Baking vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-30364, July 28, 1969

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30364 July 28, 1969

ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-30603 July 28, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, RAMON ESPIRITU, FEDERICO R. MACLANG, FEDERICO BAUTISTA, ONOFRE MANGILA and CESARIO TORRES, petitioners.

Jovito R. Salonga and Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez.
Juan T. David for petitioners Jose Lava, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Solicitors Eduardo C. Abaya and Vicente A. Torres for respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Before us for resolution are two identical petitions for habeas corpus filed by petitioners: (1) Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez in L-30364; and (2) Jose Lava, Ramon Espiritu, Federico R. Maclang, Federico Bautista, Onofre Mangila, and Cesario Torres in L-30603.

Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava, et al., G.R. Nos. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has since become final.

Previously, on March 31, 1969, petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez registered their petition for habeas corpus in G.R. No. L-30364, one of the cases at bar. They claimed that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial. On May 24, 1969, after this Court rendered its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of rebellion, Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez filed a motion for early decision of their petition for habeas corpus and for their immediate release, based primarily upon an averment similar to the other petition for habeas corpus before us in L-30603, filed on June 17, 1969.

The present thrust of the two petitions is that petitioners should now be released because they have already served the ten (10) year sentences meted out to them. They give as reasons:

First. Petitioners have been detained in prison pending the decision of their cases for more than eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months. By Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, ¹ one-half of their preventive imprisonment is to be deducted from their sentence. In other words, they are already credited with more than nine (9) years and three (3) months, representing one-half of eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months. This is not disputed.²

Second. Petitioners would go farther and claim for themselves benefits accorded by Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code granting time allowance for good conduct. Petitioners would apply said Article 97 through all the time of their detention period of over eighteen years.

We directed respondent Director of Prisons to produce before us the bodies of the petitioners. He did. In his return, thru the Solicitor General, he balks vehemently at the application of Article 97 to petitioners' case.

After hearing and submission of memoranda, the present cases are now up for decision.

1. The key problem that now confronts us in the two petitions at bar is whether or not Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to detention prisoners. Said provision of law in its English version reads:

ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:

1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior; .

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior; .

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.

Petitioners who have been detention prisoners prior to the finality of this Court's judgment of May 16, 1969, lay heavy stress on the phrase "any prisoner" in the English text of Article 97. In asking that the provision be made to apply to them when they were still detention prisoners, they say that the law does not distinguish between a prisoner who is serving sentence and decision prisoner.

The Spanish text of Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 97. Abono de tiempo por buena conducto. — La buena conducta, observada por el penado en cualquier establiciemento penal le hara acreedor a las siguientes reducciones del tiempo de su condena.

1.a Cinco dias cada mes de buena conducta durante los dos primeros años de privacion de libertad;

2.a Ocho dias por mes durante los años tercero al quinto inclusive;

3.a Diez dias por mes, durante los demas años hasta el decimo inclusive; y

4.a Quince dias por mes desde el undecimo en adelante.

It must be stated that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. ³ The term "any prisoner" in the Spanish text is "el penado." Who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final judgment. For, "el penado" means a "delincuente condenado a una peña." ⁴ There is thus no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention prisoners within its reach. Because it speaks of the buena conducta observada por el penado — not one under "prision preventiva." The allowance for good conduct "for each month of good behavior" then unquestionably refers to good behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict and not otherwise.

Indeed, under Article 24 (1), Revised Penal Code, the arrest and temporary detention of accused persons are not considered as penalties. By necessary implication from the statutory scheme of the Revised Penal Code, especially Article 28 thereof, ⁵ the service of a sentence of one in prison begins only on the day the judgment of conviction becomes final.

More to this. While Article 97 talks of "any prisoner" in the English text, it speaks, however, of that prisoner as being entitled to deductions for good conduct allowances "from the period of his sentence" ("del tiempo de su condena"). An accurate reading, therefore, of the provision yields the plain implication that the prisoner concerned is one who already has a sentence clamped upon him, i.e., a definite sentence by final judgment. The term "any prisoner" should thus be limited to those convicted by final judgment. This is the import of the law as written.

2. And then, there is the familiar precept that a codal provision is not to be interpreted in isolation. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that a code, such as the Revised Penal Code, should be construed as a whole. Courts are duty-bound to harmonize the various provisions thereof. The rule we should go by is that "a code enacted as a single comprehensive statute, is to be considered as such, and not as a series of disconnnected articles or statutes." ⁶

The reason why we now take stock of the foregoing rule is that we find in the same Revised Penal Code, Article 94, which provides as follows:

ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1äwphï1.ñët

1. By conditional pardon;

2. By commutation of the sentence; and

3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.⁷

As originally written in Spanish, this article reads:

ART. 94. Como se extingue parcialmente la responsabilidad penal. — La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente: .

1.o Por indulto condicional;

2.o Por conmutacion de la sentencia; y

3.o Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.

By the above provision, good conduct allowances are given only to the culprit who earns the same "while he is serving his sentence" ("el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia"). ⁸ What is crystal clear in Article 94 then is that good conduct allowances are awarded only to those who are serving their sentences. Petitioners, as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be said to be serving sentence during the period of their preventive imprisonment. And this, even in the face of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code which reduces petitioners' respective sentences by one-half of their preventive imprisonment. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Article 29 merely credits said time [of one-half of the preventive imprisonment] to convicts by final judgment. Said article does not in any way imply that detention prisoners, thereafter convicted by final judgment, have been serving sentence during their detention period.

So it is, that Article 97 is to be read in conjunction with Article 94 which, under the circumstances, should likewise be deemed to give meaning to the term "any prisoner" in Article 97. Article 94 above-quoted, we must say, is embraced in the same chapter of the Revised Penal Code as Article 97 relied upon by petitioners. Both of them are in Book One, Title Four, Chapter Two, entitled "PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY", the very same heading of Article 94. And Article 94 appears to be the lead article of Chapter Two, because it talks in general terms of everything contained in said Chapter Two. To elaborate, Article 95 speaks of conditional pardon, provided in Article 94(1); Article 96 deals with commutation of sentence, mentioned in Article 94(2); and Articles 97, 98 and 99 (the rest of the Chapter) refer to good conduct allowances treated by Article 94(3). Obvious from all these is that it is from Article 94(3) that Articles 97 (the provision under interpretation), 98 and 99 should take their bearings. And it says — we repeat — that: "La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente: ... 3.o Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.

Our view on the meaning of Article 97 gets a tremendous lift from Article 98 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:

ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.⁹

While Article 98 also contains the phrase "any prisoner" (translated from the Spanish text which uses the words "los penados"), it is clear that this phrase is confined to convicts who have "evaded the service of [their] sentence" ("que quebrantaren su sentencia").

The position we here take is not without jurisprudential support. In People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122, the accused was convicted of abduction and sentenced to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. After having served 8 years, 1 month and 17 days, he was pardoned "on condition that he should not again be found guilty of any crime." He left unserved 6 years, 6 months and 14 days. Subsequently, he was prosecuted, tried, found guilty of another crime — attempted robbery in band with physical injuries — and sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. He was thereafter charged with a violation of the condition of his pardon. After trial, he was adjudged guilty and sentenced "to suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon namely, six years, six months and fourteen days." In upholding that judgment of conviction on appeal, this Court, amongst others, said: "The appellant's contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of time provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in consideration of the good conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence." ¹⁰

We accordingly hold that, by a consideration of the terms of Article 97 alone, and also in conjunction with other parts of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase "any prisoner" in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as referring only to a prisoner serving sentence.

3. A formidable argument against the tenability of petitioners' plea is Section 5 of Act 1533 of the Philippine Commission (enacted on August 30, 1906), the old law "providing for the diminution of sentences ... in consideration of good conduct and diligence." Section 5 of said Act 1533 reads:

SEC. 5. Detention prisoners who voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them shall be entitled to a credit in accordance with the provisions of this Act, which shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction.¹¹

This provision of law, it must be said, still subsists. The repealing clause of the Revised Penal Code, Article 367 thereof, expressly abrogated Sections 1, 2 and 6 only of Act 1533. Section 5 thereof must therefore be deemed to form part of the present law on good conduct allowances.

By Section 5 just transcribed, detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances it they "voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them." In which case, the credit they receive "shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction." This is the sole exception to the rule that only those serving sentence shall be entitled to good conduct allowances. If detention prisoners do not follow the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533, they cannot earn credit for good conduct.

In the cases before us, there is not as much as an intimation that petitioners have voluntarily offered in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told us that they worked during the period of their preventive imprisonment. The burden to show that the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533 has been met, is certainly upon petitioners. They have not discharged this burden. It is thus our firm conclusion that they cannot avail of the benefits granted to detention prisoners under Section 5 of Act 1533.

Upon the law we read it, petitioners' remedy is not with this Court. The law is the law. We cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation. Under our system of government, we may not tread on forbidden grounds; we cannot rewrite the law. This is the function of Congress. ¹²

For the reasons given, the petitions herein to set petitioners at liberty are hereby denied. No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Castro, Barredo and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

With regret and with due recognition of the merit inherent in Justice Sanchez' ably written opinion viewed from the approach pursued, I find myself unable to concur. Hence these few words of dissent.

My starting point is the fundamental postulate under our system of government that the Constitution as the supreme law cannot be ignored or disregarded but instead imperatively calls for application to the facts as ascertained in every appropriate case or proceeding. ¹ It is on such an overriding principle, as a matter of fact, that the power of judicial review rests, enabling the courts to pass upon and, if necessary, annul legislative or executive acts. ² The decisive question for me then is whether on the admitted facts the Constitution requires that these two petitions for habeas corpus prosper? I would answer in the affirmative.

According to the opinion of Justice Sanchez: "Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava, et al., G.R. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has since become final." As a result petitioners, still under confinement, sought the remedy of habeas corpus.

It may be well to recall the broad, well-nigh illimitable reach of this great writ of liberty. So it was affirmed in one of the truly outstanding opinions of Justice Malcolm, Villavicencio v. Lukban. ³ As was there stated: "The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." ⁴ Textwriters are similarly agreed on its importance and significance. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." ⁵ Willoughby, not to be outdone, referred to it as "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." ⁶ Burdick considered it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." ⁷ Fraenkel in stressing its importance, said "that without it, much else would be of no avail." ⁸

To give the writ of habeas corpus then its full, all-encompassing scope, I would not limit our inquiry to the particular ground or grounds invoked by petitioners. If our function were thus limited, there is much to be said as earlier intended for the conclusion reached by the Court. The statutory reliance appears to be inadequate. I would not think, however, that in discharge of this function, perhaps second to none in the catalogue of judicial responsibility, we should thus be circumscribed. If it were so, the effect might very well be to dilute this great writ of much of its significance.

Instead, the decisive question for me is whether the admitted fact of continued detention for more than eighteen years, after the penalty had been reduced to ten years imprisonment, constitutes a denial of liberty without due process. That the Constitution prohibits. The historic role of due process as a safeguard of freedom cannot be sufficiently stressed. It bears repeating that freedom is the rule and restraint the exception. The eloquent language of the Chief Justice Concepcion in People v. Hernandez ⁹ comes to mind: "Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom."

Considering that one stark fact emerges in all its significance, the continued imprisonment of petitioners after eighteen years, notwithstanding a reduction in their penalty to ten years, I view the matter as a grave infraction of the due process clause. This is not to lose sight of the distinction between their preventive detention and their imprisonment after final judgment. Realistically viewed, however, they have been denied and continue to be denied their liberty for more than eighteen years. The loss of freedom is no less real, the affliction no less severe by whatever name such incarceration is called. I find it difficult to believe that the Constitution affords no protection just because previous to the finality of our decision, the confinement may be characterized as other than serving the penalty imposed. To the person undergoing such a deprivation, the characterization as to the nature of the detention is without significance.

To go back then to what for me is the decisive question, is there a violation of the due process guaranty? I am inclined to think so. As far back as 1924, we made clear that due process is a safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of power. ¹⁰ That is a concept that has an ancient lineage traceable as it is to an 1819 United States Supreme Court decision. ¹¹ We have time and time again identified due process with responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. That is to rule out oppressiveness and avoid unfairness. If an official action were marred by the absence of fair play, then no fealty is shown this cardinal precept. ¹²

I cannot help but entertain the conviction that to continue the incarceration of these petitioners who all this while for a period longer than the penalties imposed on them have been deprived of their freedom is to commit an affront against the rudimentary requirement of fairness and of justice, which the due process clause is intended to secure. Hence, my inability to concur in the decision reached by the Court.

There is this additional matter to consider. According to the opinion of Justice Sanchez: "Upon the law as we read it, petitioners' remedy is not with this Court. The law is the law. We cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation. Under our system of government, we may not tread on forbidden grounds: we cannot rewrite the law. This is the function of Congress."

As a statement of a general proposition, the above excerpt can be admitted unqualifiedly. It is to its applicability to the situation before us that I beg to differ. What is involved is liberty, and on that issue it is the theory of our constitutional regime, confirmed by constant and uninterrupted practice that the role thrust upon the judiciary is far from modest. As a matter of fact, the courts are called upon to assure that in each and every appropriate legal proceeding, and habeas corpus is the remedy most suitable for the purpose, the claims of freedom must be given the utmost sympathy and accorded priority. Otherwise, the judiciary runs the risk of failing to live up to the exacting responsibility that is peculiarly its own.

It could be argued to the contrary that the force of what I just affirmed is blunted by a specific provision of the Revised Penal Code. ¹³ It reads: "Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the services of their sentences consisting of deprivation of liberty, with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, ..." On its face, it does appear to stand in the way of yielding full assent to the view that petitioners' plea for liberty is solidly buttressed by the imperative requirement of the due process guaranty.

I am not convinced that it poses such an insurmountable obstacle. It is to be remembered that the reduction of the penalty to ten years from the much more severe life sentence imposed by the lower court resulted from our finding that there was a grossly mistaken assumption on the part of the prosecution as to the existence of such a complex offense of rebellion with other crimes. Certainly, it does appear arbitrary for the petitioners to be made to suffer further for the error thus incurred. Also, the final disposition of the cases against them did consume a protracted period of time. It could very well be that they were in part to blame for such delay, not to mention other fortuitous causes. At any rate, it is undeniable that another arbitrary aspect would be imparted to the proceeding against petitioners, if after all this while it is held that they had not as yet fully served a ten-year sentence after the lapse of eighteen years. The due process mandate, it would seem to me, would be ignored if on the above considerations it is not given controlling force entitling petitioners to the remedy now sought.

I would add the further observation that the constitutional infirmity of the above Revised Penal Code provision is rather apparent manifesting as it does so little regard for the equal protection clause in general and repugnant as it is to the due process safeguard in the matter under consideration. Not that there is any need as I see it for such a declaration of nullity. It suffices, as we had occasion to do in other litigations, to declare it inapplicable considering that the constitutional safeguard of due process is undoubtedly the higher law and takes precedence. The undeniable facts of record leave such conclusion inescapable. If necessary, however, from and after November 15, 1935, the effectivity of our Constitution, I would consider such Revised Penal Code provision, dating back to January 1, 1932, inoperative, as we did in at least two cases, ¹⁴ in view of its contrariety and repugnance to the regime of liberty and equal protection enshrined in the fundamental law.

The foregoing consideration appear to me decisive and compel me to reach a result at variance with that reached by the Court.

Footnotes

¹ART. 29. One-half of the period of the preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentences consisting of deprivation of liberty, with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily;

3. When they have been convicted of robbery, theft, estafa malversation of public funds, falsification, vagrancy, or prostitution.

²Petitioners claimed in a previous petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No. L-28151) that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional. Petitioners moved to withdraw that petition on the ground that the petition had become moot and academic, which motion was granted by this Court on June 19, 1969.

³People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172, 174, citing People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665, 668.

⁴Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimoctava ed. (1956), pag. 1002. See also: Spanish-English Dictionary by Velasquez (1942), pag. 489.

⁵The first paragraph of Article 28, in its English and Spanish versions, reads:

ART 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 28. Modo de computer las peñas. — Cuando el culpable estuviese preso, la duracion de las peñas temporales empezara a contarse desde el dia en que la sentencia condenatoria hubiere quedado firme.

x x x x x x x x x

⁶Crawford, Statutory Construction, 1940 ed., p. 669, citing cases.

⁷Emphasis supplied.

⁸"Reo" in Spanish may mean: "Criminoso, culpado or "Persona que por haber cometido una culpa merece castigo." Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimoctava ed. (1956), pag. 1130.

⁹Emphasis supplied. The Spanish text reads:

ART. 98. Abono especial de tiempo por lealtad. — A los penados que quebrantaren su sentencia en las circumstancias previstas en el articulo 158 de este Codigo, y se entregaren a la autoridad dentro de las 48 horas siguientes a la proclama del cese de la calamidad a que se refiere dicho articulo, se les condera un abono de una quintaparte de su condena.

¹⁰At p. 125; emphasis supplied. See also. People vs. Tapel, 64 Phil. 112, 114; Alvarado vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 157, 158 (1959).

¹¹Emphasis supplied. The "credit" mentioned in Sec. 5, Act 1533, appears in Section 1 thereof, which reads:

SECTION 1. Each convict who is sentenced for a definite term of more than thirty days and less than life shall be entitled to diminish the period of his sentence under the following rules and regulations:

(a) For each full month, commencing with the first day of his arrival at a provincial or Insular jail or prison, during which he has not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been assigned to him, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days from the period of his sentence.

(b) After he has served two full years of a sentence, the deduction shall be eight days for each month thereafter.

(c) After he has served five full years of a sentence, the deduction shall be ten days for each month thereafter.

(d) After he has served ten full years of his sentence, the deduction from his term shall be fifteen days for each month thereafter.

This was supplanted by Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code.

¹²The present Article 33 of the Penal Code of Spain reads:

ART 33. El tiempo de prision preventiva sufrida por el delincuente durante la tramitacion de la causa, se abonara en su totalidad para el cumplimiento de la condena, cualquiera que sea la clase de la peña impuesta. (Redaccion de 1944: (Ripolles, Codigo Penal, Tomo 1, pag. 338).

FERNANDO, J.: dissenting:

¹Cf. Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, pp. 10-16 (1960).

²Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

³39 Phil. 778 (1919).

⁴Ibid., p. 788.

⁵2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 709 (1927).

⁶3 Willoughby, on the Constitution 1612 (1929).

⁷Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 27 (1922).

⁸Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties 6 (1944).

⁹99 Phil. 515, 551-552 (1956).

¹⁰Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23 (1924).

¹¹Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat 235, 244. Cf. "As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitution of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice."

¹²Cf. Victorias Milling Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-25665, May 22, 1969.

¹³Article 29.

¹⁴People v. Liñsangan, 62 Phil. 646 (1935); De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950).

Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-14284 -14285, February 24, 1960

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285 February 24, 1960

WILLIAM POMEROY and CELIA MARIANO POMEROY, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE SUPERINTENDENT OF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN, respondents-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot, Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Pacific P. de Castro for appellants.
Cipriano Manansala for appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by the state from a decision of the Court First Instance of Rizal in habeas corpus proceedings instituted by William Pomeroy and his wife Celia Mariano, directing that both prisoners be released from custody.

On June 7, 1952, William Pomeroy and Celia Mariano were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 19166) with the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery committed in pursuance of the rebellion. Arraigned on June 18, 1952, the accused entered a plea of guilty, whereupon the court found them guilty as charged and sentenced both to reclusion perpetua. On the same day, both prisoners entered prison and began serving their sentence.

On August 18, 1958, the spouses filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, invoking the decisions of this Court in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil., 515; 52 Off. Gaz., (12) 5506; People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz.,(1) 68; and People vs. Togonon, 101 Phil., 804; 54 Off. Gaz., (36) 8237, wherein this Court declared that the acts of violence committed in pursuance of rebellion did not give rise to a complex crime, but only to simple rebellion punishable under Article 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor and a fine of not more than 20,000 pesos. They averred that according to the decisions cited, the Court of First Instance of Manila had no power to sentence them to reclusion perpetua; that in view of their plea of guilty, they could, at most, be sentenced to prision mayor in its minimum degree; that in so far as it exceeded said penalty, the sentence imposed upon them is void; that they had served the minimum of prision mayor, after the deductions for good conduct provided by law; and prayed for their release.

Notwithstanding the vigorous objection of the Solicitor General, in representation of the Director of Prisons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, by decision of August 27, 1958, found that the petitioning prisoners had served 6 years, 2 months and 9 days to date; that crediting them with the corresponding good conduct time allowance and one-half of the preventive imprisonment, starting from their arrest on April 1, 1952 until the day the two began to serve sentence on June 17, 1952,

the Court is of the opinion that petitioners have already served more than the full period of imprisonment which could be lawfully imposed upon them and therefore are entitled to be released.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the release of the petitioners unless there exist any other legal and valid cause for their further detention. Without costs.

From that decision the State attorneys resorted to this Court assigning the following errors:

1. The court a quo erred in not holding itself without jurisdiction to entertain the petition for habeas corpus.

2. The court a quo erred in holding that habeas corpus is a proper remedy in this case.

3. The court a quo erred in finding that the petitioners-appellees have already served their lawful sentence.

4. The court a quo erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus and ordering the release of the appellees.

Upon appellant's petition, we issued a preliminary injunction.

With reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and can not function as a writ of error. Hence, the writ will not lie to correct mere mistakes of fact or of law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions, if the court has jurisdiction over the crime and over the person of the defendant (Talabon vs. Prov. Warden, 78 Phil., 599; Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140; Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; U.S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90; McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U.S. 99; 41 Phil., 971).

In the case at bar, the applicant prisoners do not question the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the various crimes of rebellion, murder, arson, etc., alleged in the information to which they pleaded guilty. Nor do they question that the Court of First Instance could have properly sentenced them for the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson, etc. if such crimes could properly be deemed as constituting one single complex offense. Their precise contention (upheld by the court below) is that since rebellion can not form a complex with common crimes, because the latter are either absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent offenses (as subsequently decided by this court), the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted out to them is excessive and void in so far as it goes beyond the prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000 prescribed by Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

It will be seen that the prisoners' stand assumes that doctrines and rulings of the Supreme Court operate retrospectively, and that they can claim the benefit of our decisions in People vs. Hernandez, People vs. Geronimo, and People vs. Togonon (ante), promulgated four or more years after the prisoner applicants had been convicted by final judgment and started serving sentence. However, the rule adopted by this Court (and by the Federal Supreme Court) is that judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided (People vs. Pinuila, 103 Phil., 992; 55 Off. Gaz., [23] 4228).

The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal, holding that said appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six Justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1962, has long become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined. As already stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 A. L. R. 1025, considered the same question and arrived at the same result. Said the Court:

All of the loose ends presented in this discussion on the effect of altering the law can be pretty well tied together when it is realized that law is not a pure science, that law loses its vital meaning if it is not correlated to the organic society in which it lives, that law is a present and prospective force, that law needs some stability of administration, that the law is all the law there is, that law is more for the parties than for the courts, that people will rely upon and adjust their behavior in accordance with all the law be it legislative or judicial or both.

These considerations should guide the lawmakers and the law appliers in making their determinations in respect of whether a change in the law is to be effective only for the future or also for the past, and if the latter, to what extent.¹ And these considerations should be applicable to both sides of a potential litigation, civil or criminal, so that we may have our rules of the game as we go. The Supreme Court in the Nye case applied its new law to the litigation then before it. Inasmuch as personal liberty was involved and the courts usually apply law this much after the fact, such a result was meritorious. But the Court did not indicate whether its new law was to be applied to cases decided under the old law previous to its decision. That question is now for us, another court.

We believe that appellant is not entitled to discharge upon habeas corpus writ. The District Court had the power to sentence him in a criminal contempt proceeding in 1939. The Nye case of 1941 should not be applied so as to sweep away that power as of 1939. This collateral attack, then, is unavailing. We reject the idea that if a court was considered to have the power in 1939 to do a certain thing under existing statutory construction, and in 1941 that construction is changed so that it no longer has the power to do that thing, it should be concluded that it never had the power in 1939. It has often been said that the living should not be governed by the dead, for the would be to close our eyes to the changing conditions which time imposes. It seems sounder to say that the living should not be governed by their posterity, for that, in turn, would be downright chaotic.

It is thus apparent that it cannot be properly said that the sentence meted out to the applicants Pomeroy was erroneous and beyond the court's jurisdiction. But, assuming that it was error for the Court to consider that the murders and other common crimes charged against the prisoners could be "complexed" with the rebellion and warranted imposition of a penalty beyond prision mayor, there remains the issue whether the mistake was or may be considered jurisdictional. We think not.

In providing for complex crimes, the Revised Penal Code did not set up a category of crimes independent of the component ones, but only for an aggravated form thereof. This rule was impelled by the desire to impose only one penalty for all offenses resulting from one and the same criminal impulse. Whether or not the offenses are so related as to constitute one single punishable violation evidently depends upon the Court's appreciation the facts of the case and the applicable law, and not upon its jurisdiction, since it is not contested that the various component crimes were within the Court's power to try and adjudicate. Granting that the sentencing court's estimate of the facts and its conclusion as to the governing law were erroneous, the mistake did not render it powerless to act upon the premises nor deprive it of authority to impose the penalty that in its view of the case was appropriate. The view it had taken was not such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since at that time the Supreme Court had affirmed convictions for the complex crime of treason with murder and other offenses.² As a matter of fact, the existence of the "complexed" rebellion is still upheld to this day by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court. Hence the error committed was correctible only by seasonable appeal, not by attack on the jurisdiction of the sentencing Court.

While this court has also ruled that an excessive sentence or penalty imposed by final judgment may be corrected by habeas corpus, the cases where such ruling was applied involved penalties that could not be imposed under any circumstances for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted (subsidiary imprisonment for violation of special acts, in Cruz vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil., 269; imprisonment for contempt by refusal to execute a conveyance, instead of having the conveyance executed as provided by sec. 10 of Rule 39, in Caluag vs. Potenciano Pecson, 82 Phil., 8). In the present case, there is no question that the sentence meted out was the one provided by law for the complex crime of which herein applicants were indicted and convicted.

The situation of petitioners Pomeroy is not unique in our judicial annals. A previously adjudicated case, similar in all essential respects, is Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140. There a prisoner, convicted of robbery, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, plus an additional five years for habitual delinquency in view of his four previous convictions for analogous offenses. He contested the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, on the strength of a subsequent doctrine of this Court that all crimes committed prior to the first conviction should be counted as only one for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency; and applied for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking his release after serving the principal term of imprisonment. This Court denied the writ, saying (cas. cit., pp. 143-144):

In the present case the petitioner does not invoke the benefit of article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, giving retroactive effect to penal provisions so far as they are favorable to the accused, provided he is not a habitual criminal, but seeks the review of a sentence which has proved erroneous in view of a subsequent doctrine laid down by this court the error consisting in that, instead of counting the various convictions as one only, due to the proximity and almost simultaneity of the commission of the several crimes of which the petitioner was convicted, the same were considered as separate convictions for the purposes of the law establishing habitual delinquency. This error could have been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an undue exercise of judicial powers which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding. This court has repeatedly held that mere errors of fact or law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions, having jurisdiction over the crime and over defendant, cannot be corrected through the special remedy of habeas corpus (Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; U.S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90; McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U.S., 99; 41 Phil., 971.)

The case of Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons ( 24 Phil., 121 ) may also be cited. There the prisoner applied for habeas corpus and release, on the ground that he was erroneously convicted and sentenced for abduction with consent of a virgin above 18 years of age, when according to a subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court the woman abducted should be leas than 18 years old. This Court again denied the release (cas. cit., pp. 123-124), ruling that the error was not jurisdictional:

We agree with counsel for the petitioners that under the doctrine laid down in the Fideldia case, judgment of conviction was erroneously entered by the trial court and erroneously affirmed by us, if the allegations of the petitioners are true, and if it is a fact that the record in the case in which these petitioners were convicted and sentenced does not disclose that the woman whom they were charged with having abducted was less than 18 years of age at the time when the alleged crime was committed. But such an error, if in fact it was committed, in no wise affected the jurisdiction of the court below to render judgment of conviction and to sentence the petitioners for the crime of which they were convicted. Throughout the entire course of those proceedings in the trial court, that court had jurisdiction of both of the persons of the accused and of the crime with which they were charged, and it did not and could not lose that jurisdiction as a consequence of mistake or error committed by the trial judge in his finding of fact as to the age of the woman, or in his conclusions of law as to the bearing of the woman's age upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused of the crime with which they were charged. (emphasis supplied).

In consonance with the foregoing precedents, we find that the Court of First Instance of Rizal erred in ordering the release of the prisoners William Pomeroy and Celia Mariano. While the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them by final judgment is considerably longer than that imposed by us in subsequent similar cases, the remedy lies in the hands of the Chief Executive and not in the Courts.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the petition for habeas corpus is ordered dismissed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

This petition for habeas corpus was presented in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on the strength of the petitioners' reliance that the decisions of the Supreme Court will be enforced.

The petitioners in the court below, who are now appellees, were sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua after entering a plea of guilty to an information charging them with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies and kidnappings.

We have held in People vs. Hernandez et al., 99 Phil., 515; 52 Off. Gaz., (12) 5506, that rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. We have adhered to and reiterated this ruling in People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., (1) 68; People vs. Togonon, 101 Phil., 804; 54 Off. Gaz., (36) 8237, People vs. Romagosa, 103 Phil., 20; 52 Off. Gaz., [14] 2946 and People vs. Santos, 104 Phil., 551; 56 Off. Gaz., [19] 3546. And the Revised Code penalizes rebellion with prision mayor (Art. 135).

Following the doctrine laid down in the Hernandez case and consistently repeated in our decisions, the maximum penalty to which the appellees could have been sentenced, upon their plea of guilty, was the minimum period of prision mayor which ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.

In Cruz vs. The Director of Prisons, 17 Phil., 269-73, this Court has held that when a sentence imposed punishment in excess of the power of the court, the sentence is void as to such excess and a prisoner confined thereunder is entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus if he has served so much of the sentence that could have been lawfully imposed.

Again, in Caluag vs. Pecson (82 Phil., 8; 46 Off. Gaz., (2) 514, 516) this Court said:

A sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty different from or in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense of which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction, as to the excess in the latter case. And a judgement of imprisonment which the court has no constitutional or statutory power to impose, as in the present case, may also be collaterally attacked for want or rather in excess of jurisdiction.

Considering that at this time, by crediting their good conduct time allowance and one-half of the period of their preventive imprisonment, the appellees have served the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been lawfully imposed upon them, they are entitled to the writ prayed for.

Some members of the Court would prefer to adhere to their dissenting opinion in the rebellion cases above cited to the effect that there exists in our legal system the complex crime of rebellion, notwithstanding the settled doctrine of this Court on the matter which has precipitated a move in the Congress of the Philippines after the promulgation of the Hernandez and Geronimo cases to amend the penal code so as to make the crime of rebellion a capital offense. Other members of the Court believe that the remedy of appellees, if any, would be an application for pardon, thus making the right to liberty of an accused under similar circumstances dependent upon the discretion of the Chief Executive and depriving him of his remedy in courts of justice. From the different opinions of the members of the Court, I regret to dissent and express my vote to give effect to the doctrines enunciated in our decisions which are relied upon by the appellees.

It is unfortunate that the majority cites as authority the case of People vs. Pinuila, et al., 103 Phil., 992; 55 Off. Gaz., [23] 4228, promulgated on May 30, 1958. I would like to point out that when this Court interpreted Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, we simply meant that our interpretation was the law since the Code's enactment. Rooted on this notion, I now quote the dissenting opinion, of Mr. Justice Felix in the Pinuila case, as follows:

I concur in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice and make mine his reasons in support of his contention. I wish, however, to add another reason which, I know, may be more realistic than juridical.

There is no dispute among the member of the Court that the decision We rendered in this case when it was first brought up to Us, was errouneous because by that time, the defendant had already been placed in double jeopardy. Nonetheless, this Tribunal ruled that lower court had jurisdiction over the case and remanded same to the lower Court for further proceedings. Needless to say that when this case was elevated to Us for the second time and despite our previous ruling aforementioned, the defendant had not ceased to be in double jeopardy, and it is may considered opinion that We cannot sanction or approve our said under the theory that it was then the law of the case. Once Aristotle said that he was "amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas", and in paraphrasing this statement that history passed on to us and sanctioned with its approval, I may say that although I am prone to follow the principle of stare decisis and maintain the law of the case, as already stated, yet I am always more determined to uphold the TRUTH and recognize an error that this Court may have previously committed.

Bautista Angelo, J., concurs.

Footnotes

¹ Snyder, Retrospect Operation of Over-ruling Decisions (1940) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 121; Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 230; (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 779; (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 210. Compare 38 ALR 1514 et seq; but see, United States vs. Hill, 3 Cir., 70 F (2d) 1006, certiorari denied 292 US 634, 54 S Ct 719, 78 L ed 1487; Compare Hoiser vs. Aderhold, 5 Cir, 71 F (2d) 422 and Rives vs. O'Hearne, 64 App (DC) 48, 73 F(2d) 984; Ellerbee vs. Aderhold, DCND (Ga) 5 F Supp 1022.

² See People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377; People vs. Albano, 82 Phil., 767; People vs. Vilo, 82 Phil., 524; People vs. Jardinico, 85 Phil., 410.