Lee vs. Court of Appeals

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118387.  October 11, 2001

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862.  The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers.  One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng.  The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.

Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners).  On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion.  On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.

Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931.  Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.

Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan.  She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng’s mistress.  As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners.  They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in.  All was well, therefore, before private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.

The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng’s demise on May 9, 1989.  Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng’s death that was to be published in the newspapers.  It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents’ curiosity, if not suspicion.7

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter.  After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following:

1. As per Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was “GRAVIDA I, PARA I” which means “first pregnancy, first live birth delivery” (refer to:  MASTER PATIENT’S RECORDS SUMMARY – Annex I).  Also, the age of the mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG’s age was then already 38 years old.  The address used by their father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila).  The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.

2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-2).  Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.

3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG’s 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4).  As per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.

4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11th child.  Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in the records.  If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.

Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old.  Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that impossible age.

5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG.  Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG’S true age at that time was 45 years old.

6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant’s allegation, she was born at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.

7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.

8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old.  However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old.  Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO’s birth on 11 May 1950.  KEH SHIOK CHENG’s age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIO’s birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age.  As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO’s birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.

In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:

10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.  Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future.  The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions - SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 - on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.9

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course.  Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the City Hall of Manila.

Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.

Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:

It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was published in “Media Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the “Media Update” published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor General,  City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case. 

x x x x x x x x x.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.  Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.13

Finding no merit in petitioners’ arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15

Hence, this petition.

I. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners’ mother changed from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who is a completely different person.  What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.”16 Petitioners thus label private respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Debunking petitioners’ above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:

x x x x x x x x x.

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment x x x, the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right.  Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.17

x x x x x x x x x.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.  Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children.  There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.19

Further sanctioning private respondents’ resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner’s minor children as stated in their records of birth from “Chinese” to “Filipino”, and “legitimate” to “illegitimate”, respectively.  Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.  Thus we held:

“Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

‘SEC. 3. Parties. -  When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.’

‘SEC. 4.  Notice and publication. -  Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.  The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.’

‘SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.’

“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.  Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.  The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as “summary”.  There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.”22 (Underscoring supplied.)

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.

We agree.  As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.  In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.  In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein.  Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions.  A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.23 (Underscoring supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower court’s order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.

We explained in this wise:

“x x x. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

“In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.  Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents.  They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby.  All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.

x x x x x x x x x.

“The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from ‘legitimate’ to ‘illegitimate’.  Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.  The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.  Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules ‘shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.’  If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights.  This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.”31 (Underscoring supplied).

Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register.  The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.  Thus:

“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake.  However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.  Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. x x x.”33 (Underscoring supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion.  But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary.  One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se.  Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3).  The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5).  Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.  It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.  The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child.  We ruled thus:

“This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals.  In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor.  He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the “non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage.” In debunking the trial court’s ruling granting such petition, the Court held as follows:

‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding “marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose.  However, it is not as simple as it looks.  Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage.  A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’

‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’

‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’ 

“Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as in Sarah Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.”39

It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.

The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.  The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:

“x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.  If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected.  If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.  Such action can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties.  This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.”41

This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said that:

“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register.  Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.’  If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”43 (Underscoring supplied).

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like.  Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues.  Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.

First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

“No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.”

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order.  As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and “changed”. In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set right”; “to remove the faults or errors from”44 while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute”.45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have.  Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412.  What are the entries in the civil register?  We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.

“Art. 407.  Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.”

“Art. 408.  The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.”

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality.  Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous.  This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.”

The above law speaks clearly.  Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general.  The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.  Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.  This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind.  For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is.  Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding.  Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application.  Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.

II.  The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death.48

Article 171 provides:

“The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

“(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

“(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

“(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.”

Petitioners’ contention is without merit.

In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births.  We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50

We likewise held therein that:

“x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case.  A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child.  The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.  The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner.  In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all. x x x.”51

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:

“Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.

x x x x x x x x x.

“A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.  Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.  Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.  Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.  Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.  For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.  Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.  Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:

‘Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken.  This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy.  It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.  They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all.  Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.’”53

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents’ cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.54

We disagree.  As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:

“Art. 1149.  All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.”

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.  It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.55

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action.  The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago.  Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right of action or right to sue accrued.  However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date.  This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate.  It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents’ suspicions were aroused and confirmed.  From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners’ birth records in 1989.  Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners’ thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world.  Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water.  Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by prescription.  One is either born of a particular mother or not.  It is that simple.

IV.  Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping.  They enumerate the other actions filed by private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:

(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal and against defendants as alleged accessories;

(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and

(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate.57

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan.  They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.58

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for.  The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners’ birth records.  Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng’s naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents’ right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother’s estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Ninal vs. Bayadog

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. 

D E C I S I O N

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death.1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)7 in relation to Article 58.8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.17 The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" 

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. 

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Scä juris

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Lao vs. Dee Tim

GRN  21017  February 25, 1924

In re estate of JOSE YAP SIONG, deceased. MARIA LAO and JOSE LAO, petitioners and appellees, vs. DEE TIM, YAP Kim TING, YAP Kim SENG, and YAP HU CHO, respondents, and appellants.

1. MARRIAGES BY CHINESE PERSONS IN CHINA.-A marriage ceremony performed in China will be sustained in this jurisdiction when it is proved that the ceremony took place in accordance with the laws and customs of China. When the marriage has been thus celebrated, it will be held to be legal and valid. The proof, however, must be clear and convincing.

2. MARRIAGE,; MARRIAGE OF ONE MAN TO TWO WOMEN.-When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children, and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. A woman who is deceived by a man, who represents himself as a single man, and who marries him, she and her children are entitled to all the rights of legitimate wife and children.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Guevara, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Salvador Barrios and Gabino S. Abaya for appellants.

Felix B. Bautista and Jose Gutierrez David for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in the municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1) and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.

Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap Siong were joined in holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.

In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a great deal of proof was presented. Exhibits I and 1-A, certificates of marriage, were presented to show that she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number of other documents (Exhibits 9 to 13) were presented to show that Yap Siong had admitted that he was a married man. Exhibits 14 to 17 were presented for the purpose of proving that Yap Siong had admitted in a public document that Maria Lao was his wife.

The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof to show that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong, lawfully joined to him in holy wedlock in China on the 14th day of September, 1893. To support that contention she presented what she contended was a certificate of marriage, marked Exhibit A-Exhibit A-1. She contended that Exhibit A was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of 52 years of age, swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China, and that Exhibit A was the ordinary and customary document issued to prove that the ceremony of marriage had taken place. He described in detail the ceremony of marriage performed in accordance with the customs and practice in China.

Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age and a lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the manner and form in which they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual proof or certificate issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had taken place. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual and ordinary proof, or certificate, if it may be called a certificate, issued to show that a marriage ceremony had been performed between the persons mentioned therein. Mr. Ty Cong Ting was, at the time he declared as a witness, the legal attorney of the Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila.

The respondent Dee Tim presented several witnesses who confirmed her contention that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong and that her three children Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children, born of her marriage with Yap Siong. To further sustain her contention she presented Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J, documents in which Yap Siong had expressly recognized his marriage to her.

To overcome the proof adduced by Dee Tim in support of her marriage to Yap Siong, the petitioner presented Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Said exhibits are alleged letters supposed to have been written by an uncle in China of Yap Siong during the years 1900 to 1906, urging him to return to China for the purpose of marrying, thus attempting to establish the fact that Yap Siong during that period was not a married man. When we first studied the record in this case we were inclined to give said letters great credit, but upon a further examination of the record and a further argument by the respective parties, we are now inclined to believe that said letters were fabricated for the very purpose of defeating the contention of Dee Tim. They were not identified properly by persons who had reason to know that they were genuine in character and were actually prepared in China and sent to Yap Siong in the Philippine Islands. We are of the opinion, and we believe that was the real opinion of the trial court, that said exhibits should not be admitted as proof to sustain the fact for which they were presented. We are now persuaded that said letters are pure fabrications.

The petitioner further presents two or three witnesses for the purpose of showing that the marriage between Dee Tim and Yap Siong never took place for the reason that Yap Siong was in the Philippine Islands on the 14th day of September, 1893, and that at that time he was living in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province of Pampanga, and that he never left that municipailty. A careful reading of their testimony, however, does not convince us that it is altogether reliable. The testimony which they gave was given in the month of January, 1923, and they testified positively as to exact dates, times, and places in the year 1897. Their testimony contains no facts, or data, or peculiar circumstances or conditions which caused them to remember the particular facts concerning which they testified. They gave no reason why they were able to remember the exact whereabouts of Yap Siong during the period to which their testimony referred. Upon the contrary there is much proof in the record that Yap Siong returned to China a number of times after his first arrival here. The petitioner further presents some proof to show that Yap Siong had admitted on several occasions that Dee Tim was his querida and not his wife.

The respondents further attempted to show that Maria Lao and Jose Lao, her son, were not the legitimate wife and son of Yap Siong, by presenting Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit L is the baptismal certificate issued by the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles, in which it is made to appear that on the 5th day of January, 1904, he baptized a child named Jose Martin, a natural son of Maria Lao, and whose father was unknown. Exhibit LL is a certificate of birth issued by the secretary of the municipality of Angeles, in which it appears that Jose Martin Lao, a child, was born on the first day of January, 1904, a natural son of Maria Lao. There is nothing, however, in Exhibits L or LL, which shows that Maria Lao was responsible for the facts which they contain. Exhibit LL contains the statement that the facts therein were not obtained from Maria Lao but from one Isabelo Lao.

There is a notable conflict between Exhibits L and 7LL. Exhibit LL certifies that Jose Martin Lao was born on the first day of January, 1904, while Exhibit L certifies that the baptism took place on the 5th day of January, 1904, and that the child was then 34 days old. It is apparent therefore that the facts stated in one or the other of said exhibits are untrue. And, moreover, when we consider the customs of the Filipino people in their relation with the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, it is easily understood, in view of the alleged fact that Maria Lao and Yap Siong had been joined in holy matrimony under the forms of the Protestant Church, why the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles stated in his certifi. cate that the father of the child, then Jose Martin, was unknown.

The respondents further attempted to show that Yap Siong and Maria Lao had never been joined legally in holy wedlock, by the testimony of a number of witnesses to the fact that Yap Siong had on numerous occasions asserted that Maria Lao was his querida only. It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions, depending upon his interest and convenience at the particular time, state that Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for the same reason, that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the information, that he was married to each of said women, from coming to the knowledge of the other, which, as the facts show, he was quite able to do, until he had passed to that bourn from which none returns, and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary.

From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the record, we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence shows the following:

(1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance with the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children born of that wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the fact that Yap Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born of that wedlock; and that they had, no reason to believe, until after the death of Yap Siong, that he was legally married to the petitioner herein.

(2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June, 1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man, without any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose Lao is the legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao.

In other words, we are fully convinced that a preponderance of the evidence shows that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing that each was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his double marriage. They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other.

Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between the two families? Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title .13, partida 4), where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U. S., 553.)

A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as single and who marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. To remedy that hardship under the common law and following the wise jurisprudence of Spain, both England and many of the states of the United States adopted statutes. (Glass vs. Glass, 114 Mass., 563; Spicer vs. Spicer, 16 Abbot's Practice [N. SJ, 114; Dyer vs. Brannock, 66 Mo., 39]; Graham vs. Bennet, 2 Cal., 503; Smith vs. Smith, I Tex., 621 [46 Am. Dec., 121]; Clendenning vs. Clendenning, 7 Martin [La.], 587; Patton vs. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann., 98; Abston vs. Abston, 15 La. Ann., 137; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U. S., 553; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 38 U. S., 404; Estate of Navarro, 24 La. Ann., 298; In re Taylor, 39 La. Ann., 823.)

The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the decision of this court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the reason that in each of said cases a preponderance of the evidence showed that no legal marriage had been performed in China, that is, that the alleged Chinese wife and the deceased in each of those cases had never been legally married.

Therefore the conclusion reached in the decision heretofore announced by this court in the present case is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be revoked and that the estate of Yap Siong be divided equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao, and the other one-half to Dee Tim and her three children. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed. 

Family Code of tthe Philippines

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES July 6, 1987

I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and promulgate the Family Code of the Philippines, as follows:
TITLE I MARRIAGE Chapter 1. Requisites of Marriage
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a)

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)

Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)

Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a)

Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

(1) Full name of the contracting party;

(2) Place of birth;

(3) Age and date of birth;

(4) Civil status;

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

(6) Present residence and citizenship;

(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;

(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;

(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and

(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.

The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. (59a)

Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.

If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality.

The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age. (60a)

Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.

In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse. (61a)

Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a)

Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a)

Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.

Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)

Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication. (63a)

Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a)

Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a)chan robles virtual law library

Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a)

Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.

Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)

Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also state:

(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;

(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;

(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;

(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;

(5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases;

(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and

(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n)

Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary. (n)

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Chapter 2. Marriages Exempted from License Requirement
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (75a)

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a)

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)

Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)

Chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:

(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage. (87a)

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n)

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.chan robles virtual law library

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

TITLE II LEGAL SEPARATION
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:

(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;

(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;

(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;

(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;

(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or

(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)

Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)

Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)

Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a)

Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)

Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. (105a)

Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;

(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)

Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.

The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final. (107a)

Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)

Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:

(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and

(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.

The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)

Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:

(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;

(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and

(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.

The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.

The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)

TITLE III RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper; and

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)
TITLE IV PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE Chapter 1. General Provisions
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(3) By the local custom. (118)

Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a)

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. (121)

Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties. (122a)

Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a)

Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. (123a)

Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.

This rule shall not apply:

(1) Where both spouses are aliens;

(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and

(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a)

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a)
Chapter 2. Donations by Reason of Marriage
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. (126)

Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles. (127a)

Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void.

Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills. (130a)

Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a)

Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:

(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;

(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;

(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;

(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;

(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;

(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general. (132a)

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a)
Chapter 3. System of Absolute Community Section 1. General Provisions
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a)

Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property.

When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a)

Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n)

Section 2. What Constitutes Community Property
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;

(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)

Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160) chan robles virtual law library
Section 3. Charges and Obligations of the Absolute Community
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;

(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and

(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.

If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)

Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. (164a)
Section 4. Ownership, Administrative, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)

Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n)

Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (n)

Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)

Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:

(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;

(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;

(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)

Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n)

Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)

Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a)

Chapter 4. Conjugal Partnership of Gains Section 1. General Provisions
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)

Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. (n)

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. (147a)

Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. (148a)

Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.

Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located. (137a, 168a, 169a)

Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same. (n)

Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse. (n)

Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper. (150a)

Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of gains. (151a)

Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. (n)

Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;

(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;

(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;

(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and

(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. (153a, 154a, 155, 159)

Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. (n)

Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a)

Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:

When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.

In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. (158a)

Section 4. Charges Upon and Obligations of the Conjugal Partnership
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)

Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property. (164a)

Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (174a)

Section 6. Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)

Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:

(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;

(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;

(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)

Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a)

Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and Liabilities
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.

(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.

(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.

(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.

(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.

(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.

(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a)

Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)

Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a)

Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a)

Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. (188a)

Chapter 5. Separation of Property of the Spouses and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse During the Marriage
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a)

Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties.

All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)

Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code.

During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a)

Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. (191a)

Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property. (193a)

Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors. (194a)

Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances:

(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;

(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;

(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration;

(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other;

(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof;

(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or

(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted.

The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. (195a)

Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse:

(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;

(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;

(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or

(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case.

If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n)
Chapter 6. Regime of Separation of Property
Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory. (212a)

Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a)

Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. (214a)

Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.chan robles virtual law library

The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (215a)

Chapter 7. Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)

TITLE V THE FAMILY Chapter 1. The Family as an Institution
Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a)

Art. 50. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a)

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)

Chapter 2. The Family Home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a)

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)

Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property.

Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (227a, 228a)

Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (231a)

Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (235a)

Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a)

Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)

Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)

Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)

TITLE VI PATERNITY AND FILIATION Chapter 1. Legitimate Children
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)

Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n)

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or

(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)

Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)

Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a)

Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a)

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;

(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and

(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. (264a)

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)

Chapter 4. Legitimated Children
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. (269a)

Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a)chan robles virtual law library

Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)

Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)

Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (274)

Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. (275a)

TITLE VII ADOPTION
Art. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family.

Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title.

In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to be adopted. (27a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;

(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(3) An alien, except:


(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, E. O. and PD 603)

Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority.

(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and

(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over,

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;

(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;

(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and

(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (31a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a, PD 603)

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the adopters.

(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters;

(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)

Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted is at least eighteen years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant. (40a, PD 603)

Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:

(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or

(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, PD 603)

Art. 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both.

Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.

The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. (42a, PD 603)

TITLE VIII SUPPORT
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)

Art. 105. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (291a)

Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership. (n)

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.

However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.

When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)

Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)

Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. (297a)chan robles virtual law library

Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.

Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a)

Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)

Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)

Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)

Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.

Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n)

TITLE IX PARENTAL AUTHORITY Chapter 1. General Provisions
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)

Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a) chan robles virtual law library

Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)

Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)

Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )

Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires. (317)

Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.

However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)

Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.

The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)

Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.

The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)

Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)

Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:

(1) Upon the death of the parents;

(2) Upon the death of the child; or

(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:

(1) Upon adoption of the child;

(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;

(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;

(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or

(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a)

Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)

Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:

(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;

(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;

(3) Compels the child to beg; or

(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.

If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances.

The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)

Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)

Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

TITLE X EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years.

Emancipation also takes place:

(1) By the marriage of the minor; or

(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. (397a, 398a, 400a, 401a)

Art. 235. The provisions governing emancipation by recorded agreement shall also apply to an orphan minor and the person exercising parental authority but the agreement must be approved by the court before it is recorded. (n)

Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a)

Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the parental authority over the minor but shall not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of the final judgment in the Civil Register. (n)

TITLE XI SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW Chapter 1. Prefatory Provisions
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. (n)
Chapter 2. Separation in Fact
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.

The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)

Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. (n)

Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses resides. (n)

Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n)

Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings. (n)

Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n)

Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n)

Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n)

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (n)

Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed by these rules. (n)

Chapter 3. Incidents Involving Parental Authority
Art. 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be verified. (n)

Art. 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides. (n)

Art. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals, entities or institutions exercising parental authority over the child. (n)

Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are applicable. (n)

Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings
Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n)
TITLE XII FINAL PROVISIONS
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Art. 257. This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President.

Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.