Manalo vs Roldan Confesor, G.R. No. 102358, March 30, 1993

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 102358 March 30, 1993

SPOUSES VICENTE and GLORIA MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, JOSE SARMIENTO as POEA Administrator, CAREER PLANNERS SPECIALISTS' INTERNATIONAL, INC., and SPOUSES VICTOR and ELNORA FERNANDEZ, respondents.

P.M. Castillo for petitioners.

Fides C. Cordero-Tan and Roberto M.J. Lara for private respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

In Our Decision of 19 November 1992, We set aside the Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July and 9 October 1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent POEA of 4 February 1991, and reinstated instead its Order of 7 May 1990.

Briefly, the facts in retrospect: Petitioners sued private respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and violation of other pertinent labor laws, rules and regulations. In its 7 May 1990 Order, POEA suspended the authority of Career Planners Specialists' International, Inc. (CAREER), for four (4) months for illegal exaction on two counts or, in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 was imposed, plus restitution of P28,714.00 to petitioner-spouses Vicente and Gloria Manalo, meted on respondent therein Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. (FILMAN), also a fine of P40,000.00 on two counts of misrepresentation, and reiterated its perpetual disqualification from recruitment activities. On 4 February 1991, however, on the basis of the same facts, POEA reversed itself on the penalty imposed on illegal exaction, reasoning that a clear and convincing evidence was necessary to justify the suspension of the authority/license of CPSI. On appeal, Undersecretary Confesor sustained POEA in reversing itself and held that the charge of illegal exaction should be supported by other corroborative circumstantial evidence, and on 9 October 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners.

In Our decision, We stressed that only a substantial evidence was required to establish administrative findings of fact. This holds true even if the determination may result in the suspension of authority or license to operate a particular line of business and will not justify requiring a higher degree of proof.

On the dispute regarding the failure of petitioners to state in their testimonies the exact date of payment of the recruitment fee of P40,000.00 and their conflicting versions on how the P30,000.00 cash was presented, even POEA must have considered it trivial as it did not even touch on the issue. For, indeed, what is more important is that peso bills were delivered to and received by respondent-spouses. We further stated that with the payment of a check for P10,000.00, which remains undisputed, the charge of unlawful exaction was clearly established since according to POEA only P3,000.00 was legally chargeable.

On 11 December 1992, private respondents Victor and Elnora Fernandez and CPSI (excluding FILMAN) filed a motion for reconsideration primarily arguing that there was sufficient legal and evidentiary basis for the order of reconsideration issued by POEA as well as the orders of DOLE sustaining the same, and that this Court substituted its own discretion for that of POEA and DOLE.

On 15 December 1992, public respondents also filed their own separate motion for reconsideration arguing that "[t]he POEA and DOLE Orders dated 4 February 1991, 5 July 1991 and 9 October 1991, finding private respondents not guilty of illegal exaction, are themselves supported by substantial evidence, and are therefore not subject to judicial inquiry."

We disagree. According to POEA itself, in its original Order of 7 May 1990 —

After a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented, We are more inclined to give weight to complainants' (petitioner spouses herein) posture. Complainants' version of the case spontaneously presented in their pleadings specifically during the clarificatory questioning is, to our mind, more convincing than respondent's (sic) stand. Moreover, the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the allegation that respondent CAREER is indeed guilty of illegal exaction (emphasis supplied).

Nothing could be clearer than these categorical statements. We are surprised why, on the basis of the very same findings, public respondent POEA executed a complete turn-about and adopted a different factual conclusion. This is grave abuse of discretion.

Contrary to the present claim of respondents, there is nothing in the assailed orders which states that the version of private respondents has become more believable than that of petitioners. For that reason, the position of POEA expressed in its original Order that the "complainants' version of the case . . . is, to our mind, more convincing than respondent's (sic) stand," and that "[m]oreover, the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the allegation that respondent CAREER is indeed guilty of illegal exaction," remains unreversed, even up to now.

This view finds support in the fact that public respondents reconsidered only the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine to be imposed on CPSI, while the other orders, i.e., restitution of P28,714.00 to complainants and the P40,000.00 fine on FILMAN, remained undisturbed. The assailed orders were virtually saying that while the testimonies of petitioners met the substantial degree of proof requirement (otherwise petitioners could not have been entitled to restitution), the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine could not be imposed on CPSI because the same testimonies did not meet the clear and convincing evidence requirement. In short, there was no change in the findings of fact, but only an escalation of the degree of proof.

The tergiversation of the penalty imposed just because the testimonies were "uncorroborated" was a patent mistake. There is no law, rule or jurisprudence that states that an uncorroborated evidence is ipso facto insufficient and the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine may not be imposed for illegal exaction, even if the charge was substantially proved and restitution of the money exacted was ordered. Even in criminal cases (People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 432; People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 71626, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 505; People v. Base, G.R. No. 92124, 6 May 1991, 196 SCRA 688; People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 46132, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 556; People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 83214, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 578; People v. Lazo, G.R. No. 75367, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 274; People v. Sampaga, G.R. No. 91539, 30 September 1991, 202 SCRA 157; People v. Babac, G.R. No. 97932, 23 December 1991, 204 SCRA 968), which require proof beyond reasonable doubt, a credible, convincing and positive testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to sustain conviction. The original Order regarded and characterized the subject testimonies as "convincing" and "inspired belief".

The subsequent categorization of petitioners' testimonies as "[m]ere allegation of complainant" (p. 2, POEA Resolution of 4 February 1991; See also p. 2, respondent Undersecretary's Order of 5 July 1991) is startling, coming as it does from the same body which found CPSI guilty of illegal exaction "[a]fter a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented." The same may also be said of a later pronouncement that there was "no concrete evidence or proof to support the POEA Administrator's initial findings" (p. 2, respondent Undersecretary's Order of 5 July 1991; see also p. 2, POEA Resolution of 4 February 1991).

As regards the failure of petitioners to state the exact date when the payment was made and their different versions on how the money was bundled together, public respondents may not now complain that these circumstances remain unexplained. It should be noted that petitioners were questioned separately and they were not told of the discrepancies in each other's testimony. We consider it unjust for public respondents to expect petitioners to explain inconsistencies which were not brought to their attention, or of which they were given no chance to explain, and then discredit their testimonies on the basis of said inconsistencies.

Public respondents may be correct in saying that where two conflicting versions are supported by substantial evidence, the administrative body may choose which to uphold and for that reason even flip-flop on its factual findings without thereby incurring grave abuse of discretion. In this case however, public respondent reversed the penalty, not on the basis that one version is more believable than the other, but that the testimonies of complainants, after describing them to be "more convincing than respondent's stand" and which "inspired belief," were not clear and convincing. Thus, to that extent, public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.

Admittedly, an appellate court may not reverse an award for civil liability because an obligation was not established beyond reasonable doubt for, in civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence is required. Likewise, an administrative body may not require a degree of proof higher than the substantial evidence contemplated in Sec. 5, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, and the rules of administrative due process enunciated in Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635, G.R. No. 46496, 27 February 1940), otherwise, what would prevent an agency from demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt or require at least two or more witnesses to support an administrative finding of fact. Then, an agency may even create its own degree of proof — like requiring five witnesses, or an evidence be totally uncontested, to prove a claim — all in the spirit of the relative independence of administrative bodies from technical rules.

The Court is charged with having unjustifiably invaded the turf of public respondents. We need only stress that the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and all lower courts necessarily includes the authority to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution). Clearly then, even presidential prerogatives are not beyond judicial review when, as in this case before Us, there is grave abuse of discretion or an utter disregard of the law.

In Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. v. Factoran, Jr. (G.R. No. 75501, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 57), We reiterated the rule that judicial review of administrative findings of fact may be made —

. . . when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding (L-21588 — Atlas Development and Acceptance Corp. v. Gozon, etc. et al., 64 O.G. 11511 [sic] [1987]), where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest (Ateneo de Manila University v. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101 [1986]; International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).

Respondents assert that FILMAN, as the deploying agency of petitioners, was legally entitled to charge P10,000 for both petitioners, hence, its acceptance of a check for the same amount was not an overcharge. Here, public respondents appear confused. Their orders and resolutions prove otherwise.

It is undisputed that the Fernandez spouses demanded and received the check for P10,000.00, but the subject orders and resolutions of public respondents did not particularly indicate whether the check was received by the Fernandezes in their capacity as officers of CPSI or of FILMAN. Nevertheless, since the check was delivered to the Fernandezes in the office of CPSI and in the absence of proof that at that time the latter represented themselves as officers of FILMAN, there is no conclusion other than that the Fernandezes indeed acted as officers of CPSI. Moreover, the same amount represented by the check was the object of CPSI's prayer for recovery of placement fees in its answer with counterclaim and position paper filed before respondent POEA (Annexes "C" and "D", Petition; Rollo, pp. 75-79 and 115-117). If, as alleged, the Fernandezes did receive the check as officers of FILMAN, then CPSI and the Fernandez couple (and the other respondents as well) have to do a lot of explaining as to why CPSI prayed for an award of placement fees.

Significantly, the original order of POEA deducting from the amount to be reimbursed the sum of P3,000.00 as appropriate placement fees of both petitioners is a clear manifestation that a private recruitment entity (CPSI) and not a private employment agency (FILMAN) was entitled to those fees.

As regards the remaining issue on procedure, the same is deemed waived as it is brought to Us only for the first time in this motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, finding no substantial argument to warrant modification of Our Decision of 19 November 1992, much less a reversal, and for lack of merit, We Resolve to DENY WITH FINALITY the motions for reconsideration respectively filed by public and private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Quiason, JJ., concur.

People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. L-33492, March 30, 1988

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33492 March 30, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
EFREN MERCADO, defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision * rendered by the defunct Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, dated 11 March 1971, in Criminal Case No. CCC-564-Rizal, entitled: "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Efren Mercado, accused," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Efren Mercado, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dominador Salvador, Jr., the amount of P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.

The facts of the case, as summarized in the People's Brief, are as follows:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of December 23, 1970, the deceased Dominador Salvador, Jr. and his friends were in their house preparing to caroling. Among those with the deceased were Ding Cristobal, Rod Cristobal, Teody Pangilinan, Emilio Fuerte and Leonardo Calvento. (t.s.n., pp. 2-3, January 14, 1971) From the house of Dominador Salvador they proceeded to the house of Mr. Aguilar a place which is more or less 16 to 25 meters from the place of the deceased Dominador Salvador, Jr. (t.s.n., p. 3, January 15, 1971), In going to the place of Mr. Aguilar they were to pass through an "eskinita" a small road (t.s.n., p. 3, January 15, 1971). Mr. Aguilar lives in Real street, a national road.

When they went to the place of Mr. Aguilar, Dominador Salvador, Jr. and Leonardo Calvento went ahead of the group. The group walked in a regular manner, not too slow but not too fast. On their way to Mr. Aguilar's place they heard slanderous words directed at them and when they looked around to ascertain who uttered the slanderous words, stones were suddenly hurled against them. Those who hurled the stones belonged to the group of the accused Efren Mercado (t.s.n., p. 4, January 15, 1971). Emilio Fuerte who was one of those who went caroling was hit by a stone about one (1) inch in a diameter (t.s.n., p. 5, January 15, 1971) and because he was not hurt very much and, finding that the guitar which they brought along with them had a broken string, the group returned to the place of Dominador Salvador, Jr. to repair the guitar (t.s.n., p. 6, January 15, 1971). It took the deceased and his group ten (10) minutes to repair the guitar after which they proceeded to go caroling again.

Upon reaching a comer, they saw the group of the accused Efren Mercado waiting for them (t.s.n., p. 6, January 15, 1971). The group of the accused again stoned the group of the deceased and because of this, deceased (and Leonardo Calvento) approached the group of the accused to inquire from them why they were stoned (t.s.n., p. 6-7, January 15, 1971).

Deceased and Leonardo Calvento were followed by Emilio Fuerte. While Emilio Fuerte was in front of the store he saw Efren Mercado grab the deceased and gave him a thrust with his right hand. At first Leonardo Calvento who was with the deceased thought that the deceased was not stabbed but when they were leaving the place of the incident the victim stated the following words, "May tama ako," and later he saw blood on the right chest of the victim. The victim was brought to the San Juan De Dios Hospital where he died on arrival. A necropsy report was made on the victim by Dr. Roberto Garcia and the following wounds were found:

POST-MORTEM FINDINGS

Pallor, integument conjunctivae and nailbeds, stab wound, chest, right, anterior aspect, infraclavicular region, at the level of the 1st intercostal space, right, 6.5 cms. from the anterior mediam line, 1.7 cm. in size, oriented downward and laterally, edges, clean-cut, upper extremity sharp, lower extremity, contused, directed downwards, backwards, and medially, involving among other things, the soft tissues, thru the lst intercostal space, right grazing the lower order of the 1st rib, into the right thoracic cavity, perforating the upper lobe right lung, into the middle mediastinum penetrating the superior vena cava with approximate depth, 12.0 cms.

Hemothorax, right -1,920 cc.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.

Stomach - 1/2 filled with partly digested rice and food materials

CAUSE OF DEATH — Stab wound of the chest, right. ¹

The accused-appellant admits having stabbed the deceased, but claims self- defense. His account of the incident is as follows:

... It appears that in the evening of December 23, 1970, accused Efren Mercado had to go to the house of his employer, Larry Salvador, at Real Street, Las Pinas Rizal. He had two companions at the time, who were left outside when he went into the house of his employer. When he came out, his two companions complained to him that they were "napagiinitan" by a group of persons, who were later Identified to be Dominador Salvador and his "barkada." This group of Dominador Salvador threw firecrackers at the two companions of the accused. To avoid any incident, the accused told his companions to go home, and he himself went home. On the way home, he saw some persons, numbering twelve in all, chasing two other persons. He Identified the pursued persons as his two companions so he intervened and tried to stop the pursuers. The pursuers turned on the accused, attacking him with piece of chain and a piece of bamboo. To defend himself, the accused whipped out a knife and brandished it before his attackers, to frighten them. He had no intention to injure anyone, only to stop his attackers and to defend himself. After the attackers ran away, the accused proceeded home. Later, in the evening, he was brought to the police department and subsequently charged for the death of one Dominador Salvador. ²

The trial court, after analyzing the evidence, rejected the defense of the accused, because of the positive and unqualified Identification by prosecution witnesses Leonardo Calvento and Emilio Fuerte that the accused-appellant was the unlawful aggressor and slayer of the victim; and, besides, according to the trial court, the act of the appellant of running away from the scene of the crime, after the commission thereof, is "repugnant" to the appellant's claim of innocence "for if it is really true that he was forced to slay the victim to save his life, then he could have surrendered to the police authorities right after the commission of the crime or given himself to any member of the barrio council, where he is residing as is ordinarily done in urban areas." ³

We agree with the trial court that the accused-appellant has not convincingly proven his claim of self-defense. His defense is based solely upon his testimony, whereas, the version of the prosecution is supported by the testimonies of Leonardo Calvento and Emilio Fuerte both of whom were with the deceased on the night in question and witnessed the commission of the offense. It is well-settled that self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that precludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it, ⁴ and the Court has ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but, in itself, is extremely doubtful, ⁵ and cannot overcome the version of the prosecution supported by the testimony of two eye-witnesses who saw the incident. ⁶

The accused-appellant, in this appeal, assails the trial court for giving more weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses despite certain errors, inconsistencies and contradictions in their declarations.

We have examined the record of the case with great care and find no reason to set aside the findings of fact of the trial court, which are supported by documentary evidence and the testimony of witnesses who have no reason whatsoever to testify falsely against the accused-appellant. Moreover, the rule is well-settled that, where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Herein appellant failed to demonstrate that his case falls under such exception which would justify this Court to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court.

The accused-appellant further assails the trial court for denying his motion to dismiss dated 28 January 1971. The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove a prima facie case against him so that the trial court should have granted his e motion to dismiss.

The contention is not well-taken. Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to the evidence is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse thereof, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. In the instant case, the trial court, after hearing the evidence presented by the prosecution, was convinced that said evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty vis-a-vis the accused. As a matter of fact, the Court is convinced that the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the death of Dominador Salvador, Jr. even without the admission of the accused-appellant.

The crime committed, however, as pointed out by counsel for the accused- appellant and confirmed by the Solicitor General, is Homicide and not Murder. We cite with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General:

We agree that the defendant should have been convicted of Homicide instead of Murder. The circumstance alleged in the information to qualify the crime of murder is treachery. There is treachery or "alevosia" if the "offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

A perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution reveals that the stabbing incident was preceded by the "uttering of slanderous remarks and followed by stoning." (t.s.n., pp. 4-5, January 14, 1971 and t.s.n., pp. 4, 5, 6, January 15, 1971). Because of the stoning, the deceased approached the group of the accused and (t.s.n., p. 6, January 14, 1971) it was at that time when the deceased was inquiring from the group of the accused the reason why they were stoned that he (deceased) was stabbed.

The utterance of slanderous remarks followed by the stoning incident is a warning to the deceased and Ms group of the hostile attitude of the group of the appellant and these should have placed the deceased and his companions on their guard. (People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 2173; People vs. Luna, 76 Phil. 107; People vs. Sagayno, 95 SCRA 366).

Further, the prosecution evidence also discloses that the place of the wound indicated that the accused was facing the deceased. (p. 8, t.s.n., January 12, 1971)

All these circumstances negative "alevosia".

We also find merit in the submission of the accused-appellant that the trial court erred in finding that he (accused) had fled from the scene of the crime. Pat. Artemio Talampas of the Las Pinas police declared that he arrested the accused in the latter's house, which is located about 40 meters away from the scene of the stabbing incident; that the accused was at the time talking with his friends; and that when he confronted the accused with the knife, the accused readily admitted ownership, thereof, as well as his having stabbed Dominador. ⁷ These circumstances negate flight.

As recommended by the Solicitor General, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellant shall be eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. However, the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim shall be increased to P30,000.00, in line with recent decisions.

WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Penned by Judge Onofre A. Villaluz.

1 Appellee's Brief, pp. 2-5.

2 Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3.

3 Trial Court decision, p. 16, Rollo, p. 24.

4 People vs. Lebumfacil, G.R. No. L-32910, March 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 573.

5 People vs. Maranan, G.R. Nos. L-47228-32, L-46587, Dec. 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 243.

6 People vs. Empeno, G.R. No. L-27610, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 40.

7 T.S.N. of Jan. 12, 1971, pp. 17-18,