Case Digest - Banawa vs. Mirano, No. L-24750, 97 SCRA 517, May 16, 1980

Case Digest for Statutory Construction

FACTS: Defendants-appellants spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of Maria Mirano, Juliana’s niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido Punzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses wanted something for Maria after their death.

On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death she left only as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are children of the deceased’s brother.

The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba property as legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:

In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and were substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano was not legally adopted.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the instant case?

HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

People vs Dominguez, G.R. No. L-1238, October 9, 1903

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1238 October 9, 1903

THE UNITED STATES AND MANUEL PARDO, complainants-appellants,
vs.
MARCELO DOMINGUEZ, defendant-appellee.

Antonio V. Herrero for private prosecutor.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellant.
Alberto Barretto for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

We find it necessary to pass upon only one of the questions presented by the record. The appellant makes the following statement in his brief, in this court:

There is no doubt that the defendant has the character of a receiver, consequently it is his duty to return what he has received in trust. This being the case, the punishable act involved in a refusal to so return implies a damage to the depositor or his assignee, inasmuch as the latter is illegally deprived of something which belongs to him; and this refusal and damage is covered by the fifth clause of article 535 of the Penal Code.

This is not the law." The paragraph cited from the Penal Code says that the depositary shall be guilty of estafa, not if he refuses to return the thing deposited but if he denies that he ever received it. In this case the defendant has never denied that he received the rice as a deposit; on the contrary, when the demand was made upon him by the private prosecutor on December 7, 1901, he said that he had delivered it to Alejandro Cornejo a few days before the death of Borras, the bailor, by the written order of the latter. The defendant never having denied that he received the deposit, he can not be convicted unless it is proved that he had appropriated or diverted it. The mere refusal to return the article is not in itself sufficient to prove this. In addition to this refusal, there must be evidence in the case from which the court can see that the depositary has appropriated it to his own use of to that of another. There is no such evidence. On the contrary, it is entirely probable that, after the departure of the defendant from Libmanan on September 20, 1898, two days after the uprising of the civil guard in Nueva Caceres, the rice was seized by the revolutionists and appropriated to their own uses.

The brief of the appellant is devoted almost exclusively to establishing the civil liability of the defendant. With such liability we have nothing to do in this case. Whatever may be the fact in regard thereto, it is plain that no criminal liability has been proved.

The judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the private prosecutor, the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, and McDonough, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not sit in this case.

People vs Adiao, G.R. No. L-13785, October 8, 1918

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13785 October 8, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS ADIAO, defendant-appellant.

Victoriano Yamzon for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with the crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he was found guilty of the crime of frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The sole error assigned on appeal is that the lower court erred in holding that the defendant was guilty of the crime of theft as dis closed by the facts appearing of record. We have examined the evidence carefully and from our study are unable to say that the proof is contrary to the findings of the lower court. Stated in one sentence, the defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese named T. Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees.

Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime can not properly be classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment crime of theft. The fact that the defendant was under observation during the entire transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain are in point:

The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but sometime later. The court said: ". . . The trial court did not err . . . in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)

Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while the defendant was still inside the church, the offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court said that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)

The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the case took a small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and then placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards who were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said: " . . . The accused . . . having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where it had been, and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)

There exists the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position. Wherefore, in view of the provisions of articles 517 and 518, No. 5, of the Penal Code, and there being present one aggravating circumstance compensated by no mitigating circumstances, the penalty must be imposed in the maximum degree.

Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant is sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances against him. The merchandise in question, attached to the record as Exhibit A, shall be returned to the lawful owner, T. Murakami. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.