Showing posts with label 1964. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1964. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

Santos vs. McCullough Printing Company


GRN L-19439  October 31, 1964

MAURO MALANG SANTOS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MC- CULLOUGH PRINTING COMPANY, defendant and appellee.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Alvendia, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellant. 
Esposo & Usison for appellee.

PAREDES, J.:
This is an action for damages based on the provisions of Articles 721 and 722 of the Civil Code of the Philip.? pines, allegedly on the unauthorized use, adoption and appropriation by the defendant company of plaintiff's in tellectual creation or artistic design for a Christmas card. The design depicts "a Philippine rural Christmas time scene consisting of a woman and a child in nipa hut adorned with a star shaped lantern and a man astride a carabao beside a tree, underneath which appears the plaintiff's pen name, Malang".

The complaint alleges that plaintiff Mauro Malang Santos, designed for former Ambassador Felino Neri, for his personal Christmas card greetings for the year 1959, the artistic motif in question. The following year the defendant McCullough Printing Company, without the knowledge and authority of plaintiff, displayed the very design in its album of Christmas card and offered it for sale, for a price. For such unauthorized act of defendant, plaintiff suffered moral damages to the tune of P16,000.00, because it has placed plaintiff's professional integrity and ethics under serious question and caused him grave embarrassment before Ambassador Neri. He further prayed for the additional sum of P3,000.00 by way of attorney's fee.

Defendant in answer to the complaint, after some denials and admissions, moved for a dismissal of the action, claiming that 
(1) The design claimed does not contain a clear notice that it belonged to him and that he prohibited its use by others;
(2) The design in question has been published but does not contain a notice of copyright, as in fact it had never been copyrighted by the plaintiff, for which reason this action is barred by the Copyright Law;
(3) The complaint does not state a cause of action.

The documentary evidence submitted were the Christmas cards, as originally designed by plaintiff, the design as printed for Ambassador Neri, and the subsequent reprints ordered by other parties. The case was submitted on a "Stipulation of Facts", the pertinent portions of which are hereunder reproduced:
"1. That the plaintiff was the artist who created the design shown in Exhibit A,  * * * 
2. That the design carries the pen name of plaintiff, MALANG, on its face * * * and indicated in Exhibit A, * * *
3. That said design was created by plaintiff in the latter part of 1959 for the personal use of former Ambassador Felino Neri; * * *
4. That former Ambassador Neri had 800 such cards * * * printed by the defendant company in 1959, * * * which he distributed to his friends in December, 1959;
5. That defendant company utilized plaintiffs design the year 1960 in its album of Christmas card samples displayed to its customers * * *.
6. That the Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. placed an order with defendant company for 700 of said cards * * * while Raul Urra & Co. ordered 200 * * *, which cards were sent out by them to their respective correspondents, clients and friends during the Christmas season of 1960;
7. That defendant company's use of plaintiff's design was without knowledge, authority or consent of plaintiff;
8. That said design has not yet been copyrighted;
9. That plaintiff is an artist of established name, goodwill and reputation.

Upon the basis of the facts stipulated, the lower court rendered judgment on December 1, 1961, the pertinent portions of which are recited below:

"As a general proposition, there can be no dispute that the artist, acquires ownership of the product of his art. At the time of its creation, he has the absolute dominion over it. To help the author protect his rights the copyright law was enacted.

"In intellectual creation, a distinction must be made between two classes of property rights: the fact of authorship and the right to publish and/or distribute copies of the creation. With regards to the first, i.e., the fact of authorship, the artist cannot be divested of the same. In other words, he may sell the right to print hundred of his work yet the purchaser of said right can never be the author of the creation.

"It is the second right, i.e., the right to publish, republish, multiply and/or distribute copies of the intellectual creation which the state, through the enactment of the copyright law, seeks to protect. The author or his assigns or heirs may have the work copyrighted and once this is legally accomplished any infringement of the copyright will render the infringer liable to the owner of the copyright.

"The plaintiff in this case did not choose to protect his intellectual creation by a copyright. The fact that the design was used in the Christmas card of Ambassador Neri who distributed eight hundred copies thereof among his friends during the Christmas season of 1959, shows that the same was published.

"Unless satisfactorily explained a delay in applying for a copyright, of more than thirty clays from the date of its publication converts the property to one of public domain.

"Since the name of the author appears in each of the alleged infringing copies of the intellectual creation, the defendant may not be said to have pirated the work nor guilty of plagiarism. Consequently, the complaint does not state a cause of action against the defendant.

WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the complaint without pronouncement as to costs."
In his appeal to this Court, plaintiff-appellant pointed live (5) errors allegedly committed by the trial court, all of which bring to the fore, the following propositions, (1) whether plaintiff is entitled to protection, notwithstanding the fact that he has not copyrighted his design; (2) whether the publication is limited, so as to prohibit its use of by others, or it is general publication, and (3) whether the provisions of the Civil Code or the Copyright Law should apply in the case. We will undertake a collective discussion of these propositions.

Under the established facts, We find that plaintiff is not entitled to a protection, the provision of the Civil Code, notwithstanding. Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative Order No. 3 (as amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled "Rules of Practice in the Philippines Patent Office relating to the Registration of Copyright Claims", promulgated pursuant to Republic Act 165, provides, among others, that an intellectual creation should be copyrighted thirty (30) days after its publication, if made in Manila, or within sixty (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which renders such creation public property. In the case at bar, even as of this moment, there is no copyright for the design in question. We are not also prepared to accept the contention of appellant that the publication of the design was a limited one, or that there was an understanding that only Ambassador Neri should have absolute right to use the same, In the first place if such were the condition, then Ambassador Neri would be the aggrieved party, and not the appellant. In the second place, if there was such a limited publication or prohibition, the same was not shown on the face of the design. When the purpose is a limited publication, but the effect is general publication, irrevocable rights thereupon become vested in the public, in consequence of which enforcement of the restriction becomes impossible (Nutt vs. National Institute, 31 F [2d] 236). It has been held that the effect of offering for sale a dress, for example, manufactured in accordance with an original design which is not protected by either a copyright or a patent, is to divest the owner of his common law rights therein by virtue of the publication of a 'copy' and thereafter anyone is free to copy the design or the dress (Fashion Originators Guild of America vs. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F [2d] 80). When Ambassador Neri distributed 800 copies of the design in controversy, the plaintiff lost control of his design and the necessary implication was that there had been a general publication, there having been no showing of a clear indication that a limited publication was intended. The author of a literary composition has a right to the first publication thereof. He has a right to determine whether it shall be published at all, and if published, when, where, by whom, and in what form. The exclusive right it confined to the first publication. When once published, it is dedicated to the public, and the author loses the exclusive right to control subsequent publication by others, unless the work is placed under the protection of the copy right law, (See II Tolentino's Comments on the Civil Code, p. 433, citing Wright vs. Eisle, 83 N.Y. Supp. 887.)

Conformably with all the foregoing, We find that the errors assigned have not been committed by the lower court. The decision appealed from, therefore, should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs taxed against plaintiff-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. P. L. 
Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Gillera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-20741, January 31, 1964

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20741 January 31, 1964

SOCORRO A. GILLERA, petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON FERNANDEZ and ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Executive officer the Board of Examiners, respondents.

Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

The following are the undisputed facts of the case:

On December 26, 1961, Socorro A. Gillera was extended an ad interim appointment as Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners by then President Carlos P. Garcia, for a fix term of three years to fill the position being vacated by Board Examiner Dr. Federico Cruz, whose term was expiring December 28, 1961. Gillera accepted the appointment, took the oath of office on December 28, 1961, assumed and discharged the functions appertaining thereto — preparing the questions on the subjects assigned to her for the examinations which actually were given on January 2, 3, 4, and 7, 1962. In the meantime or under date of December 31, 1961, she received a communication from the Executive Secretary informing her of the "withdrawal" or recall of her ad interim appointment in view of the President's Administrative Order No. 2.

On January 11, 1962, the President designated Gillera as Acting Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners, effective January 2, 1962, "to continue only until after the results of the Pharmaceutical examinations now being given by the Board has been approved by this Office and released." It was therein stated that said designation was made "as a matter of emergency in order not to disrupt public service and not to prejudice the candidates in the current pharmacist examination." Allegedly in view of the fact that the session of Congress terminated without the examination results having been released, the President issued to Gillera another designation on May 18, 1962, also until the results of the examination were approved and released. On the other hand, her ad interim appointment of December 28, 1961 was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 9, 1962.

The results of the pharmaceutical examinations were released on June 14, 1962. In the succeeding examinations, which were given in July, 1962, Gillera again took part as Member of the Board. On December 29, 1962, Corazon C. Fernandez was appointed to the position vacated by Dr. Cruz which at the time, was already occupied by petitioner. Alleging that the designation of Fernandez to the position occupied by her and to which she had qualified was null and void, Socorro Gillera filed the instant petition for quo warranto and prohibition against said appointee and the Civil Service Commissioner, as Executive Officer of the Board of Examiners.

In the answer filed by the Solicitor General for the respondents, it was contended, among others, that the valid discharge by petitioner Gillera of the functions of Member of the Pharmaceutical Board in connection with the January 1962 examinations was not due to the ad interim appointment extended to her on December 26, 1961, because that was withdrawn and recalled pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2 of the President, but by virtue of the two presidential designations on January 11 and May 18, 1962, which terminated upon the release of the examination results on June 14, 1962; that her participation in the July, 1962 examinations was effected upon the verbal permission and on the belief of the former Executive Secretary of the Board of Examiners. Amado del Rosario, that in the absence of a successor, petitioner could continue discharging the office of examiner under the "hold-over" doctrine; that "the designation of respondent Fernandez to the position of Dr. Cruz which petitioner (Gillera) was occupying by virtue of her designation" indicated that the latter's right to the same position had already ceased.

The only issue to be determined here is whether petitioner's ad interim appointment of December 28, 1961 was validly recalled or withdrawn by the President's Administrative Order No. 2, in the light of the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of Aytona v. Castillo.1

There is no question that petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment on December 26, 1961 (although to take effect December 28, 1961) or after December 13, 1961, and apparently is covered by Administrative Order No. 2, which, according to respondents, was declared valid by this court in the Aytona case. It must be remembered, however, that in our resolution of March 30, 1962 clarifying the ruling enunciated in the aforementioned case, we said:

... the resolution of the majority in this case has not specifically declared the "midnight" appointments to be void. The resolution in substance held that the Court had doubts about their validity, and having due regard to the separation of powers and the surrounding circumstances, it declined to overthrow the executive order of cancellation and to grant relief.1äwphï1.ñët

In other words, this Court not only did not categorically declare Administrative Order No. 2 valid and all appointments made by then outgoing President Garcia, ineffective, but clearly indicated that its decision was more influenced by the doubtful character of the appointments themselves and not by the contention that the President had validly recalled them. As a matter of fact, in the decision in that Aytona case it was stated that, "the filling up of vacancies (by the outgoing President) in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted." It is for the foregoing basic consideration, i.e., the necessity of filling the position, that the appointee is qualified, and that it was not one of those "mass ad interim appointments" issued in a single night, that this Court upheld the validity of an appointment to the position of Auxiliary Justice of the Peace,2 extended by President Garcia and released on December 20, 1961, notwithstanding Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal.

In the instant case, even the new President recognized the need for the immediate filling of the position of Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners, in view of the examinations that were given on January 2, 3, 4, and 7, 1962, that he (the President) saw it fit, "as a matter of emergency in order not to disrupt public service" to "designate" petitioner herself to the same position to which she was previously appointed and had qualified. There is also no allegation that petitioner is not qualified to the said office, or that her appointment was one of those attended by the "mad scramble in Malacañan" in the evening of December 29, 1961. On the contrary, it is not controverted by respondents that petitioner's appointment was extended on December 26, 1961 or even before the actual expiry of the term of Examiner Cruz, which was a few days before the examinations would take place, although said appointment was to take effect only on December 28, 1961, and in fact petitioner took her oath of office only on the latter date. Clearly, it cannot be said that in the instant case, petitioner's appointment was not the result of the President's deliberate action, considering her qualification and the exigency of the service.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's appointment which was duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, is hereby declared valid and she is entitled to the position of Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners. Respondent Corazon C. Fernandez is directed to vacate the position and deliver the same to petitioner. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

For the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in the case of Aytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313, 19 January 1962, to which I make reference and which I re-incorporate and reiterate to avoid repetition, the ad interim appointment of the petitioner Socorro A. Gillera on 26 December 1961 by the then President of the Republic to fill the position of Dr. Federico Cruz, as member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners, whose term was to expire on 28 December 1961, and the assumption of office to which she had been appointed and the performance of the duties thereof by her on and from the last mentioned date, lapsed, ended or expired on 30 December 1961. As she was not appointed ad interim after the 30th day of December 1961 but performed the duties of the office in acting capacity only, which it must be presumed, she had accepted by performing the duties of the office, the confirmation of her appointment by the Commission on Appointments on 9 May 1962 was no validity and effect, as she had no ad interim appointment that was to be or could be confirmed. The ad interim appointment of the petitioner having expired on 30 December 1961 and the confirmation of her lapsed or non-extant ad interim appointment being of no validity and effect, she is not entitled to the position or office to which the respondent Corazon C. Fernandez has been lawfully appointed. The petition for a writ of quo warranto should be dismissed.

Footnotes

1G. R. No. L-19313, promulgated January 19, 1962.

2Merrera v. Liwag, G. R. No. L-20079, promulgated September 30, 1963.