16, 2009

2009 Bar Questions - CIVIL LAW

PART I

I

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)

  1. The doctrine of "processual presumption" allows the court of the forum to presume that the foreign law applicable to the case is the same as the local or domestic law.

  2. In reserva troncal, all reservatarios (reservees) inherit as a class and in equal shares regardless of their proximity in degree to the prepositus.

  3. An oral partnership is valid.

  4. An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding.

  5. A dead child can be legitimated.

II

Dr. Lopez, a 70-year old widower, and his son Roberto both died in a fire that gutted their home while they were sleeping in their air-conditioned rooms. Roberto’s wife, Marilyn, and their two children were spared because they were in the province at the time. Dr. Lopez left an estate worth P20M and a life insurance policy in the amount of P1M with his three children --- one of whom is Roberto --- as beneficiaries.

Marilyn is now claiming for herself and her children her husband’s share in the estate left by Dr. Lopez, and her husband’s share in the proceeds of Dr. Lopez’s life insurance policy. Rule on the validity of Marilyn’s claims with reasons. (4%)

III

In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license, went to the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not there, but the Mayor’s secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up and sign the required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait, and went out to look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring municipality.

When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she showed him the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their witnesses were waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the marriage contract, gave them to the secretary who returned to the Mayor’s office. She then gave copies of the marriage contract to the parties, and told Michael and Anna that they were already married. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and wife, and had three sons.

  1. Is the marriage of Michael and Anna valid, voidable, or void? Explain your answer. (3%)

  2. What is the status of the three children of Michael and Anna? Explain your answer. (2%)

  3. What property regime governs the properties acquired by the couple? Explain. (2%)

IV

Harry married Wilma, a very wealthy woman. Barely five (5) years into the marriage, Wilma fell in love with Joseph. Thus, Wilma went to a small country in Europe, became a naturalized citizen of that country, divorced Harry, and married Joseph. A year thereafter, Wilma and Joseph returned and established permanent residence in the Philippines.

  1. Is the divorce obtained by Wilma from Harry recognized in the Philippines? Explain your answer. (3%)

  2. If Harry hires you as his lawyer, what legal recourse would you advise him to take? Why? (2%)

  3. Harry tells you that he has fallen in love with another woman, Elizabeth, and wants to marry her because, after all, Wilma is already married to Joseph. Can Harry legally marry Elizabeth? Explain. (2%)

V

Four children, namely: Alberto, Baldomero, Caridad, and Dioscoro, were born to the spouses Conrado and Clarita de la Costa. The children’s birth certificates were duly signed by Conrado, showing them to be the couple’s legitimate children.

Later, one Edilberto de la Cruz executed a notarial document acknowledging Alberto and Baldomero as his illegitimate children >with Clarita. Edilberto died leaving substantial properties. In the settlement of his estate, Alberto and Baldomero intervened claiming shares as the deceased’s illegitimate children. The legitimate family of Edilberto opposed the claim.

Are Alberto and Baldomero entitled to share in the estate of Edilberto? Explain. (4%)

VI

On December 1, 2000, Dr. Juanito Fuentes executed a holographic will, wherein he gave nothing to his recognized illegitimate son, Jay. Dr. Fuentes left for the United States, passed the New York medical licensure examinations, resided therein, and became a naturalized American citizen. He died in New York in 2007. The laws of New York do not recognize holographic wills or compulsory heirs.

  1. Can the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes be admitted to probate in the Philippines? Why or why not? (3%)

  2. Assuming that the will is probated in the Philippines, can Jay validly insist that he be given his legitime? Why or why not? (3%)

VII

Ramon Mayaman died intestate, leaving a net estate of P10,000,000.00. Determine how much each heir will receive from the estate:

  1. If Ramon is survived by his wife, three full-blood brothers, two half-brothers, and one nephew (the son of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%)

  2. If Ramon is survived by his wife, a half-sister, and three nephews (sons of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%)

VIII

Jude owned a building which he had leased to several tenants. Without informing his tenants, Jude sold the building to Ildefonso. Thereafter, the latter notified all the tenants that he is the new owner of the building. Ildefonso ordered the tenants to vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from notice because he had other plans for the building. The tenants refused to vacate, insisting that they will only do so when the term of their lease shall have expired. Is Ildefonso bound to respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants? Explain your answer. (3%)

IX

Before migrating to Canada in 1992, the spouses Teodoro and Anita entrusted all their legal papers and documents to their nephew, Atty. Tan. Taking advantage of the situation, Atty. Tan forged a deed of sale, making it appear that he had bought the couple’s property in Quezon City. In 2000, he succeeded in obtaining a TCT over the property in his name. Subsequently, Atty. Tan sold the same property to Luis, who built an auto repair shop on the property. In 2004, Luis registered the deed of conveyance, and title over the property was transferred in his name.

In 2006, the spouses Teodoro and Anita came to the Philippines for a visit and discovered what had happened to their property. They immediately hire you as lawyer. What action or actions will you institute in order to vindicate their rights? Explain fully. (4%)

X

Rommel’s private car, while being driven by the regular family driver, Amado, hits a pedestrian causing the latter’s death. Rommel is not in the car when the incident happened.

  1. Is Rommel liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased? Explain. (2%)

  2. Would your answer be the same if Rommel was in the car at the time of the accident? Explain. (2%)


PART II

XI

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)

  1. A clause in an arbitration contract granting one of the parties the power to choose more arbitrators than the other renders the arbitration contract void.

  2. If there is no marriage settlement, the salary of a "spouse" in an adulterous marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains.

  3. Acquisitive prescription of a negative easement runs from the time the owner of the dominant estate forbids, in a notarized document, the owner of the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement.

  4. The renunciation by a co-owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property in lieu of the performance of his obligation to contribute to taxes and expenses for the preservation of the property constitutes dacion en pago.

  5. A person can dispose of his corpse through an act intervivos.

XII

Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State Department, got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a ground for annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Manila. On the first year of the spouses’ tour of duty in the Philippines, Margarita filed an annulment case against Emmanuel before a Philippine court on the ground of her husband’s sterility at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

  1. Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer. (3%)

  2. Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their wedding in Kenya, they come back and take up residence in the Philippines. Can their marriage be annulled on the ground of Emmanuel’s sterility? Explain. (3%)

XIII

Rafael, a wealthy bachelor, filed a petition for the adoption of Dolly, a one-year old foundling who had a severe heart ailment. During the pendency of the adoption proceedings, Rafael died of natural causes. The Office of the Solicitor General files a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the case can no longer proceed because of the petitioner’s death.

  1. Should the case be dismissed? Explain. (2%)

  2. Will your answer be the same if it was Dolly who died during the pendency of the adoption proceedings? Explain. (2%)

XIV

Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital and other medical expenses in delivering the child by caesarean section; moral, claiming that Rodolfo promised to marry her, representing that he was single when, in fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.

  1. If you were the judge, would you award all the claims of Nanette? Explain. (3%)

  2. Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular support, can he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)

  3. When Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she prefers to live with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files an action for the custody of Rona, alleging that he is Rona’s choice as custodial parent, will the court grant Rodolfo’s petition? Why or why not? (2%)

XV

Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new car, she obtained a loan from the same bank in the amount of P1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments. Sarah issued in favor of the bank post-dated checks, each in the amount of P100,000.00, to cover the twelve monthly installment payments. On the third, fourth and fifth months, the corresponding checks bounced.

The bank then declared the whole obligation due, and proceeded to deduct the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Sarah’s deposit after notice to her that this is a form of compensation allowed by law. Is the bank correct? Explain. (4%)

XVI

Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the sea. The land had been brought under the Torrens System, and is cultivated by Ulpiano and his family as farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river has brought silt and sediment from its sources up in the mountains and forests so that gradually the land owned by Marciano increased in area by three hectares. Ulpiano built three huts on this additional area, where he and his two married children live. On this same area, Ulpiano and his family planted peanuts, monggo beans and vegetables. Ulpiano also regularly paid taxes on the land, as shown by tax declarations, for over thirty years.

When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land, he ordered Ulpiano to demolish the huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of the harvest. Marciano claims that under the Civil Code, the alluvium belongs to him as a registered riparian owner to whose land the accretion attaches, and that his right is enforceable against the whole world.

  1. Is Marciano correct? Explain. (3%)

  2. What rights, if any, does Ulpiano have against Marciano? Explain. (3%)

XVII

Rosario obtained a loan of P100,000.00 from Jennifer, and pledged her diamond ring. The contract signed by the parties stipulated that if Rosario is unable to redeem the ring on due date, she will execute a document in favor of Jennifer providing that the ring shall automatically be considered full payment of the loan.

  1. Is the contract valid? Explain. (3%)

  2. Will your answer to [a] be the same if the contract stipulates that upon failure of Rosario to redeem the ring on due date, Jennifer may immediately sell the ring and appropriate the entire proceeds thereof for herself as full payment of the loan? Reasons. (3%)

XVIII

The Ifugao Arms is a condominium project in Baguio City. A strong earthquake occurred which left huge cracks in the outer walls of the building. As a result, a number of condominium units were rendered unfit for use. May Edwin, owner of one of the condominium units affected, legally sue for partition by sale of the whole project? Explain. (4%)

XIX

In 1972, Luciano de la Cruz sold to Chua Chung Chun, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land in Binondo. Chua died in 1990, leaving behind his wife and three children, one of whom, Julian, is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Six years after Chua’s death, the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate, and the parcel of land was allocated to Julian. In 2007, Luciano filed suit to recover the land he sold to Chua, alleging that the sale was void because it contravened the Constitution which prohibits the sale of private lands to aliens. Julian moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of pari delicto, laches and acquisitive prescription. Decide the case with reasons. (4%)

XX

  1. If Ligaya, a Filipino citizen residing in the United States, files a petition for change of name before the District Court of New York, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)

  2. If Henry, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, files a petition for change of name before a Philippine court, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)


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