Showing posts with label conspiracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conspiracy. Show all posts

Thursday, July 9, 2009

People vs. Cantuba, G.R. No. 79811 March 19, 1990

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79811 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIO CANTUBA & PEDRITO LALAGUNA, defendants-appellants.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ernesto P. Pangalangan for defendants-appellants.

PARAS, J.:

The accused-appellants Pio Cantuba and Pedrito Lalaguna together with co-accused Gualberto Versales (alias Berting), Satur Gerbuela, Ricardo Baco, Rogelio Penales (alias Pugo), Romeo Totong Labuyo and Mayor Moises Espinosa were charged with the crime of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code in an amended information which reads as follows:

That on or about December 23, 1981 in the municipality of Masbate, province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and with night-time as a means to better facilitate the commission of the crime, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one ATTY. ADOLFO CELERA, by then and there shooting him at several parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter, mortal wounds which are the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law. (p. 124, Rollo)

The accused Cantuba, Lalaguna, Versales, Gerbuela, Baco and Mayor Moises Espinosa pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Penales and Labuyo remained at large and were not arraigned.

The defense, in a motion for an order requiring the Prosecuting Fiscal or Fiscals in this case to conduct another investigation and thereafter to include in the Amended Information all persons, who appear responsible therefor, moved for the inclusion of one Pat. Torrecampo, a confessed participant in the alleged crime, as one of the accused. Although the motion was granted by the court, the issue was eventually rendered moot and academic when the trial was completed without the Prosecuting Fiscals having complied with the court's order.

On April 27, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find accused PIO CANTUBA and PEDRITO LALAGUNA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify jointly and solidarily the heirs of Atty. Celera in the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.

Accused GUALBERTO VERSALES, SATUR GERBUELA and MAYOR MOISES R. ESPINOSA, are hereby ACQUITTED, for insufficiency of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with the consequent cancellation of their bailbonds.

The case against accused RICARDO BACO who is already dead is DISMISSED.

The case against ROMEO alias TOTONG LABUYO and ROGELIO PENALES alias PUGO who, up to the present are at large, is hereby placed in the ARCHIVES.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 66-67, Rollo)

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Margie Rotor, Romulo Tama and Pat. Rodolfo Torrecampo and on the basis of their testimonies the facts as hereunder narrated are reconstructed by the Solicitor General, as follows:

On December 21, 1981, Patrolman Rodolfo Torrecampo, then under suspension but working as the bodyguard of Mayor Moises Espinosa, went to Dagusungan, Milagros, Masbate to fetch one Romeo "Totong" Labuyo, the "encargo" of Mayor Espinosa's ranch, and to Pulang-Bato, Masbate, Masbate to fetch Pio Cantuba, the mayor's "sidekick" in his cockpit (TSN, Sept. 3, 1985, pp. 335, 337; TSN, September 2, 1985, p. 297).

On December 23, 1981, all three went to the provincial jail to secure the release of Ricardo Baco, a detention prisoner (TSN, Sept. 3, 1985, pp. 338, 342). Together with Baco, they proceeded to the house of Saturnino Gerbuela, a provincial guard, but the latter was not at home (Id., p. 343). They left Baco behind to wait for Gerbuela with instructions that they both should proceed to Sunrise Disco Pub a 6:00 p.m. (Id.). Torrecampo, Labuyo and Cantuba went to the Bel-Air Theater to kill time staying there for about two hours before proceeding to the Sunrise Disco Pub (Id., pp. 344, TSN, November 7, 1985, p. 446). Ricardo Baco was already at the Sunrise Disco Pub when they arrived (TSN, September 3, 1985, p. 345).

Torrecampo told the group to wait outside while he checked inside the pub to see if Atty. Adolfo Celera was inside (Id., p. 345). As the pub was dark, he could not confirm Atty. Celera's presence (Id., p. 346). Coming out of the pub, Torrecampo explained to Cantuba, Labuyo and Baco how they would kill Atty. Celera. He handed to Labuyo a .45 cal. pistol and to Baco a knife (machete) (Id., pp. 346-347). Torrecampo described the features of the victim to Baco (Id., p. 346) and instructed Cantuba, who knew Atty. Celera, to signal Baco and Labuyo as soon as he sees their victim approaching (TSN, November 7, 1985, p. 446).

Atty. Adolfo Celera was a practicing lawyer and had run for public office (Id., p. 450). He had been the lawyer for the complainant in a rape case brought against Mayor Espinosa, formerly Governor of Masbate (TSN, January 23, 1985, p. 75, TSN, October 21, 1987, pp. 3-4), who at the time of Atty. Celera's death had filed a case against the latter for moral damages (TSN, September 2, 1985, p. 294). After the trial of the damage suit began, Atty. Celera confided to his wife that Mayor Espinosa had warned him that should he lose the suit a "miracle" would happen (TSN, October 21, 1985, pp. 4, 5). Subsequently, Atty. Jolly Fernandez (later Assemblyman), who collaborated with Atty. Celera in the rape case against Mayor Espinosa, was "bombed" as he left the court on December 2, 1981 (Id., pp. 6, 7).

On the evening of December 23, 1981, Atty. Celera, together with Margie Rotor and Ave Refil, attended the Christmas party of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). They left the place after staying for one hour and took a tricycle to Pil-Tel, a local long distance telephone company. Atty. Celera went inside Pil-Tel while his companions waited outside. Margie Rotor noticed that there were also three other people standing outside Pil-Tel (Id., p. 59) one of them she recognized as Pio Cantuba a long time acquaintance (Id., p. 60). After 5 minutes, Atty. Celera came out of Pil-Tel and then headed for the Sunrise Disco Pub (TSN, January 23, 1985, pp. 56, 58, 61) just across the street from Pil-Tel. (Id., p. 58, 59; TSN, June 10, 1985, p. 135). Ave Refil was called by somebody and Atty. Celera and Margie Rotor went inside the Pub and ordered a bottle of White Castle and before they had consumed its contents Atty. Celera told her that he will go home already (Id., p. 62)

Margie Rotor accompanied Atty. Celera to the gate of the pub where they stood facing the street waiting for a tricycle, with Margie Rotor standing at the right side of Atty. Celera (TSN, January 23, 1985, p. 63). The gate was lighted by a long flourescent lamp. Near them, by the side of Carandang Optical, Margie Rotor noticed a man standing by a blue Yamaha Motorbike with a butterfly sticker (Id., p. 71). She also noticed that Pio Cantuba and his two companions were still standing near the wall of Pil-Tel (Id., p. 63; TSN, January 24, 1985, p. 133). Then the three dispersed. Pio Cantuba walked towards UCPB which was to her left and then Cantuba returned and headed towards where she and Atty. Celera were standing (Id., p. 64). One of Cantuba's companions who was wearing white t-shirt and maong pants, whom Margie Rotor recognized in the courtroom and turned out to be Ricardo Baco, circled behind them (Id., p. 64).

As Cantuba slowly approached them, Margie Rotor saw that Cantuba was holding a gun (Id., p. 65). Then she heard a gunfire (TSN, September 3, 1985, p. 348) and Atty. Celera staggered. Then Ricardo Baco rushed from behind and stabbed Atty. Celera twice on the left chest (Id., p. 349; TSN, January 23, 1985, p. 66). Atty. Celera fell to the ground, groaning (Id., p. 67).

As Cantuba and Baco were fleeing, Margie Rotor saw a "tricycle" speeding towards the fallen victim (Id., p. 68) but Margie Rotor was able to pull his body out of its path (Id., p. 69). The glaring lights of the vehicle made it difficult for her to make out and identify the rider (Id., p. 68). However, 17 year old Romulo Tama, a bystander who had also seen the blue Yamaha motorbike with a butterfly sticker near Carandang Optical, saw the rider, whom he recognized as Pedrito Lalaguna, start the engine and speed away right after Atty. Celera fell to the ground mortally wounded (TSN, June 10, 1985, pp. 131, 132).

Margie Rotor, Patrolman Igloso and Nino, a waiter at Sunrise Disco Pub, took Atty. Celera to the Masbate Provincial Hospital in a tricycle (TSN, June 23, 1985, pp. 69, 70). Atty. Celera sustained a gunshot in the left lumbar area, or at the left back just above the waistline, with no exit wound, and two stab wounds on the left side of his body, one over the "epig. area" and the other between the 6th and 7th ribs between sternal and mid-clavicular lines or just below the nipple (TSN, July 30, 1985, p. 259; September 2, 1985, pp. 291-292). Adolfo Juancho Celera, Jr., eldest son of the deceased, also rushed to the hospital and saw the doctor remove a .45 cal. slug from his father's right torso (TSN September 2, 1985, p. 288). Atty. Celera died in the hospital.

Technical Stg. Randolf Arizala, together with Col. Cesar Veloso immediately investigated the reported shooting of Atty. Celera (TSN, November 26, 1984, p. 13). Arizala saw the slug that was extracted from the deceased (Id., pp. 14, 15). As a result of an on-the-spot investigation, Sgt. Arizala traced the blue Yamaha motorcycle to Ernesto Lampago and found the vehicle at the latter's address in Masbate, Masbate (Id., pp. 16, 18). While the rear tire was deflated, Sgt. Arizala observed that the engine was still warm (Id., p. 17). Sgt. Arizala impounded the vehicle (Id., p. 18).

That same evening, at around nine o'clock in the evening, Romeo Gerona, went out of his sister's house to buy cigarettes (TSN, July 30, 1985, pp. 266, 267). On the way, a tricycle with four persons on board passed him and then stopped in front of the house of Mayor Espinosa (Id., p. 267). He recognized two of them — Pugo Penales and Pio Cantuba (Id., pp. 267, 268). (pp. 4-9, Appellee's Brief; p. 124, Rollo)

Now Appellants Pio Cantuba and Pedrito Lalaguna filed the instant appeal assigning the following errors:

I

The Lower Court erred in finding that accused, Pio Cantuba, fired the fatal shot that snuffed the life of deceased Adolfo Celera, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

II

The Lower Court erred in convicting accused, Pedrito Lalaguna, despite the fact that the only evidence against him considered solely of having been seen driving a motorbike away from the scene of the crime.

III

The Lower Court erred in disregarding the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (p. 3, Appellee's Brief)

It is the contention of accused-appellant that even if he (Cantuba) did approach the victim with a gun in his hand, it was never established that the fatal shot came from his gun.

The contention is untenable. First, the factual points marshalled by the appellants do not engender reasonable doubt as to his (Cantuba) culpability. Second, even assuming that he (Cantuba) never fired his gun, he would still be principally liable as a co-consipirator in the killing of Atty. Celera under the principle that the act of a conspirator is the act of all co-conspirators. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in a conspiracy.

With regard to the alleged conflicting testimonies of the two principal witnesses, Margie Rotor and Pat. Torrecampo, as to who really fired upon Atty. Celera, the Court is convinced that the testimony of Margie Rotor is more credible than that of Torrecampo because when witness Margie Rotor heard the gunfire, it was after she saw Pio Cantuba holding a gun while walking towards them. This court finds that the only competent persons to identify the person who fired the gun are the witnesses present at the scene of the crime. Witness Margie Rotor who was standing right beside the victim is more believable than Torrecampo who was standing across the street. When contradictory statements refer only to minor details, this does not destroy their credibility. Their inconsistency in minor details is proof that they were not rehearsed.

With respect to the sworn statement of Ricardo Baco claiming that it was Totong Labuyo who shot Atty. Celera remain hearsay evidence and, therefore, inadmissible since Baco was never presented to allow the prosecution to cross-examine him. Moreover, it was physically impossible for Baco to see who actually fire the gun because Baco went the opposite direction and encircled Rotor and the victim from behind. His eyes were fixed on the victim and not on the gunwielder who was at a distance from the victim.

It is well settled rule that when the main thrust of the appeal is that of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution is assailed, and appellant failed to demonstrate why this court should depart from the cardinal principle that the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility should not be disturbed on appeal due to its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying unless some fact or circumstance may have been overlooked that may affect the result of the case.

Anent the second assignment of error, it is the contention of the accused-appellant Pedrito Lalaguna that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the fact that the only evidence against him consisted solely of having been seen driving a motorbike away from the scene of the crime.

We do not agree with the appellant's claim that his participation in Atty. Celera's murder is tenuous because the records show otherwise. Both prosecution witnesses Margie Rotor and Romulo Tama testify to one motorbike or "tricycle" that was speeding at precisely the same time, i.e., immediately after Atty. Celera had fallen to the ground as a result of the gunshot and stab wounds.

Accussed-appellant Lalaguna points out that Margie Rotor did not testify against him. This statement is misleading. Margie Rotor testified against the rider of the speeding "tricycle" as a participant in the ambush because he was bent on running over the fallen Atty. Celera. The only element missing in her testimony is the identity of the rider because of the glare of the vehicle's lights. This however, was supplied by Romulo Tama who recognized the rider to be Pedrito Lalaguna, whom he had known even before the incident. Their testimonies as to the motorbike aspect of the incident corroborate each other. They both distinctly remember the noticeable speed of the vehicle and that it happened after Atty. Celera had fallen to the ground. By reason of their relative vantage points, this court finds each witness naturally recalling details which the other would not have noticed. This is indicative of credible and unadulterated testimony. Slight variations in the testimony of two witnesses strengthen their credibility (People v. Villamil, 135 SCRA 610).

Accused-appellant further calls the attention of this court to the fact that Pat. Torrecampo did not mention him (Pedrito Lalaguna) as among his companions when the former directed the killing. This court finds this fact not exculpatory.

It does not in any way contradict the testimonies of Margie Rotor and Romulo Tama that appellant Lalaguna was at the scene of the crime and tried to run down the victim. Appellant Lalaguna's identity and participation had been sufficiently established, and his motives become inconsequential (People v. Soriano, 134 SCRA 542).

The trial court correctly convicted appellant Lalaguna as a co-conspirator as the circumstances of his participation indubitably showed unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful acts as can be gleaned from the fact that, Lalaguna knew of the plot to assassinate Atty. Celera as he too had been ordered to scout for a man who could do the job (TSN, Sept. 3, 1985, pp. 355-356). He also knew exactly the place where the killing was to take place and also the date and approximate time of the assault. At the very least, therefore, he had to know about the Torrecampo plot and decided to join its execution. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. (People v. Caday, 28 SCRA 388; People v. Sy, 113 SCRA 207)

Appellant Lalaguna insists that the act of driving a motorbike is an equivocal act. This would be correct only if the testimony of Romulo Tama were considered in isolation from the testimony of Margie Rotor, Pat. Torrecampo and Sgt. Rodolfo Arizala which clearly indicate that Lalaguna drove the vehicle to run down the victim and that he shared in the criminal intent to do away with Atty. Celera. Therefore, the criminal culpability of appellant Pedrito Lalaguna had been clearly established.

Relative to the last assigned error, the state has satisfactorily discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants' discussion of their third assignment of error seems to imply that the decision was premised on the weakness of the arguments and evidence for the defense. However, an unprejudiced reading of the decision and the points already discussed will readily show otherwise.

Be it noted that the questioned judgment tried very well to rebut the defense of alibi of Pio Cantuba and Pedrito Lalaguna. Appellants' defense of alibi is jurisprudentially weak (People v. Onquillano, 149 SCRA 442; People v. Acelajado, 148 SCRA 142). As they were not able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Moreover, the defense of alibi is generally accepted with caution, because under certain circumstances might exonerate the accused on the ground of impossibility of participation, or at the very least, raise a reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, both appellants claimed that on the night and time of the incident they were not at the vicinity of the Sunrise Disco Pub where the alleged crime was committed, as they were then in the house of Asst. Provincial Treasurer Manlapaz playing "pusoy". But considering the admitted fact that the distance between the house of Asst. Provincial Treasurer Manlapaz where the accused claimed to be, is only 300 meters away from the Sunrise Disco Pub, where the crime was perpetrated, there is no physical impossibility for both accused to be at the scene of the crime. Accordingly, such defense merits no serious consideration. Moreover, both accused were positively identified by prosecution witnesses Margie Rotor, Rodolfo Torrecampo and Romulo Tama. Accused Pio Cantuba, as the person who fired the gun and Pedrito Lalaguna, as the rider of the speeding motorbike or "tricycle" who was bent on running over the fallen body of Atty. Celera.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-35700, October 15, 1973

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35700 October 15, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
JOSE GERONIMO and ROMEO GERONIMO, defendants and appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for plaintiff-appellee.

Eleuterio F. Martinez as Counsel de Oficio for defendants-appellants.

ESGUERRA, J.:

This appeal was originally taken by the defendants-appellants to the Court of Appeals, but as the penalty imposed by the trial court 1 is reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals by its resolution 2 of June 20, 1972, elevated the case to this Court for decision. .

The amended information for Murder filed against the three (3) accused, Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo, included two other persons, namely, Isidro Geronimo and Eleodoro Carlos, but these two accused have not been apprehended. Enrico Geronimo pleaded guilty to the charge but Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo went to trial upon their plea of not guilty.

Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo are brothers while Enrico Geronimo is their uncle for being a first cousin of their father. The deceased, Fermin Magbanua, is a first cousin of Romeo and Jose and also a nephew of Enrico.

On April 6, 1966, at about 122:30 p.m. in Sitio Ilaya Ilaya, Poblacion Norte, Sigma, Capiz, accused-appellants Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo, and the deceased, Fermin Magbanua, arrived from the market place of Sigma, Capiz, already drunk and stopped at the store of one Fesertas Bacalangco to buy ten liters of tuba. After drinking, Fermin Magbanua and the accused started to go home, but after having gone several meters away from the store of Fesertas Bacalangco, Fermin Magbanua was hit on the face by a sling shot wielded by one Eleodoro Carlos. Fermin fell to the ground and Romeo Geronimo ran to where he had fallen and held him, while Jose Geronimo went around and hit Fermin on the head with a stone, rendering him unconscious. While Fermin was held unconscious by Romeo, Enrico Geronimo took Fermin's bolo from his waist and hacked the latter on the right ankle joint and Jose also boloed his left ankle joint, almost severing it. Fermin Magbanua died as a result of his wounds.

Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo were charged before the Court of First Instance of Capiz with murder committed allegedly as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of April, 1966, in the Municipality of Sigma, Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused in company with Isidro Geronimo and Eleodoro Carlos, who are still at large, all armed with boloes, sling-shot and stones, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with superior strength and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone and stab one Fermin Magbanua with the said weapons, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following wounds as reported in the medical certificate. 3 to Wit:

1. Incised wound at the right ankle joint, posterior aspect about 3-1/2 inches long;

2. Incised wound 4.5 inches long just below and almost around the left ankle joint completely severing the tendon of achilles;

3. Multiple small (about one cm. long each) wounds in the hand region, upper lip and distal end of the left forearm;

4. Multiple small laceration with hematoma on the scalp;

5. Hemorrhage, massive secondary to the above lesions.

which caused his death; that due to the death of said Fermin Magbanua and the consequent loss of his earning capacity (the deceased having no permanent physical disability at the time of his death), his heirs have suffered damages in the amount of P6,000.00 in consonance with the provisions of Article 3306 of the New Civil Code.

Contrary to law. (pp. 51-52, rec.)

Before his death Magbanua executed an ante-mortem declaration naming the accused as his assailants, and which reads as follows:

Question — Who is your name?

Answer — Fermin Magbanua.

Q — What happened to you?

A — I was boloed by Enrico Geronimo, Jose Geronimo and Romeo Geronimo.

Q — What was the cause?

A — Because we have grudges before.

Q — What do you feel of your wounds?

A — I might die of my wounds because I am feeling bad.

Q — Will you sign to the truthfulness of your statement?

A — I will just thumb marked it.

(Mkd.) FERMIN MAGBANUA

WITNESSES TO THUMBMARK:

1. (Sgd.) RAMON S. ISIDERIO

2. (Sgd.) AMANDO PONSARAN

(pp. 164-166, rec.)

Upon arraignment Enrico Geronimo, assisted by Counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge 4 but in so doing he manifested that he alone inflicted the injuries of the deceased. He was accordingly sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. He was credited with one-half (1/2) of his preventive imprisonment.

The case for the prosecution rests mainly on the testimony of Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin and on the ante-mortem declaration of the deceased. The respective testimonies of Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin are substantially as follows:

Bonifacio Bacalangco: On April 6, 1966, while he was looking out of the window of the second floor of the house of Manuel Bacalangco, he saw the accused, Enrico Geronimo, Jose Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo, Isidro Geronimo, Eleodoro Carlos, and the victim, Fermin Magbanua, coming out of a store four meters away from the house of Manuel; that all of a sudden Isidro Geronimo and Eleodoro Carlos hit Fermin successively by their sling-shots between his eyes and forehead; that Romeo at once embraced Fermin, and Jose, with a stone in his hand, approached Fermin and hit him twice on the right side of his head rendering the latter unconscious; that Enrico approached Fermin, drew the latter's bolo from his waist and hacked Fermin on his right ankle joint; that Jose followed in hacking Fermin this time on the latter's left ankle joint which was almost severed; that after all this had happened, with Romeo still embracing Fermin, a peace officer arrived and brought the victim to the hospital.

Teresita Delfin: She corroborated Bonifacio Bacalangco's version with the only difference that according to Teresita, Enrico hacked Fermin on the left ankle joint while Jose did it on the right ankle joint.

The defense gave a different version of the incident. Enrico who pleaded guilty maintains that it was he alone and nobody else who was responsible for the wounds inflicted on the deceased as described in the medical certificate Exhibit "A". On the other hand, Romeo and Jose categorically denied direct and active participation in the infliction of the injuries and branded as utterly untrue the prosecution witnesses' testimony that they helped facilitate the hacking by immobilizing the victim. Their versions are as follows:

Enrico Geronimo: At about 11:30 a.m. of April 6, 1966, while he was on his way home, he saw Fermin Magbanua inside the store of Felix de Juan drinking tuba; that upon seeing him, Fermin called him and offered a drink; that after drinking the tuba, Fermin told him to pick up a quarrel with one Pedro Bacalangco; that when he refused, Fermin got mad and hit him with his fist; that after being hit by Fermin, he got hold of a stone and threw it at Fermin who was then running away; that he hit Fermin on the head and the latter fell face downward; that it was at that moment when he hacked Fermin on the right and left ankle joints; that he also hit Fermin on the left arm; that Romeo embraced him to pacify him while Jose tried to help Fermin by bringing the latter to the hospital; that he at once reported the incident to the municipal building and surrendered to the authorities.

Romeo Geronimo: He stated that on said occasion Fermin offered Enrico a drink inside the tuba store; that after drinking the glassful of tuba, he heard Fermin induce Enrico to fight Pedro Bacalangco; that when Enrico refused, Fermin boxed the former; that Enrico got hold of a piece of stone and threw it at Fermin who ran away but was hit on the head and fell face downward; that Enrico unsheathed Fermin's bolo and hacked Fermin on the right and left ankle joints; that Enrico also hacked Fermin on the left and right arms; that he carried Fermin in his arms and brought him to the hospital; that he has nothing to do directly or indirectly with the killing of Fermin; and that he has never been to school.

Jose Geronimo: He corroborated the testimony of Romeo and maintained that it was he who pacified and stopped Enrico from further inflicting injuries on Fermin.

Consolacion Banjao and Enrico de la Cruz: Their testimonies corroborated those of Romeo and Jose.

The Court of First Instance of Capiz after hearing convicted the accused and sentenced them as follows:

Wherefore, this Court finds the accused Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and this Court hereby sentences each of said accused, Jose Geronimo and Romeo Geronimo, to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of Fermin Magbanua in the sum of P12,000.00 pursuant to the ruling of our Honorable Supreme Court in the recent case of People vs. Pantoja, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost. The weapon used in the commission of the offense is ordered confiscated.

Said Jose Geronimo and Romeo Geronimo are credited with One-half (1/2) of their preventive imprisonment.

Hence, this appeal by Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo who claim that the lower court erred:

(1) In convicting both appellants by holding that they conspired with Enrico Geronimo in killing the deceased;

(2) In convicting both appellants upon testimonies which are unbelievable and unworthy of credence;

(3) In convicting appellant Romeo Geronimo inspite of the evidence of the prosecution showing that he did not participate in the fight;

(4) In convicting both appellants of murder and not of homicide; and

(5) In not crediting both appellants with the mitigating circumstance of "lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" and as to appellant Romeo Geronimo, with the alternative mitigating circumstance of "lack of instruction"

I. DISCUSSION

The issue raised by the first assignment of error is whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Jose and Romeo Geronimo conspired with Enrico Geronimo in killing the deceased. Both accused maintain that the element of conspiracy was never proven and nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution is it shown that there was an agreement relating to the commission of the offense; that the aggression was instantaneous and all of a sudden, which circumstance precludes the idea of a preconceived design to attack the deceased; that prosecution witness Bonifacio Bacalangco even exculpated Romeo Geronimo when he testified as follows:

Q. — You said that you know the cause of the death of Fermin Magbanua. Do you know who boloed him?.

A. — Jose and Enrico, sir.

Q. Are these the only persons you mentioned, Enrico and Jose Geronimo, who boloed Fermin Magbanua?

Atty. Martinez: Objection, very leading Your Honor.

Court: Witness may answer.

A. — These are the only persons, sir. (t.s.n. hearing of March 13, l968).

This shows, he argues, the utter absence of conspiracy on the part of appellants Romeo and Jose as the evidence clearly shows that Romeo did not participate in the killing of Fermin Magbanua.

Upon the other hand, the prosecution claims that Romeo and Jose conspired with their uncle Enrico to kill the victim; that their acts were concerted and cooperative; that Romeo's act of holding Fermin immobilized the latter, thus allowing Jose to hit Fermin's head with a stone, rendering him unconscious; that these acts of Romeo and Jose enabled Enrico to hack with ease the prostrate Fermin; and that conspiracy is sufficiently established by circumstances evincing unity of purpose.

It has been laid down as a rule that when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, 66; People vs. Carbonell, 48 Phil. 868). When conspiracy has been proven, all conspirators are liable as co-principals for the wrongful act and its consequences (U. S. vs. Bundal, 3 Phil. 89; People vs. Villamora, 47 O.G. 6180).

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that there was conspiracy among the accused. It should be noted that all the accused and the victim were drinking together in a tuba store on the day of the incident. No other evidence was presented by the prosecution to show conspiracy which according to the settled rule, must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. It must be real and not presumptive. 5 In the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by them, and there being no satisfactory showing that the killing was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, they cannot be held responsible therefor (People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493; People vs. Cerdenia, 51 Phil. 393; People vs. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598). 6

In People vs. Portugueza 7 We ruled that:

Although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy (People vs. Caayao, 48 O. G. 637).

— II —

The issue raised by the second assigned error is whether or not both appellants were convicted upon testimonies which they brand as unbelievable and unworthy of credence. Appellants claim that the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses who saw the happening should not have been accepted as true since their testimonies tend to show that they were influenced by other persons into signing their affidavits the contents of which they merely related during the hearing. The testimony of witness Bonifacio Bacalangco on cross examination is as follows:

Q. — When did you know that you are going to testify in this case?

A. — They sent me a notice.

Q. — Who sent you the notice?

A. — The Chief of Police of Sigma.

Q. — Who asked you to make this affidavit?

A. — They are the ones, sir.

Q. — Who?

A. — They are the ones sir, Chief of Police and the Mayor.

Q. — Why, was the Mayor there present when this incident took place?

A. — No, sir.

Q. — How many times that the Mayor asked you when you signed this affidavit?

Fiscal Delfin: No basis Your Honor.

Atty. Martinez: I am on cross examination Your Honor. He said that the Chief of Police and the Mayor asked him so I have to widen on my cross examination.

Court: Witness may answer.

A. — Once, sir.

Atty. Martinez: Where did the Mayor ask you to sign this affidavit?

A. — I was sent through somebody in this Office.

Q. — Where were you when that somebody met you for the purpose of asking you to go to the Office of the Mayor?

A. — I was at home.

Q. — Was the affidavit already finished when you were asked by the Mayor to sign it?

A. — Not yet, sir.

Q. — What took place when you arrived at the Office of the Mayor?

A. — They were making the affidavit.

Q. — Who were the companions of the Mayor when they were making the affidavit?

A. — The Chief of Police, sir.

Q. — No more?

A. — No more.

Q. — So, after the affidavit was finished they asked you to sign this, do I get you right?

A. — Yes, sir. (t.s.n., March 13, 1968)

The testimony of another prosecution witness Teresita Delfin, is as follows:.

Q. — My question to you is this, when you saw that affidavit for the first time, it was already finished and it came from Jose Ordanoso, do I get you right? That is only answerable with yes or no.

A. — When the complaint was made, we were called and we were investigated and that was the time when the said affidavit was made.

Q. — Therefore, when you saw that affidavit for the first time, it was already typewritten by Jose Ordanoso, do I get you right?

A. — Yes, sir. (t.s.n., March 20, 1968)

Appellants maintain that it can be seen from the above quoted testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that their testifying was not voluntary and that their affidavits were already prepared before they, were asked questions about the case.

It should be noted that the dying declaration of the deceased points to Romeo and Jose, together with Enrico, as his assailants who had grudges against him. The statement of the deceased was taken at the municipal building while he was in a serious condition. A man at the threshold of death would not accuse his first cousins, who supposedly even helped him, as his would-be killers if the accusation does not sit with the truth. The medical certificate attesting to the injuries suffered by the victim supports prosecution's theory. Wound No. 4 more specially substantiates the reported participation of appellant Jose. Prosecution witnesses Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin narrated in detail the participation of Romeo and Jose and these witnesses have no proven motive to testify falsely in court.

Where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question for having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 8 In People vs. Tatlonghari, 9 this Court said:

The issue in the case being hinged on the credibility witnesses, the ruling of the court below must be sustained. For, in the absence of proof that there has been misappreciation of evidence — and there is no such proof in this case — the conclusion of the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses while testifying, deserves the respect of the reviewing tribunal.

The second assigned error is, therefore, without merit, no sufficient reason having been adduced why the trial court's findings and conclusion on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution should be discarded. Besides, the prosecution witnesses have no reason to impute so grave a wrong to the accused, if really they did not commit it.

— III —

The issue raised by the third assigned error is whether or not the trial court erred in convicting appellant Romeo Geronimo inspite of his alleged non-participation in the agression against the deceased. The defense argues that according to the testimony of prosecution witness Bonifacio Bacalangco, Romeo Geronimo had no part in the fight; that it was Romeo who even brought the victim to the hospital, and that the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Policeman Jose Ordanoso, also shows that he merely prevented the deceased from falling by holding the latter.

Although the Solicitor General does not argue on the third assigned error, the contention of the defense cannot be sustained. Actual participation in a fight or combat is not the only gauge to one's criminal responsibility. Appellant Romeo's holding or embracing of the victim, Fermin Magbanua, when appellant Jose Geronimo hit the latter with a stone on the head; the hacking of the deceased on the right posterior ankle joint by Romeo's uncle, Enrico Geronimo, and the hacking also of Fermin's left posterior ankle joint by Jose Geronimo while Romeo was holding or embracing the victim, indicate that Romeo was very much involved in the fight.

As earlier shown, the details of the commission of the offense do not satisfactorily support the finding of conspiracy, let alone the uncontradicted fact that all the accused and the victim met only casually. Whatever responsibility was incurred by Romeo Geronimo must be predicated on his act of holding the victim. While this act was undoubtedly one of help and cooperation, it is not indispensable for the commission of the offense as the hacking could have been committed just the same without his holding the victim. Romeo's cooperation not being essential to the commission of the crime but merely to facilitate the same, he thereby cooperated in the commission thereof and hence his liability is that of an accomplice (Article 18, Revised Penal Code) ... In People vs. Tatlonghari, 10 this Court held:

... " although ..., participation on the part of an accomplice in the criminal design of the principal is not essential to the same extent as such participation is necessary on the part of one charged as co-principal, nevertheless, it is evident that, as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the purpose of holding the same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.

— IV —

The issue raised by the fourth assigned error is whether the crime committed is murder or homicide. Appellants contend that if at all they are liable, they should not be convicted of murder because no circumstance was proven to qualify the offense as such. What actually took place, according to them was an instantaneous and sudden outburst of temper that led to the killing.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that the killing was characterized by treachery since the deceased was already helpless, in fact unconscious, when he was boloed by Enrico and Jose Geronimo, and that Romeo's act of holding the victim contributed to the latter's helpless condition.

The appellants' contention is without merit. The record and the medical
certificate
11 show that the serious wounds inflicted upon the deceased were all at the back part of the body, indicating that the assailants were behind the deceased when they hacked the latter. Prosecution witnesses Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin, both declared that after the deceased was held or embraced by Romeo, Jose with a stone on hand hit the deceased on the head, followed by Enrico's hacking on the right posterior ankle joint. In the situation pictured by these witnesses, there can hardly be any doubt as to the helpless condition of the victim when he received the injuries which caused his death. Treachery attended the killing where the nature and location of the wounds indicate that the victim was attacked from behind. 12 For murder results from the presence of qualificative circumstances based upon the manner in which the crime was committed and not upon the state of mind of the accused. 13 In People vs. Labis 14 this Court held:

His defense of justified killing unsustainable, appellant Labis must suffer the consequences for his unlawful act. The killing of the decedent was qualified by treachery. It has been clearly established that Clarito Fabria was being held firmly by appellant Cabiles, thereby preventing the former from moving or making any defense when Labis struck him from behind with a bolo. There was hardly, if any, risk at all for Labis; the deceased was defenseless. Appellant Labis is liable for murder. 15

— V —

The last issue raised by the fifth assigned error is whether both appellants should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13, No. 3, Revised Penal Code) and, as to appellant Romeo Geronimo alone, with the alternative mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction (Art. 15, Revised Penal Code). Appellants maintain that if at all they are liable, both of them should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. It will be seen from the Medical Certificate 16 that the serious wounds of the deceased were wound No. 1 -incised wound at the right ankle joint posterior, about 3-1/2 inches long; and wound No. 2 — incised wound 4.5 inches long just below and almost around the left ankle joint completely severing the tendon of achilles. All these are at the back part of the body, which shows that the intention, according to the defense, was not to kill or else the blows should have been aimed against the vital parts of the body.

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should have been appreciated by the trial court, but not for both but only for appellant Jose Geronimo who alone inflicted injury without intent to cause the death of the victim when appellant Romeo Geronimo was holding him.

Regarding the alternative circumstance of lack of education, while the evidence shows that appellant Romeo is unschooled, this circumstance alone is not sufficient. Illiteracy alone will not constitute such circumstance. 17 It must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's act. As held by this Court in People vs. Sari:

Appellant was proved, beyond reasonable doubt, to have committed the crime of murder qualified by either treachery or abuse of superior strength since his victim was an unarmed, defenseless woman, whom he ruthlessly attacked with a bolo different parts of the body. Appellant claims to be entitled to benefit of the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. We have repeatedly held, however, that it is for the trial court rather than the appellate court to find and consider the circumstance of lack of instruction and similar circumstance in favor of the accused; for it is not illiteracy alone, but the lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's acts, which only the trial court can appreciate, that constitute this mitigating circumstance (People v. Ripas, et al., L-6246, March 26, 1956; also U.S. v. Estorio, 35 Phil. 410; People v. Joseph, 52 Phil. 206; People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87; People v. Sedenio, L-6372, April 29, 1954). 18

Appellant's acts were committed with treachery which qualifies the offense as murder punishable, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As appellant Jose Geronimo lacked the intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, this mitigating circumstance may be appreciated in his favor. Accordingly, the penalty should be imposed upon him in its minimum period, or reclusion temporal, maximum. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, a penalty ranging from prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporal, medium, shall be imposed.

As regards appellant Romeo Geronimo who is liable as an accomplice, a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for a principal should be imposed. Accordingly, an indeterminate penalty ranging from the maximum of prision correccional, minimum, to the medium of prision mayor, as maximum should be imposed on him.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified by sentencing appellant Jose Geronimo to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Romeo Geronimo as accomplice is sentenced to serve from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day to prision mayor, as maximum.

In other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Pages 98-103, Rollo.

2 Page 110, Rollo.

3 Page 10, Folder of Exhibits.

4 t.s.n. page 5, March 12, 1968.

5 People vs. Chaw Sun, L-19590, April 25, 1968.

6 People vs. Tatlonghari, L-22094, March 28, 1969.

7 L-22604, July 31, 1967.

8 People vs. Dayday, L-20806, August 14, 1965; People vs. Pasiona, L-18295, April 30, 1966.

9 L-22094, March 28, 1969.

10 L-22094, March 28, 1969; 27 SCRA pp. 741-42.

11 Page, 10, folder of exhibits.

12 People vs. Comigjod, L-23113, May 30, 1967.

13 People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536.

14 L-22087, November 15, 1967.

15 Emphasis supplied.

16 Page 10, folder of exhibits.

17 People vs. Ripas, L-6246, May 26, 1954.

18 L-7169, May 30, 1956; Emphasis supplied; see also Criminal Law, Padilla, 9th Edition, 1964, pages 394-395.